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ABSTRACT
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) continue to grow as one of the most exciting and challenging
research areas of engineering. They are characterized by severely constrained computational and
energy resources and also restricted by the ad-hoc network operational environment. They pose
unique challenges, due to limited power supplies, low transmission bandwidth, small memory sizes
and limited energy. Therefore, security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be directly
adopted. So, new ideas and approaches are needed, in order to increase the overall security of the
network. Security applications in such resource constrained WSNs with minimum overhead provides
signicant challenges, and is the main focus of this dissertation.
There is no \one size ts all" solution in defending WSNs against intrusions and attacks. There-
fore, intrusions and attacks against WSNs should be carefully examined to reveal specic vulnera-
bilities associated with them, before beginning the design of any kind of intrusion prevention and
detection systems. By following this rationale, the dissertation starts with providing information
regarding the WSNs, types of attacks towards WSNs, and the methods on how to prevent and detect
them. Then, in order to secure WSNs, a security provisioning plan is provided.
In general, the following processes may be involved in securing WSNs: Intrusion Prevention,
Intrusion Detection, and Intrusion Mitigation. This dissertation presents solutions (algorithms and
schemes) to the rst two lines of defenses of the security provisioning plan, namely, Intrusion Pre-
vention and Intrusion Detection.
As a rst line of defense in securing WSNs, this dissertation presents our proposed algorithm
(\Two-Level User Authentication" scheme) as an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) for WSNs.
The algorithm uses two-level authentication between a sensor node and a user. It is designed for
heterogeneous WSNs, meaning that the network consists of two components: regular nodes and
more powerful cluster heads. The proposed scheme is evaluated both analytically and also in a
simulation environment, by comparing it to the current state-of-the-art schemes in the literature.
x
A comprehensive and systematic survey of the state-of-the-art in Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) that are proposed for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) and WSNs is presented. Firstly,
detailed information about IDSs is provided. This is followed by the analysis and comparison of
each scheme along with their advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of security. Finally,
guidelines on IDSs that are potentially applicable to WSNs are provided. Overall, this work would
be very helpful to the researchers in developing their own IDSs for their WSNs.
Clustering (of the nodes) is very important for WSNs not only in data aggregation, but also in
increasing the overall performance of the network, especially in terms of total life-time. Besides, with
the help of clustering, complex intrusion prevention and detection algorithms can be implemented.
Therefore, background on the clustering algorithms is provided and then a clustering algorithm for
WSNs is proposed, that is both power and connectivity aware. The proposed algorithm provides
higher energy eciency and increases the life-time of the network. In evaluating the proposed
clustering algorithm (in a simulation environment by comparing its' performance to the previously
proposed algorithm, namely Kachirski et al.'s algorithm), it is demonstrated that the proposed
algorithm improves energy eciency in WSNs.
Finally, an IDS framework based on multi-level clustering for hierarchical WSNs is proposed. It
is based upon (the nodes use our proposed clustering algorithm while forming their clusters) the
clustering algorithm that is proposed in this dissertation. The framework provides two types of
intrusion detection approaches, namely \Downwards-IDS (D-IDS)" to detect the abnormal behavior
(intrusion) of the subordinate (member) nodes and \Upwards-IDS (U-IDS)" to detect the abnormal
behavior of the cluster heads. By using analytical calculations, the optimum parameters for the D-
IDS (number of maximum hops) and U-IDS (monitoring group size) of the framework are evaluated
and presented.
Overall, this dissertation research contributes to the rst two lines of defenses towards the security
of WSNs, namely, IPS and IDS. Furthermore, the nal contribution of this dissertation is towards
the topology formation of the WSNs (especially for the hierarchical WSNs), namely, clustering;
which would be very useful in implementation of the IPS and IDS systems that are presented in this
dissertation.
xi
CHAPTER 1 :
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Wireless communications is inevitable in today's technology owing to the advantages it brings,
such as mobility, portability, freedom from wired infrastructure, etc. Despite the benets, it intro-
duces opportunities to adversaries for eavesdropping of the data being transmitted, and also makes
active intrusions easier (through the wireless medium). In order to prevent unauthorized access
to the network, the design of secure communication protocols are needed, which will provide both
privacy of the wireless data communications and authenticity of communicating parties.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) continue to grow as one of the most exciting and challenging
research areas of engineering. There are many applications of WSNs which are intended to monitor
physical and environmental phenomena such as ocean and wildlife, earthquakes, pollution, wild res
and water quality. WSNs can also be used to gather information regarding human activities such
as health care, manufacturing machinery performance, building safety, military surveillance and
reconnaissance, highway trac, etc.
WSNs are characterized by severely constrained computational and energy resources, and an ad
hoc operational environment. They possess unique characteristics such as limited power supplies, low
transmission bandwidth, small memory size and limited energy; therefore security techniques used in
traditional networks cannot be adopted directly. Security applications (e.g. intrusion prevention and
intrusion detection) in such resource constrained WSNs with minimum overhead reveals signicant
challenges, and is the main focus of this dissertation.
As mentioned earlier, WSNs are one of the most promising technologies that have applications
ranging from health care to tactical military. Although WSNs have appealing features (e.g. low
installation cost, unattended network operation, etc.), due to the lack of a physical line of defense
(i.e., there are no gateways or switches to monitor the information ow) and also due to the physical
constraints, the security of such networks is a big concern. This is valid for the applications especially
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where condentiality has prime importance. For instance, securing WSNs is critically important in
tactical (military) applications where a security gap in the network would cause casualties of the
friendly forces in a battleeld.
Stuxnet virus, which was targeted at the Iranian nuclear power plants, has shown that the
network security is not a hoax, but a reality [1]. A 500KB worm has shut down a number of
facilities (14 industrial sites) and severely damaged targeted power plants resulting in up to 2 years
of delay to the uranium-enrichment plan. One of the intriguing facts of the Stuxnet is that it was
able to penetrate closed networks (intranet), although the targeted facilities did not have direct
access to the internet. This is a very important example from real life that shows us the importance
of preventing and also detecting intrusions in any kind of network (closed or open) on time.
In order to operate WSNs in a secure way, if possible, intrusions should be prevented with
intrusion prevention techniques. Otherwise, they should be detected on time with intrusion detection
techniques, before attackers can harm the network resources (i.e., sensor nodes) and/or information
destination (i.e., data sink or base station).
1.2 Research Motivation and Goals
WSNs are characterized by severely constrained computational and energy resources, and also
restricted by the ad-hoc network operational environment. Although there are plenty of applications
for the WSNs, in most cases they are deployed in hostile environments where physical security does
not exist and they are operated in an un-attended way.
Keeping these constraints of the WSNs in mind, it is obvious to conclude that traditional security
solutions of wired/wireless networks would not be feasible for WSNs. Any security solution to
be devised for WSNs needs to consider these limitations and constraints of WSNs. These facts
encouraged us to address security challenges in our dissertation as one of the main concerns.
Intrusion prevention is the rst line of defense in any security system. Therefore, any security
plan being developed for WSNs should start with an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) that is
suitable (designed by taking into account of all the constraints and challenges of WSNs). Current
IPSs available in the literature, SPINS [2], TinySec [3] and LEAP [4], provide only one-hop \node
authentication", opting out the end-to-end secure communication (i.e., between the user and the
sensor node). This is a very big security drawback, since the integrity of the data being transmitted
cannot be guaranteed. Other proposed schemes provide end-to-end secure communication with
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either Secret Key Cryptography (SKC) [5{7]; or with Public Key Cryptography (PKC) [8]. SKC
based schemes are not scalable for thousands of sensor nodes and users, and need signicant memory
to store authentication codes. Thus, addition of new nodes and users is troublesome in terms of
key distribution. On the contrary, PKC based scheme is not practical for WSNs because of the
homogenous network structure it possess, meaning that all the power and processing demanding
PKC operations are supposed to be handled on the normal sensor nodes. As a result, authentication
operations take minutes and batteries of the sensor nodes deplete faster. Therefore, one of the main
goals of this dissertation is to propose an IPS that provides a unique solution (by using PKC and
SKC in an intelligent way) to prevent intrusions in WSNs by opting out all the design drawbacks
mentioned above.
When an intruder manages to pass the rst line of defense (namely IPS) in a network, it should
be detected by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS); in order to take further action to diminish
the damages that could be carried out by the intruder. Hence, IDS should constitute the second
line of defense in securing the WSNs. Here, it is important to emphasize that our focus (of IDS)
is on the hierarchical WSNs, meaning that sensor nodes are gathered into groups called \Clusters".
The current IDSs for hierarchical WSNs available in the literature have drawbacks: In the IDS
approaches proposed by [9], [10] and [11], the direction of the alert propagation is from sub-ordinates
through CHs, leaving the following question unanswered for the detection part: \What happens if
a malicious CH drops the packet that is coming from a subordinate node and is about to alert an
upper level CH?". In the IDS approaches proposed by Agah et al. [12, 13], only one of the clusters
of the network is monitored at a time. This leaves the rest of the network unprotected. In the
IDS approach of Su et al. [14], both downwards and upwards protection are provided, meaning that
CH's monitor subordinate nodes and vice versa, respectively. However, the proposed scheme uses
SKC and therefore new nodes cannot be added to the network after the deployment, which makes
it impractical. Therefore, another main goal of this dissertation is to propose an IDS framework for
hierarchical WSNs that provides a unique solution to detect intrusions in WSNs by opting out all
the design drawbacks mentioned above.
Hierarchical WSNs usually use \Clustering" for the formation of their architecture. With the
help of clustering, complex intrusion prevention and detection algorithms can be implemented. Fur-
thermore, clustering is very important for WSNs not only in data aggregation, but also in increasing
the overall performance of the network, especially in terms of total life-time. Clustering algorithms
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for WSNs should be devised considering the special needs of WSNs; most importantly they should
be very stingy in power consumption. Additionally, since cluster heads are assigned with high power
consuming tasks, clustering algorithm should take into account the power levels of each candidate.
Finally, elected cluster heads should be somewhere close to the main communication hubs, thus clus-
tering algorithm should also consider the connectivities of the candidates. The proposed clustering
algorithms in the literature either do not consider power awareness [15, 16], connectivity aware-
ness [17{21], or both [9, 22, 23]. Therefore, another goal of this dissertation is to design a Clustering
Algorithm that will be aware of both the power and the connectivity of the candidate nodes.
1.3 Contributions of this Dissertation
In providing \Security Provisioning" for WSNs, our main contributions in the dierent areas can
be summarized as follows:
1. Intrusion Prevention: For Intrusion Prevention in WSNs, we have developed a Two Level
User Authentication scheme. Our scheme is designed for heterogeneous WSNs, where
the network consists of two dierent types of elements, namely cluster heads and sen-
sor nodes. Our analysis and simulation results show that our scheme is not only more
secure and scalable than existing secret key cryptography based schemes [5{7], but also
requires less processing power and provides higher energy eciency than existing public
key cryptography based schemes [8].
2. Intrusion Detection: For Intrusion Detection in WSNs, we have developed a framework
to detect intrusions in WSNs. Our framework is an IDS based on multi-level clustering
for hierarchical WSNs. The framework consists of two parts: 1)Downwards-IDS (D-IDS)
and 2) Upwards-IDS (U-IDS). D-IDS detects intrusions through subordinate members,
whereas U-IDS detects intrusions through cluster heads. By using analytical calculations,
the optimum parameters (number of maximum hops for D-IDS and monitoring group size
for the U-IDS) of our proposed framework are evaluated.
3. Clustering: We have devised a power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm that
increases energy eciency, and therefore increases the overall life-time of the WSNs. Ac-
cording to the simulation results, our proposed algorithm is energy ecient and also pro-
vides longer life-time to the network (in the worst-case scenario, up to 85% for a 15-node
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network with 1-hop connectivity), compared to the previous algorithm (namely, Kachirski
et al.'s algorithm [15]).
1.4 Organization of this Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation is as follows:
In Chapter 21, a detailed background on WSNs is provided. Chapter 2 starts with the description
of wireless ad-hoc networks (mobile ad-hoc networks - MANETs), and then provides the character-
istics of WSNs and nally emphasizes the distinctions between WSNs and MANETs. Afterwards,
the application areas of the WSNs are mentioned. Finally, the security issues for WSNs, such as
the attacks against WSN security are discussed. Without knowledge of attacks, neither can security
measures be devised to protect WSNs, nor can models be developed to detect intrusions towards
the WSNs. Therefore, more information on attacks and security measures to counter those attacks
are provided. One of the main counter measures against attacks is Cryptography. Some background
of cryptography and its application to WSNs are provided. Following that, some open problems in
WSN security are mentioned. Finally, the authors' point of view regarding the provisioning of the
security towards WSNs is presented.
In Chapter 32, a detailed description of the proposed Two Level User Authentication scheme for
heterogeneous WSNs is provided. It is an IPS that was devised to prevent intrusions against WSNs.
The proposed user authentication scheme is secure and scalable. In addition, it employs both public
and secret key cryptography schemes, by taking advantage of the strengths of both schemes. In
order to evaluate security and performance analysis of the proposed scheme, it is compared to the
current state-of-the-art schemes in the literature, both analytically and with simulations.
In Chapter 43, a thorough literature survey of the state-of-the-art IDSs that are proposed for
WSNs is provided. Firstly, detailed information about IDSs is provided. Secondly, a brief survey
of IDSs proposed for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) is presented and applicability of those
systems to WSNs is discussed. Thirdly, IDSs proposed for WSNs are presented. This is followed by
the analysis and comparison of each scheme along with their advantages and disadvantages. Finally,
guidelines on IDSs that are potentially applicable to WSNs are provided. The chapter concludes by
highlighting open research issues in the eld.
1The content of this chapter is published in parts in [24, 25].
2The content of this chapter is published in parts in [26{28].
3The content of this chapter is published in parts in [29].
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In Chapter 54, clustering algorithms that are proposed for WSNs are investigated. Then, a
clustering algorithm for WSNs, that is both power and connectivity aware is proposed. The proposed
algorithm provides higher energy eciency and increases the life-time of the network. The proposed
clustering algorithm is evaluated in a simulation environment and its' performance to a previously
proposed algorithm (namely Kachirski et al.'s algorithm) is compared.
Chapter 65 presents our proposed IDS framework for hierarchical WSNs that is based on multi-
level clustering. It is based upon the clustering algorithm that is proposed in this dissertation
(the nodes use our proposed clustering algorithm that is presented in Chapter 5, while forming their
clusters). Our proposed IDS framework provides two types of intrusion detection approaches, namely
\Downwards-IDS (D-IDS) Scheme" to detect the abnormal behavior (intrusion) of the subordinate
(member) nodes and \Upwards-IDS Scheme" to detect the abnormal behavior of the cluster heads.
Furthermore, the eect of cluster size (maximum hops between cluster head and cluster members) on
the detection (malicious subordinate nodes) probability of the proposed D-IDS scheme is evaluated.
Finally, the eect of total number of monitoring nodes on the detection (malicious cluster head)
probability of the proposed U-IDS scheme is evaluated.
In Chapter 7, contributions from Chapters 2-6 are summarized and then recommendations for
future work are presented.
4The content of this chapter is published in parts in [30].
5The content of this chapter is published in parts in [31].
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CHAPTER 2 :
SECURITY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Wireless ad hoc network (or Mobile ad hoc network - MANET1) is composed of a network of
wireless devices that have no a priori infrastructure support (there is no specically assigned routers
or gateways exists). These devices in this context are called \nodes". Nodes dynamically establish
connections when they are in radio range of one another and thus this is called communication \on
the y". Nodes that are out of the range of each other rely on the intermediate nodes to forward
their packets. Therefore, each node may act as source, sink or a relay for packets depending on the
position [32].
MANETs are multi-hop networks in which all nodes work cooperatively to maintain network
connectivity. They are useful in situations where temporary network connectivity is needed such
as natural disaster area. Such a network would allow medical personnel to retrieve patient records
from hospital databases assuming that the network managing station (base station) of the network
has connection to those databases via internet or some other ways. In the same manner insurance
company agents can get and submit queries from their databases in order to le claims regarding to
the damages of their customer goods.
Recent developments in wireless communications and micro electro mechanical systems (MEMS)
technologies facilitated the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), in which sensor nodes collect
the intelligible data from their surrounding environments and share them in a wireless fashion to
send the information towards a meaningful data sink. WSNs are special application of MANETs,
in which they have limitations on energy, computational power, memory storage, mobility, etc.
According to scientic predictions, the total number of wireless sensors deployed is expected
to reach 60 trillion in years 2012-2022, meaning 10,000 sensors for every person on the world [33].
Therefore, all the problems and challenges concerning WSNs will expose plentiful topics for academia
as well as the commercial researchers.
1In general, the terms of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) and wireless ad-hoc networks are used inter-
changeably; therefore from now on, we will use MANET to refer both of them throughout the dissertation.
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Nodes in the WSN have limited power supplies. Therefore WSNs require energy-ecient proto-
cols and applications that would maximize the total lifetime of the WSN. Besides, nodes are prone
to the failures, which would change the topology of the WSN unpredictably.
In a WSN, communications among the nodes are not continuous. This is because of the fact
that WSN provides data to the users either on demand or upon event detection. While not in the
communication phase, nodes either switch to \idle" phase or \hibernate" phase and they turn o
their radios. In fact, this helps nodes to save energy and increases the total lifetime of the WSN.
WSNs may be subjected to dierent kinds of attacks (intrusions) against their availability (Denial
of Service - DoS attacks) and against the integrity, authenticity and condentiality of the information
that is transmitted, processed and stored on the nodes. Besides, in some applications (e.g. military),
WSNs are deployed in hostile environments and are operated unattended way, increasing the risk of
being captured and compromised. These necessitate the security to be considered as one of the key
design criterion for WSNs.
2.1 Characteristic of Wireless Sensor Networks
Comparison of WSNs vs. MANETs: Basic dierences between WSNs and MANETs are [34]:
 The number of sensor nodes in a WSN can be several orders of magnitude higher than
the nodes in a MANET.
 Sensor nodes are densely deployed, and are stationary in most of the scenarios. Whereas in
MANETs, nodes are most likely mobile and because of that they are not densely deployed.
 Sensor nodes are prone to failures due to harsh environments and energy constraints.
 The topology of a sensor network changes frequently due to the failures, but not as rapid
as in the case of MANETs where the nodes are moving.
 Sensor nodes are limited in computation, memory, and power resources; compared to the
powerful nodes of MANETs which are typically laptop or a PDA.
 Sensor nodes may not have a global identication, on the contrary, MANET nodes gen-
erally deployed with an IP address.
 WSNs are widely used in environmental and building monitoring in which sensor nodes
retrieve information on an event and pass this information to the base station; whereas
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MANETs are used in disaster relief operations and tactical operations in which multiple
kinds of radio carrying devices (aircraft borne, sea craft borne, ground craft borne, ground
personnel borne, etc.) communicate with each other.
These dierences (especially constraints on WSNs) greatly aect the implementation of secure
data transmission in WSNs. As an example, low powered radio transmission of sensor nodes makes
the communication channel susceptible to DoS attacks. Contrary to MANETs, advanced anti-
jamming techniques (such as frequency-hopping spread spectrum communication) and physical tam-
per proong of nodes are quite impossible in a WSN due to the requirements of a greater design
complexity and higher energy consumption.
Features of WSNs: WSN is a distributed system, which does not have any infrastructure support
(no gateways or routers). WSN consists of low cost, small sized nodes which are mostly stationary.
Nodes in a WSN are generally deployed in large-scale, so that they need the ability to self-organize
for the sake of wireless communications in a multi-hop way. Nodes need to operate autonomously
with a limited amount of resources, requiring power ecient communication strategies (i.e., sleep,
hibernate, awake cycles).
Network Topology of WSNs: In general, Hierarchical Topology is used for WSNs in which the
network is divided into clusters. Key points of hierarchical topology are;
 Each cluster consists of two types of nodes: cluster heads (CHs) and subordinate (member)
nodes.
 In most of the cases, varying levels of computational power within WSN; CHs have more
computational power.
 Sensors do not communicate each other directly, the CHs are the gateways in doing so.
 Data ows from sensor nodes to the CHs.
Hardware specications of WSNs:
 ARM-7 microprocessor is widely used in today's WSN nodes, which is working in the
milli-watt range.
 XBee and XBee-PRO IEEE 802.15.4 OEM RF modules are embedded solutions providing
wireless end-point connectivity to devices. These modules use the IEEE 802.15.4 network-
ing protocol for fast point-to-multipoint or peer-to-peer networking. They are designed
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for high-throughput applications requiring low latency and predictable communication
timing.
 ZigBit is a low-power, high-sensitivity 802.15.4/ZigBee module. ZigBit is based on the
industry leading Atmel Z-link hardware platform. The powerful ATmega 1281v MCU
features 128KB of ash memory and 8KB of RAM. The transceiver boasts -101dBm of
Rx sensitivity and up to +3dBm of Tx power. A link budget of 104dB gives the ZigBit
a much longer range than competitive modules with lower link budgets. ZigBit packs
impressive functionality into less than a square inch of space and oers superior radio
performance with exceptional ease of integration. The ZigBit module eliminates the need
for costly and time-consuming RF development, and shortens time to market for a wide
range of wireless applications.
 Libelium Wasp motes [35] use ZigBit technology for telecommunications.
 Memsic MicaZ motes [36] use IEEE 802.15 technology for telecommunications.
Constraints and Challenges of WSNs: Increasing deployment of WSN for dierent applications is
due to its inherent advantageous characteristics: such as, self-conguration, multi-hop behavior, no
single point of failure, autonomous behavior, infrastructure-less operation, ease of deployment, and
low cost. However, the benets and exibility of WSNs inevitably introduce many design challenges
and constraints.
Main constraints of WSNs inherent from their design are;
 Limited bandwidth of wireless links lead to lower QoS compared to wired links.
 Limited battery power (typically 2AA sized batteries).
 Limited bandwidth (low throughput).
 Limited memory.
Main challenges in designing algorithms (i.e., telecommunications, networking and security) for
WSNs;
 Dynamic topology due to nodes' mobility leads to packet losses, network partition, and
network instability due to frequent route disconnections.
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 Broadcast nature of wireless link leads to unavoidable interference and thus causes packet
errors.
 Heterogeneous nodes with dierent capabilities (e.g., air interfaces) create further chal-
lenges.
 Network connectivity depends on transmission power, nodes density, and dynamic topol-
ogy.
 Network reliability and robustness depends on autonomous nodes' behavior, node density,
network load, topology changes, and link disconnections.
 Network security is critical since wireless links are prone to eavesdropping.
 Network scalability presents a daunting challenge for QoS delivery (for example, through-
put or delay guarantees, etc.), network management, and security.
 By its nature, WSNs communicate through open air. Therefore it is vulnerable to various
kinds of attacks such as eavesdrop-ping, Denial of Service (DoS), man in the middle, etc.
 The sensor hardware is not reliable, not tamper proof and operates in an unattended
environment, which makes it an open target for node capture attacks (physical attack).
 Secure deployment of new nodes to an existing WSN without the need of renewal of the
keys throughout the old nodes is problematic.
 Revocation of misbehaving nodes from WSN is also a problem to be solved.
 Sensor nodes are battery powered devices, so energy consumption is very important. Since
wireless communication spends much more energy than computing; in order to extend
the lifetime of the WSN, any algorithm including communication of the nodes has to be
optimized.
 Providing security with minimum load to the sensor nodes is the main challenge.
2.2 Applications of Wireless Sensor Networks
The main objective of any WSN application is to provide solution to challenging real world
problems, such as detection and tracking the movement of troops on a battle eld, monitoring
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environmental pollutants, measuring trac ow on the roads, and tracking the location of the
patients in a hospital.
Military: Some of the potential military applications are; homeland security, target tracking and
reconnaissance.
Civil: Some of the potential civil applications are; industrial sensing (and automation moni-
toring), habitat and other environmental monitoring, scientic data collection, building monitoring,
object tracking, intrusion detection (burglar alarms), emergency response and disaster recovery, haz-
ard and structural monitoring, trac control, inventory management in factory environment and
health care (medical).
Commercial: Some of the potential commercial applications are; smart home monitoring (pa-
tient or elder people monitoring - proximity control), smart grid and remote home management
(power switches, lights, door locks, air conditioner, etc.). Especially, remote home management
would be very helpful to elderly people, wireless connected motion detectors (to monitor whether
they fall down), stove on/o (they may forget to turn o the stove), refrigerator on/o. Smart
home monitoring would be very helpful to track patient behavior(to observe the side eects of the
medicines).
2.3 Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have promising network infrastructure for many military ap-
plications, such as battleeld surveillance and homeland security monitoring [37]. In those hostile
tactical scenarios and important commercial applications, security mechanisms are necessary to
protect WSNs from malicious attacks.
A WSN may have to scale up to thousands of sensor nodes; and at the same time it needs simple,
exible, and scalable security protocols. However, to design such security protocols is not an easy
task. Higher-level security and less computation and communication over-head are contradictory
requirements in the design of security protocols for WSNs. In most cases, a trade-o must be made
between security and performance [38].
2.3.1 Cost of Security
Security is a risk management of balancing the loss from breaches against the costs of security,
both of which are dicult to measure.
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Figure 2.1 Optimization of security vs. cost [39].
From the optimization point of view to the information security and risk management; risk
reduction is dened as the balance of the cost of the breaches against the cost of security counter
measures to mitigate the risk. As shown in Figure 2.1, there is an optimal (minimum) point on the
total cost curve (shown with orange dot) which can be found as the sum of the two costs, where
the cost of countermeasures equals the cost of breaches. This is the point where optimal level of
security is satised at minimum cost and should be the main target of the security administrators
while designing their security plans.
2.3.2 Security Goals
Security goals for an information system are generally cumulated into three: CIA - Condential-
ity, Integrity and Availability. Beside these trio, we may include non-repudiation and privacy as a
supporting elements.
Condentiality: Only authorized parties should be able to access the data provided by WSN. At-
tacks against condentiality: Eavesdropping of wireless communications, physical capture of sensor
nodes.
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Integrity: If an authorized user receives data from the WSN, this data should be correct and
valid; it shouldn't be changed by unauthorized parties. Attacks against integrity: Physical capture
of some sensor nodes or intrusion of new malicious nodes.
Availability: WSN should always be able to answer any authorized request in its life time before
the request expires. Attacks against availability: Denial of service (DoS) attacks such as power
exhaustion attacks, jamming attacks, and collision attacks.
Non-repudiation: Neither the sender, nor the receiver can deny the transaction of the message.
2.3.3 Security Services
In order to fulll the Security Goals in a network, Security Services are introduced:
Access Control: Access Control is about granting user access to network resources. It should
provide access to legitimate users and deny access to illegitimate users. Access control is comprised
of authentication and authorization.
Access control ensures that all accesses to objects (information resources) are authorized by
regulating dierent privileged operations.
Precision agriculture is a good example for application of access control for WSNs [24]. For
example let's say a WSN provider oers data services to subscribed farmers regarding information
on their farms. Farmers may need to know the accurate readings on the humidity of the soil, in
order to engage the sprinklers on time, before the crops be withered. In order WSN provider to
make prot, only the legitimate users should get response to their queries from the WSN.
Authentication: It establishes a relation between a user and some identity (password, secret key,
token, etc.). Authentication can be based on three techniques:
 Something the user knows, such as a password. Comes along with password management,
which is required to prod users to change their passwords regularly, to select strong ones,
and to protect them.
 Something the user possesses, such as a token. Each token has a unique secret crypto-
graphic key stored within it, used to establish the token's identity via a challenge-response
handshake.
 Something the user is, such as biometric data (nger prints, retina scan, etc.).
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Technically, the best combination would be user-to-token biometric authentication, followed by
mutual cryptographic authentication between the token and system services.
Authorization: Establishing a relation between a user and a set of privileges (access rights,
allowed operations (read-write, read-only, etc.). This is generally implemented by access control
lists.
Audit: It is the process of gathering data about activity in the system and analyzes it to discover
security violations or diagnose their cause. Analysis can occur o-line after the fact or online in real
time. In the latter case, the process is usually called intrusion detection. Audit has two components:
the collection and organization of audit data, and an analysis of the data to discover or diagnose
security violations.
2.3.4 Possible Attacks against WSNs
Appendix B summarizes attacks towards WSNs. The classication is provided according to the
OSI protocol layer, meaning that attacks towards each OSI protocol layer (physical, data-link, etc.)
are introduced separately.
2.3.5 Solutions to Defend against Attacks towards the WSNs
Appendix C summarizes solutions to defend WSNs against attacks towards them, especially the
DoS attacks (blackhole, Sybil, ooding, etc.).
2.3.6 Patch Management
Patch management is a security practice designed to pro-actively prevent the exploitation of
security vulnerabilities that exist within a network. The expected result is to reduce the time and
money spent dealing with vulnerabilities and exploitation of those vulnerabilities. Timely patching
of security issues is generally recognized as critical to maintaining the operational availability, con-
dentiality, and integrity of networks. However, failure to keep operating system and application
software patched is one of the most common issues identied by security professionals. New patches
are released daily, and it is often dicult for even experienced system administrators to keep abreast
of all the new patches and ensure proper deployment in a timely manner.
Patch Management System (PMS)'s are useful to update patch and/or rmware to the end
devices (such as sensor nodes) in order to defend the network against recently discovered/revealed
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vulnerabilities. The importance of the PMSs has been arising, since the damages of the industrial
espionage cases (e.g. Stuxnet virus [1]) revealed.
In the literature, several PMSs [40{43] are introduced to address the mentioned problems above.
However they provide partial solutions to the problem and there is no \one size ts all" solution
proposed yet. The following statement may summarize the challenge for developing PMSs: \There
are too much vulnerabilities, requiring too many patches, with too many deployment mechanisms
to be deployed to too many machines".
Readers, who are interested in application PMSs to Wireless Industrial Sensor Networks would
nd more information in the our paper [44].
2.3.7 Open Problems in WSN Security
Following is the list of open problems of WSN security.
 Trust: Trust is a big problem in WSNs. Especially following topics are worth to work on:
trustworthiness, mutual trust, and trust management.
 Adaptability: Since WSNs possess frequently changing topology, security solutions must
be highly adaptable.
 Scalability: Hence a WSN may consist of thousands of sensor nodes, the security mecha-
nisms should be scalable.
Researchers can follow any topic on this list to conduct their research on WSN security.
2.4 Cryptography for Wireless Sensor Networks
2.4.1 Secret (Symmetric) Key Cryptography
Consider the WSN shown in Figure 2.2. By using Secret Key Cryptography (SKC), in order to
send encrypted messages to its' neighboring sensor nodes (namely, S2, S3, S4 and S5), sensor node
S1 needs to encrypt each message by using the pair wise \Secret Key" associated with that specic
neighbor. In our example, S1 needs to encrypt the message outgoing to S2 with the pair wise Secret
Key S1-S2, message outgoing to S3 with the pair wise Secret Key S1-S3, message outgoing to S4
with the pair wise Secret Key S1-S4 and nally, message outgoing to S5 with the pair wise Secret
Key S1-S5. For the neighbors of S1 (namely, S2, S3, S4 and S5), in order to decrypt the messages
coming from S1, they need to decrypt the encrypted message by using the same pair wise \Secret
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Figure 2.2 Illustration of secret key cryptography in wireless sensor networks.
Key" associated with S1 (Secret S1-S2, Secret S1-S3, Secret S1-S4, and Secret S1-S5.). By using
this methodology, each node needs to store the pair wise secret keys associated with its neighboring
nodes.
In a large network, distribution and management of these pair wise secret keys (Secret Sn-Sm)
is a big problem in terms of communications overhead, memory usage, message complexity, and
security resilience.
2.4.2 Public (Asymmetric) Key Cryptography
The computationally expensive portion of a Public Key Cryptography (PKC) system is typically
the private key operations. PKC algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm,
typically select the shorter keys as a public key in order to minimize the public key operations
such as digital signature verication and encryption. Therefore, longer keys are selected as private
keys, resulting with slow and resource demanding private key operations, such as decryption and
signature generation. On the other hand, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm requires
more overhead for encryption and signature verication than for decryption and signing [25]. Overall,
the drawback of PKC is that it suers from computational complexity (algorithms).
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Figure 2.3 Illustration of public key cryptography in wireless sensor networks.
Consider the WSN shown in Figure 2.3. By using PKC, in order to send encrypted messages
to its' neighboring sensor nodes (namely, S2, S3, S4 and S5), sensor node S1 just needs to encrypt
message by using its \Private Key". For the neighbors of S1 (namely, S2, S3, S4 and S5), in order
to decrypt the messages coming frm S1, they need to decrypt the encrypted message by using the
\Public Key" of S1. By using this methodology, each node needs to store the public keys of its
neighboring nodes as well as its own private key.
2.4.3 Hybrid Cryptography
When the number of the users in a WSN is too many, PKC algorithms are used for user authen-
tication, as it scales much better than SKC algorithms. On the other hand, PKC algorithms require
too much power to operate. Therefore for the communications between the sensor nodes, SKC al-
gorithms are used. Sensor nodes in the communication range of the user serve as gateways between
the two parts of the WSN which are using either PKC or SKC. The user communicates with the
sensor nodes in the communication range using PKC, afterwards these sensor nodes communicate
with the rest of the WSN using SKC as shown in Figure 2.4 [26].
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Figure 2.4 Illustration of hybrid cryptography in wireless sensor networks.
In hybrid cryptography approach, PKC is used for session key setup and authentication, whereas
SKC is used to provide privacy. Here is the required steps, in order to achieve a secure network with
hybrid cryptography:
1. Secure channel setup between the user and the WSN: The user executes a mutually
authenticated key establishment protocol using PKC with some specied sensor nodes.
The protocol results in the establishment of shared session keys between the user and each
honest node which participated in the protocol run.
2. Authenticated querying: After the successful secure channel setup, the base station or
the nodes in user's proximity forward user's queries into the sensor network and append
to them some additional information enabling the other nodes to verify the legitimacy of
the query.
The rst phase naturally includes the user authentication phase. Although a secure channel is
not required for access control, it is considered here because secure channel setup is a very well-
studied standard procedure and incurs marginal additional costs in comparison to unilateral user
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authentication. Additionally, secure channels between the users and the WSN are very likely to
be required in the overall WSN design. For example, the answer to the query should be kept
condential. Moreover, the user should also be able to ascertain that it communicates with the
genuine sensor network.
We briey outline a possible solution to access control assuming that the query is addressed to
a single sensor node, say sensor node S7. First, the user sends the query to the surrounding nodes
(S2, S3, S4 and S5) using the previously established secure channels. Each node computes a message
authentication code (MAC) on the query using the key shared with the node S7. For example, these
keys could be computed using polynomial-based key pre-distribution. The computed MACs are sent
back to the user who appends them to the query. The node S7 answers the query only if enough
MACs are appended.
Note that in this solution, no coordination between the nodes in user's proximity is required.
The node S7 answers the query only if enough MACs are appended to it. Such solutions should gen-
erally be preferred, as coordination requires additional messages, and therefore, additional resource
consumption.
2.5 Security Provisioning Plan for Wireless Sensor Networks
As a starting point of a provisioning plan for any network security system (in order to set-up a
rigid security system to cope with attacks), these steps should be followed:
1. Specication of the network resources.
2. Planning and design of intrusion prevention.
3. Planning and design of intrusion detection.
4. Planning and design of intrusion mitigation.
These steps are also visualized in Figure 2.5, as a ow chart of \Security provisioning plan for
WSNs". In the ow chart, it is shown that, our security provisioning plan starts with \Specication
of the network resources". This step is followed by the rst line of defense, \Intrusion Prevention".
Attacks, that would able to manage to pass the rst line of defense, should be detected by the second
line of defense, \Intrusion Detection". Finally, detected intrusions should be mitigated through the
last step, \Intrusion Mitigation".
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Figure 2.5 Security provisioning plan for wireless sensor networks.
2.5.1 Specication of the Network Resources
It's clear that specication of the network resources is the rst step in any kind of network
solution. We need to know what we need to keep secure from attackers and what kind of resources
we have to ght against attackers. Besides, any solution that we devise has to be applicable to the
network in concern. The topology (tree, ring, star, etc.) of the network has to be specied. Mobility
(mobile, slightly mobile, stationary, etc.) of the network has to be specied. Hardware and software
of the nodes need to be specied. Finally, frequency and data rate of the radio transmission need
to be specied. All these specications would aect our tailoring of the design from lightly to a
moderate level.
2.5.2 Intrusion Prevention
Access control and authentication are the security measures to prevent intrusions. In any security
system design, intrusion prevention constitutes the rst line of the defense.
Intrusion prevention is the 2nd step in a network security plan. The network members should
not be imitated by any non-member entity, and/or they should not be compromised by attackers,
and/or their hardware should not be tampered by attackers, etc. In a wired network concept this
is very well established. But in the case of wireless network concept, intrusion prevention is not as
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easy as it is thought. Especially in WSNs, intrusion prevention is almost impossible considering the
fact that physical capture of the nodes is almost inevitable (unless very specic tamper resistant
hardware is used). Hence prevention of the intrusion is not feasible in WSNs, we will leave it as the
nal step of our security plan. Therefore, detection of the intrusion (misbehaving nodes) would be
a good choice of starting point to a security plan.
2.5.3 Intrusion Detection
Intrusion is an unauthorized (unwanted) activity in a network that is either achieved passively
(information gathering, eavesdropping) or actively (harmful packet forwarding, packet dropping,
hole attacks, etc.). \Intrusion Detection" is detection of any suspicious behavior in a network
performed by the network members. In our security plan, the 3rd step is the \Intrusion Detection"
which would help mitigation step (4th step) by providing following information: identication of
the intruder, and/or location of the intruder (single node/ regional), and/or time (date) of the
intrusion, intrusion activity (active, passive), intrusion type (hole attacks worm hole, black hole,
sink hole, selective forwarding attack, etc.), layer of the intrusion (physical, data link, network,
etc.), etc. That's why \Intrusion Detection" is very important for a network from the security point
of view.
In any security system design, intrusion detection constitutes the second line of the defense.
intrusion detection systems are helpful to the overall security system in both ways:
 During any intrusion event, intrusion detection systems capture the logs of the event and
alert the system administrators and/or the intrusion mitigation systems.
 The captured audits of an intrusion event can be investigated later on, in order to improve
the rst layer of defense (would provide enough clues about the gaps in the system),
intrusion prevention.
Intrusion detection systems seek to help carry out audit controls. Passive intrusion detection
systems analyze the audit data, usually oine, and bring possible intrusions or violations to the
attention of the auditor. Active intrusion detection systems analyze audit data in real time and may
take immediate protective response such as killing the suspected process and disabling the account.
Two approaches used: Anomaly detection is based on the assumption that the exploitation of
the vulnerabilities of the system involves abnormal use of the system. Misuse detection is based
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on rules specic events, sequences of events, or observable properties of the system, symptomatic of
violations.
2.5.4 Intrusion Mitigation
The 4th and nal step of our security plan is the \Mitigation of the Intrusion". This step follows
the intrusion detection and feeds (inputs) from the outputs of that step. That's why it is very
important to design both steps in parallel and/or in coordination. The detected intrusions will be
either by passed (zone blocking, re-routing), and/or ignored (packet dropping), and/or physically
destroyed (in a military scenario), etc. according to the security strategy.
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CHAPTER 3 :
INTRUSION PREVENTION WITH TWO LEVEL USER AUTHENTICATION IN
HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
In any kind of network, there are two major steps to ensure security: intrusion prevention
and intrusion detection. As a rst line of defense, network is secured by using intrusion prevention
methods such as authentication, authorization and access control. From computer security, we know
that no system is completely secure unless it has no connection to outside world (close network).
Hence, we are dealing with networking which means multiple of connections to outside world (open
network), the intrusions are inevitable. Here, the second line of defense comes into the picture-
intrusion detection: any kind of intruder that has managed to pass the rst line of defense, need
to be captured by this step. This chapter contributes to the rst line of defense, namely to the
intrusion prevention for heterogeneous (clustered) WSNs.
One of the major methods used for intrusion prevention is User Authentication (UA): If a user
does not have enough credentials then (s)he will be denied to access the network. This would
eventually prevent intrusions throughout the network, provided that the UA scheme is very well
designed to cover entire network and leaving no weak points in terms of security. UA is critically
needed for networks that are transferring condential (sensitive and valuable) information to the
legitimate users; such as the coordinates of a hostile vehicle for a military surveillance application,
medical statistics of a patient for a health care application, etc.
Tactical WSN is a very good example of UA application. Let us say a WSN is deployed in
warfare conditions and is used to gather tactical information of enemy forces on the war eld. In
this example, we will use the concept of proximity sensors that discover any vehicle or a soldier in
their preset perimeter. Location of any hostile vehicle or soldier is very important under warfare
and should be available to only friend forces to assess tactical advantage. Any friendly vehicle or a
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soldier should not trigger an alarm in the proximity sensors (by using predened communications
using UA), but any existence of foe would do so. This is achieved by UA.
Health care is another example of UA application for WSNs. Let us say, a WSN oers instanta-
neous medical data service to subscribed health care employees such as doctors and nurses. Since the
condentiality of the data is important (i.e., privacy of patient medical records), only the legitimate
users should get a response to their queries. Unauthorized users must be prevented from accessing
the mentioned condential information. Therefore UA is a must in these kinds of networks.
WSNs are characterized by unique characteristics:
 Severely constrained computational and energy resources: limited power supplies (limited
energy), small memory sizes.
 Ad hoc operational environment: There is no structured network (there is no dedicated
router or switch for network operations)and transmission bandwidth is narrow.
Therefore security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be adopted directly. As a result,
although UA has been well studied for traditional networks, the models proposed for those networks
cannot be applied directly to WSNs because of the unique characteristics that WSNs possess. UA
in such a resource constrained WSN with minimum overhead provides signicant challenges and is
an ongoing area of research.
UA is very important for WSNs. In order to save the diminishing power resources, network should
not be accessible by the unauthorized users. Any extra data transmission in the network generated
by the malicious users (eg. ood messages) may cause battery power of a sensor node to be depleted
faster. In a WSN, since an adversary can easily inject messages, any node receiving a message needs
to make sure that the data used in any decision-making process originates from the correct source.
UA prevents unauthorized parties from participating in the network: legitimate nodes should be
able to detect messages from unauthorized nodes and reject them. UA is an intended feature that
would prevent intruders and this way ensure trustability for WSN users.
In this chapter, we propose a secure and scalable UA scheme to prevent intrusions in WSNs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides related work for UA in WSNs,
motivation of this work and our research goals. Section 3.3 presents our proposed TLUA scheme.
Section 3.4 provides the security analysis of TLUA scheme. Performance evaluation of TLUA scheme
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is provided analytically in Section 3.5 and by simulations in Section 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes
the chapter and outlines future work.
3.2 Related Work, Motivation and Research Goals
There are a couple of papers published in the area of authentication for WSNs: Perrig et al. [2]
proposed a suite of security building blocks for WSNs called SPINS. It is optimized for resource
constrained environments and wireless communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP
and TESLA. TESLA is a broadcast authentication scheme and SNEP provides two-party data
authentication. TinySec [3] is a lightweight, generic security package that can be integrated into
sensor network applications. It is incorporated into the ocial TinyOS release. LEAP [4] is a key
management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while
at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network
neighborhood of the compromised node. LEAP also includes an ecient protocol for inter-node
trac authentication based on the use of one-way key chains. A salient feature of the authentication
protocol is that it supports source authentication without precluding in-network processing and
passive participation.
SPINS, TinySec, LEAP are not \User Authentication" schemes, they only provide one-hop \node
authentication". It means that only two neighboring nodes authenticate to each other. End-to-end
secure communication (i.e., user - sensor node) is not provided. In end-to-end secure communication,
intermediate nodes cannot \see" what is being transmitted between two \end" parties, because of
the encryption (two end parties share a common encryption key).
Recently, several schemes have been introduced as a UA scheme for WSNs: Wong et al. [5](through-
out the chapter we call this as WZCW scheme) proposed a dynamic UA scheme for homogenous
WSNs. Later this work was improved by Tseng et al. [6] (throughout the chapter we call this as
TJY scheme) with the following advantages; including resistance of the replay and forgery attacks,
reduction of user's password leakage risk, capability of a changeable password, and better eciency.
As discussed in [5], authors claim that weak-password authentication is not suitable for WSNs be-
cause it loads the computational overhead to the used cryptography algorithm. In other words the
algorithm must be strong enough to compensate for the weakness in the key. Therefore they recom-
mend strong-password authentication for WSNs in which computational load is light, owing to the
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strength in the key. As a summary, both schemes use SKC for UA throughout the network which is
not scalable for a large number of sensor nodes and users.
Although Benenson et al.'s scheme (throughout the chapter we call this as BGR scheme) [8] uses
PKC for UA, it is not practical for WSNs because of the homogenous network structure, meaning
that all the power and processing demanding PKC operations are supposed to be handled on the
normal sensor nodes. As a result, authentication operations take minutes (as the authors of [8]
confess) and batteries of the sensor nodes deplete faster (according to ndings of [45]).
To the best of our knowledge, the only heterogeneous approach to the UA in WSNs in the
literature is Le et al.'s [7] scheme (throughout the chapter we call this as TTUA scheme). In TTUA
scheme, CHs are used as a backbone in the network so that the sensed data, after being collected,
are transmitted through CHs towards the requesting users. For authentication purpose, SKC is
issued between the CHs and the users. However, it is practically impossible to scale SKC keys to
include a large number of users and sensor nodes, because of the memory limitations. Besides, in
SKC, excluding existing users from the network and including new users to the network, requires key
revoking and key re-distribution, which needs a considerable amount of communication overhead.
These are the biggest constraints of the TTUA scheme.
The schemes mentioned above use either PKC approach (BGR) or SKC approach (WZCW,
TJY and TTUA). Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. PKC is preferable in terms
of scalability and key management, but it is unsuitable for the sensor nodes due to higher pro-
cessing power requirement and lower energy eciency. In contrast, SKC is preferable in terms of
lower processing power requirement and higher energy eciency, but it is not scalable because of
memory restrictions and it requires a complicated key pre-distribution, user revocation and key
re-distribution.
WZCW, TJY, and BGR schemes are using homogenous WSN architecture, in which the net-
work consists of one type of sensor node only. Nowadays, because of having better performance,
heterogeneous WSN architecture is on demand. This kind of network consists of two types of nodes:
Cluster Heads (CHs) and sensor nodes(s). TTUA scheme adopts heterogeneous WSN architecture
and owing to the high processing powered CHs, it oers better performance compared to WZCW,
TJY and BGR schemes. On the other hand, it is based on SKC just like as WZCW and TJY
schemes. Therefore, it is not scalable for thousands of sensor nodes and users, occupies a signicant
27
memory to store authentication codes. Thus, addition of new nodes and users is troublesome in
terms of key distribution.
In this chapter, we propose a secure and scalable UA scheme, named as Two Level User Au-
thentication (TLUA), to overcome mentioned shortcomings of the current state of the art schemes
(namely WZCW, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes). In our scheme, we adopt the idea of a two
level heterogeneous network architecture in which a user communicates with a sensor node through
Cluster Head (CH) of that sensor node. Our scheme uses Public Key Cryptography (PKC) between
CHs and users, and Secret Key Cryptography (SKC) between CHs and sensor nodes. We have pre-
sented basics of our scheme in [27] and then presented our early ndings of performance evaluations
in [28].
This work extends our previous eorts in a more comprehensive, presentable and conclusive way;
then evaluates our TLUA scheme and compare its performance with state of the art schemes in the
literature (namely TTUA, TJY1and BGR schemes). Evaluations are provided in two ways:
1. Analysis on the following criteria are provided:
 memory storage requirement,
 scalability,
 communication cost (in terms of time and energy),
 computational cost.
2. Simulation on energy consumption and total delays are provided.
3.3 Two Level User Authentication Scheme
Part of our scheme is rst presented in [27]. In this work, in order to relieve the confusion in the
terminology (among the tiered networks and our two level architecture), we renamed our scheme as
Two Level User Authentication Scheme (TLUA).
In our TLUA scheme, we adopted the idea of two level heterogeneous network architecture of
TTUA scheme in which a user communicates with a sensor node through CH of that sensor node.
Our proposed scheme not only keeps all the advantages of the TTUA scheme but also enhances its
1Since TJY scheme is a superior version of WZCW scheme, evaluations regarding TJY scheme will represent both
schemes.
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security by issuing PKC. Therefore, TLUA adopts (inherits) all the advantages of the PKC over
SKC.
In [45], it is shown for WSNs that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm to have a
signicant advantage over Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm, as it reduces computation time
and the amount of transmitted and stored data. Hence ECC is the best known algorithm in PKC [46,
47]; we adopt it to our TLUA scheme. By doing so, not only the scalability of the network is
improved, but also security of the scheme is enhanced. In TLUA scheme, ECC is used for digital
signature generation and verication between the users and the CHs; and Elliptic Curve Die
Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol is used to exchange secret keys among CHs and sensor
nodes.
3.3.1 System Model
In TLUA scheme, WSN consists of CHs and sensor nodes, representing a Heterogeneous network
structure: 1) CHs have high processing capability and long lasting power supplies, such as iPAQ
PDA [48]. 2) Sensor nodes have low processing capability and limited power supplies, such as
MICA-2 motes [49].
CHs are assumed as trusted gateways to the sensor nodes. TLUA scheme takes advantage of high
processing power CHs to decrease the processing load on the sensor nodes. Hence they have better
power supplies compared to sensor nodes, and are capable to run power hungry PKC algorithms.
Therefore, between CHs and users, a PKC algorithm (namely ECC) is used for UA purposes. Once
a user is authenticated to a CH then allowed to access the sensor nodes through that CH. Since it
is low power demanding, between CHs and sensor nodes an SKC algorithm is used for UA.
TLUA allows a user to register once and authenticate to the network many times. Users can
also change the password anytime at will. We consider large WSN (100's of sensor nodes) deployed
in any variety of environments. In our WSN's architecture, base station (BS) is the point of central
control, which serves as a trusted key management facility. BS is many orders of magnitude more
powerful than sensor nodes. Typically, BSs have enough battery power to surpass the lifetime of
all sensor nodes, sucient memory to store cryptographic keys, stronger processors, and means
for communicating with outside networks. After the deployment, sensor nodes form groups, called
clusters, see Figure 3.1. For each cluster, a powerful node (e.g. PDA) is assigned as a CH. CHs have
higher communication power than sensor nodes and therefore possess far more radio transmission
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coverage. CHs can communicate with each other and also with BS. In order to protect the keying
materials, CHs are equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. This assumption is reasonable, hence
the number of CHs in a heterogeneous WSN is relatively small (e.g., approximately 20-30 CHs for
1,000 sensors), and the cost of such tamper-resistant hardware is small [50]. Users are equipped with
portable computing devices, such as laptops, with no power constraints compared to sensor nodes.
Users interact with the WSN for data query and retrieval. After processing sensed information; the
sensor node either sends the data upon event detection or stores it to serve for the next query.
Figure 3.1 User authentication scenario in the TLUA scheme.
3.3.2 Key Agreement and Key Distribution
In our scheme we considered a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) issuing ECC throughout the
WSN. The network structure is the same as suggested in [7]. One BS serves as the certication
authority for the network. ECC is used for encryption and decryption, Elliptic Curve Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used for digital certicate generation and verication. The dierence
between a digital signature and a certicate is verication of a digital certicate reveals the content
whilst verication of a digital signature reveals the hash of the content [51]. ECDH key agreement
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protocol is used for key agreement between a CH (e.g. A) and their member sensor node(s), to be
used as pair-wise MAC keys, KA;s. Initially, BS generates elliptic curve parameters for ECC and
ECDSA operations to be used by BS, CHs and users, and for ECDH operations to be used by CHs
and sensor nodes. These parameters are; base point P , private key pri keyBS and the corresponding
public key pub keyBS = pri keyBSP (where  stands for elliptic curve point multiplication) itself.
BS also generates private-public key pairs for each sensor node (pri keys, pub keys = pri keysP )
and for each CH (pri keyCH , pub keyCH = pri keyCH  P ). Each sensor is pre-loaded with their
private - public key pair and also the public key of the CHs. Each CH is pre-loaded with their
private-public key pair and also the public keys of the sensor nodes.
In our scheme, between CHs and sensor nodes, in order to let both parties agree on a shared
secret key, ECDH key agreement protocol is used as discussed in [25]. ECDH allows two parties
to agree on the secret key of the SKC algorithm they are using: in our case it is MAC. In order
to reduce energy consumption, all public keys needed for ECDH protocol are exchanged between
sensor nodes and corresponding CHs before the deployment. Thus, no further communication is
needed to exchange public keys. After deployment, each sensor node (s) computes a shared secret
key (KA;s) with its CH (e.g. A), for authentication purposes as follows:
 s computes the elliptic point Rs as shown in Equation 3.1:
Rs = (xs; ys) = pri keys  pub keyA (3.1)
 A also computes another elliptic point RA as shown in Equation 3.2:
RA = (xA; yA) = pri keyA  pub keys (3.2)
 Since Equation 3.3 holds, then Rs = RA, and so does xs = xA. As a result KA;s = xs is
assigned as the shared secret key between s and A.
pri keys  pub keyA = pri keys  pri keyA  P:
= pri keyA  pri keys  P:
= pri keyA  pub keys: (3.3)
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Table 3.1 List of notations used in Section 3.3.
Abbreviation Interpretation
A cluster head named A
BS base station
cert certificate
decryptx(y) decryption of y with key x, using ECC
ECC elliptic curve cryptography
ECDSA elliptic curve digital signature alg.
encryptx(y) encryption of y with key x, using ECC
H(:) hash value
IDx identification number of x
KA;s pair-wise key between A and s
MAC message authentication code
pri key private key
pub key public key
s sensor node
signx(y) ECDSA signature
T time stamp
U user
verify(z) verification of z
k concatenation
* new
We assume that the key distribution between BS and CHs is established in a manner that all
the CHs have the public key of the BS, namely pub keyBS .
3.3.3 Authentication
TLUA includes three phases: Registration, Authentication, and Password Change. The oper-
ational functionality (handshake messages) of all these phases are summarized and illustrated in
Figure 3.22.
User registration: User sends a request to the BS for registration to the WSN along with his ID
encrypted with the public key of the BS, as shown in Equation 3.4:
user ! BS : fRegistration request; encryptpub keyBS (IDU )g (3.4)
BS has the ID list of the legitimate users and provides each legitimate user a certicate. BS
has private and public key pair (pri keyBS ; pub keyBS) and the certicate is the user's ID signed
2For abbreviations and notations used in Figure 3.2, please refer to Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.2 Communication handshake messages that are passed between dierent entities of the
WSN for Registration, Authentication and Certicate Renewal phases of the TLUA scheme.
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by the BS, using the private key (pri keyBS). As a nal step, BS sends back the certicate to the
user (see Equation 3.5).
BS : certU = signpri key BS(IDU )
BS ! User : certU (3.5)
In user authentication phase, with the public key of the BS (pub keyBS), each CH can verify
the certicate of the user and extract the ID of the user, namely IDU .
User authentication: All the communications within the network are routed by the CHs. Let
us consider the scenario where the user wants to access data aggregated at a sensor s (suppose A
is CH of s), and let us also assume that A is the closest CH in the proximity of the user (intra
communications and authentications among CHs are beyond the scope of our chapter). Then the
authentication process includes the following steps:
 Step 1) The user sends his certicate certU and time stamp TU along with the hash value
of those concatenated by user ID, IDU to A as shown in Equation 3.6:
user ! A : certU ; TU ;H(certUkTUkIDU ) (3.6)
where k means concatenation and H stands for hashing algorithm such as SHA-1. In this
representation, the hash value represents the variable (changes with the time, protected
by time stamp) password of the user.
Upon receiving an authentication request from the user, A rst checks whether TU is
valid, if yes then it can verify the certicate of the user by using the public key of the BS
(pub keyBS) and extract the ID of the user, namely IDU , as shown in Equation 3.7:
A : verify(certU ) = IDU (3.7)
Finally A veries the hash value of the user by using the ID of the user as shown in
Equation 3.8:
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A : verify(H(certUkTUkIDU )) (3.8)
 Step 2) If the verication is successful (meaning that the password provided by the user
is correct), A sends s, its identication (IDA) and time stamp (TA) along with a MAC
using its shared pair-wise key (KA;s) with the sensor s, MAC(KA;s; IDAkTA), as shown
in Equation 3.9:
A! s : IDA; TA;MAC(KA;s; IDAkTA) (3.9)
Upon receiving the message, s rst checks if TA is valid. If yes, it veries IDA by gen-
erating a MAC with the shared pair-wise key with A (KA;s) and comparing it with the
received MAC, as shown in Equation 3.10:
s : verify(MAC(KA;s; IDAkTA)) (3.10)
If all of these are successful, then the user is authentic. After successful authentication,
sensor s is ready to send data to the user. s may send a short message to inform the user
that he is authenticated via A.
User Password Change and Certicate Renewal: TLUA allows users to change their password
by means of certicate renewal at their will. Users can do so through BS. The user encrypts the
new public key (pub keyU ) and its new ID ID

U with its current private key (pri keyU ), as shown
in Equation 3.11:
user ! BS : encryptpri keyU (pub keyUkIDU ) (3.11)
After receiving the encrypted message, BS decrypts it by using the current public key of the
user (pub keyU ), as shown in Equation 3.12:
BS : decryptpub keyU (pub key

UkIDU ) (3.12)
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Then BS can sign the new ID (IDU ) by its private key (pri keyBS) to obtain a new certicate
(certU ) and send it back to the user, as shown in Equation 3.13:
BS : certU = signBS(ID

U )
BS ! user : certU (3.13)
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the TLUA scheme. In a two-party communication case,
data authentication can be achieved through a purely symmetric mechanism: The sender and the
receiver share a secret key to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of all communicated
data. When a message with a correct MAC arrives, the receiver knows that it must have been sent
by the sender. In our TLUA scheme, MAC is used for all transmissions which involve sensor nodes
and PKC (especially the ECC) is used in the backbone architecture of the network, namely between
user side, BS and CH. Accordingly, not only the security aspect of the network is increased, but
also most of the advantages of PKC and SKC are retained.
Authentication and encryption techniques can prevent an outsider to launch a Sybil attack3
against WSN. However, an insider cannot be prevented from participating to the network. (S)he
can achieve this by using the identities of the nodes (s)he has compromised. Besides, using globally
shared keys allows an insider to masquerade as any node. PKC can prevent such an insider attack.
It is one of the reasons to adopt it in our TLUA scheme. Although SKC is ecient in processing
time for sensor networks, they generally require complicated key management, which needs large
memory and communications overhead. On the other hand, PKC has simple key management with
the more computational time trade-o. With the recent progress in ECC, Wang et al. [52] shows
that PKC can be more advantageous than SKC not only with key management but also in terms
of the memory usage and security resilience. This is another reason to adopt PKC to our TLUA
scheme. In TLUA users can be added and revoked on the y. CHs only need to keep the public key
of the BS. Whereas in TTUA CHs need to keep the password list of the users every time.
3In Sybil attack, an adversary captures a single sensor node and illegitimately claims multiple identities to the
sensor network.
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In the TTUA scheme, the hash value of the user password is sent to the BS through a secure
channel. Also, the hash values list of the CHs secret keys is sent from BS to the user through
the secure channel. It means that in case of any intrusion into the secure channel, the WSN would
be compromised. In our TLUA scheme, owing to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a secure
channel is not needed between user and BS. Therefore users do not have to plug in to the BS for
key exchange. This means that users in our network are free to move anywhere but the coverage
area of the BS.
In TTUA if the secret key (KA) of the CH A is captured, then the network is compromised and
all the user passwords stored on A must be revoked. In TTUA scheme, users change their passwords
through CHs. In our TLUA scheme, users directly communicate with BS to change the password.
Since CH is not involved in the password change session, TLUA is less vulnerable compared to
TTUA. In TTUA scheme, a hash function (SHA-1) is used to secure the authentication message
between the user and the CH. In our TLUA scheme, we use ECC which is more secure than SHA-1
given that both use same sized keys.
3.4.1 Node Compromising Attacks
Since CHs are equipped with tamper resistant hardware, it is impossible to compromise them.
This way the SKC pair-wise keys between each sensor and associated CH is secured on the CH
side. Also the PKC keying materials between CHs and users are also secured. The weakest element
of our proposed scheme is the sensor nodes, since they do not have tamper resistant hardware. In
terms of security, we do not let sensor nodes carry any valuable information to compromise the
overall WSN. Hence the secret keys between a CH and each member sensor node are dierent, the
furthest point any attacker can reach is the compromising of the link communication between the
sensor node captured and the related CH. To defend this, in our TLUA scheme the secret keys
between CHs and sensor nodes are updated at certain periods with ECDH protocol.
3.4.2 Replay Attacks
In the TLUA scheme an attacker cannot re-use the previous successful login messageH(certUkTUkIDU ),
because the time stamp TU generated by the user protects this message to be used again after a
certain time. After the useful time passes, CH will not allow access to the user. Thus, reply attacks
are defended that way.
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3.4.3 Impersonation Attacks
Our proposed scheme is resilient against impersonation attacks in the following manner: In
authentication phase, an outsider tries to impersonate the login message H(certUkTUkIDU ) by
fabricating IDU as IDU guessed. The fabricated ID will change the hash value and will be caught
by the CH throughout the hash value verication, as shown in Equation 3.14:
H(certUkTUkIDU guessed)! = H(certUkTUkIDU ) (3.14)
3.4.4 Brute-force Attacks
Our proposed scheme is resilient against brute force attacks in following manners:
 In the password change phase, an adversary intercepts the message
(encryptpri keyU (pub key

UkIDU )) and tries to decrypt the message by estimating the
public key of the user. So (s)he needs to try every combination of (pub keyU ) to decrypt
the password change message. This kind of attack is known as brute force attack and is
practically and cryptographically infeasible to be successful in useful time.
 In the password change phase, an adversary intercepts the message
(encryptpri keyU (pub key

UkIDU )) and tries to estimate the private key of the user from
the encrypted message, which is practically and cryptographically infeasible in useful time.
3.5 Performance Evaluation by Analysis
In this section, we analytically evaluate (by using theoretical calculations and also practical
results from the literature) the performance of our proposed TLUA scheme and compare it to TTUA,
TJY, and BGR schemes for the following criterions: storage requirement (memory), scalability,
computational cost and communication overhead.
3.5.1 Storage
For Cluster Heads: TTUA scheme requires each CH to store user IDs and hashed password
values, which adds up with the increasing number of users. As mentioned in [7], for the TTUA
scheme, assuming that there are n number of users, user ID size is 8 bytes, and the hashed password
value is 20 bytes, each CH has to store n  28 + 120bytes of data for the users. Whereas in our
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Table 3.2 Comparison of memory storage (bytes) required on each sensor node and CH
(for1; 000users) in TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes.
TLUA TTUA TJY BGR
CH 40 28,120 N/A N/A
Sensor node 80 20 10,000 40
TLUA scheme, to authenticate the users, the only key that CHs have to store in their memory is
the public key of the BS (pub keyBS). This advantage is brought by the PKC. In our scheme, since
we use 160 bits (20 bytes) elliptic curves, the public key size is 40 bytes (keep in mind that, for a
160 bits elliptic curve, certicate is 40 bytes long, public key is 40 bytes long and private key is 20
bytes long). Assuming n=1,000; the memory required to store keys on each CH are as shown in
Table 3.2. Since TJY and BGR schemes do not require any CHs in their network, we will denote
them as N=A in the table.
For Sensor Nodes: In TLUA scheme, each sensor node need to store private key of it self and
public key of the CH for ECDH operation4. After the ECDH operation, CH and sensor nodes agree
on a secret key KA;s which is 20 bytes long. As mentioned earlier, for ECDH, public key is 40 bytes
long and private key is 20 bytes long. So, total memory space required for the keys are 80 bytes
long. In TTUA scheme, each sensor stores a secret key KA;s which is 20 bytes long. In TJY scheme,
every sensor node stores 10 bytes long key for each user. Therefore each sensor node needs to store
n10bytes long keying material. Finally, in BGR scheme, each sensor node need to store public key
of the certication authority, which is 40 bytes. Assuming n=1,000; the memory required to store
keys on the each sensor node is as shown in Table 3.2.
3.5.2 Scalability
As mentioned in the previous section, owing to the PKC approach, the memory space available
on CHs in TLUA scheme does not change with the number of users. So we can state that there is
no limit on the number of users. Literally speaking, TLUA scheme may manage thousands of users
without any problem. Where as in TTUA scheme, memory space available on CHs is inversely
proportional to the number of users. In TJY scheme, memory space available on sensor nodes is
inversely proportional to the number of users, whereas in BGR scheme (owing to the PKC approach)
it does not change with the number of users.
4This public key-private key pair is used by ECDH key agreement protocol to generate KA;s in the network
initialization phase.
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Table 3.3 Comparison of total number of users to be supported in TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR
schemes.
TLUA TTUA TJY BGR
> 10,000 < 100 > 10,000 < 200
Following the calculations from the previous section, if the memory size of each CH and sensor
node for storing the keys is allocated as 2 Kbytes, then the number of users that would be supported
in both TTUA and TLUA schemes are as shown in Table 3.3. Its apparent that TLUA and BGR
schemes are very exible and scalable compared to TTUA and TJY schemes in terms total number
of users to be supported. Although according to our calculations there is no limit on the number of
users for TLUA and BGR schemes, we limit this number to 10,000; which is reasonable for practical
applications.
3.5.3 Computation
To compare the computational cost we have two comparison criterion: time cost and energy cost.
We are interested on the operations running on CHs and sensor nodes but not interested in the
operations running on the user devices and the base station. After we calculate the time cost of
each scheme, we will calculate the energy cost of each scheme accordingly.
As a reference for our calculations, we used broad variety of reliable research results from the lit-
erature, especially papers on application of cryptography primitives over 8-bit CPU devices (namely
Atmel ATmega microcontrollers) and hand held PDA devices (namely iPAQ). For the calculations
involving sensor nodes, we referred to following research papers: [45, 46, 53{60]. For the calcula-
tions involving CHs, we referred to following research papers: [25, 61, 62]. For CH devices, we will
consider iPAQ H3670 PDA. For sensor nodes, we will consider Berkeley's MICA2 motes5.
Time cost: We dene TMAC , TSHA1, TRC5, TXOR and TV ER as computational time cost of
performing hash based message authentication code (CBC-MAC), hash function (SHA-1), symmetric
encryption (RC5), XOR operation, and digital signature verication with ECDSA, respectively.
Following this convention the computational time costs of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes
are presented in Table 3.4. Since TJY and BGR schemes do not require any CHs in their network,
we will denote their time cost as N=A in the table.
5Atmel ATmega microcontroller is the main chip on MICA2 motes.
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Table 3.4 Comparison of computational time cost on each sensor node and CH in TLUA, TTUA,
TJY and BGR schemes, provided as analytically.
Scheme Phase Cluster head Sensor node
TLUA reg. 0 0
aut. 1TV ER + 1TSHA1 + 1TMAC 1TMAC
TTUA reg. 1TRC5 + 1TSHA1 0
aut. 1TSHA1 + 3TMAC 1TMAC
TJY reg. N/A 1TSHA1
aut. N/A 2TSHA1 + 2TXOR
BGR reg. N/A 0
aut. N/A 2TV ER + 1TSHA1
Table 3.5 Time spent on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes) for processing each security primitive.
Operation Time
TSHA1 4.91 ms
TMAC 7.56 ms
TXOR  0 ms
TV ER 3.27 sec
According to practical implementations on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes), the computational time
required for each security primitive are as shown in Table 3.5.
In the case of BGR scheme, which is a PKC approach to UA in WSNs, authors [8] provided their
experimental result as follows: Authentication takes 375 sec of time on a sensor node. Considering
that the paper was published in 2005, we revised this number with latest ndings in the literature [60,
63]. With recently discovered fast point multiplications, ECDSA signature verication costs as less
as 3.27 sec. Literally speaking, in our analysis, we used up to date numbers in order to provide a
fare comparison.
According to practical implementations on PDA devices (CHs) (i.e., iPAQ H3670), the energy
spent for each security primitive are summarized in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 Time spent on iPAQ PDA devices (CHs) for processing each security primitive.
Operation Time
TSHA1 10.13 sec
TMAC 15.47 sec
TRC5 10.53 sec
TV ER 130.82 msec
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Table 3.7 Comparison of computational time cost on each sensor node and CH in TLUA, TTUA,
TJY and BGR schemes, provided as numerically.
Scheme Phase Cluster head Sensor node TOTAL
TLUA reg. 0 0 0
aut. 130:85msec 7:56msec 138:41msec
sub-total 130:85msec 7:56msec 138.41 msec
TTUA reg. 20:66sec 0 20:66sec
aut. 56:54sec 7:56msec 7:62msec
sub-total 77:2sec 7:56msec 7.64 msec
TJY reg. 0 4:91msec 4:91msec
aut. 0 9:82msec 9:82msec
sub-total 0 14:73msec 14.73 msec
BGR reg. 0 0 0
aut. 0 6:545sec 6:545sec
sub-total 0 6:545sec 6.545 sec
By using practical results of Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 we updated Table 3.4 as shown in Table
3.7. According to these results we see that TTUA is the fastest scheme and BGR is slowest (almost
1,000 fold slower). Although our TLUA scheme is using PKC, its performance results are very close
to the SKC based schemes (TTUA and TJY) owing to the high speed processing capabilities of its
CHs. To provide a better comparison, we plotted the total time cost (in msec) of each scheme as
shown in Figure 3.3.
In our TLUA scheme, CHs are not involved in the registration phase, therefore the computation
cost is zero. The authentication phase takes almost 138 milliseconds for TLUA scheme and 8
milliseconds for TTUA scheme. Which means that TLUA scheme is slower than (almost 15 fold
slower) TTUA scheme for the authentication phase, which is expected. This is the trade o for
changing cryptography approach from SKC to PKC. But keeping in mind that, BGR scheme requires
6.545 sec for the authentication phase, our scheme is almost 50 times faster owing to the high
processing powered CHs.
Energy cost: As in the case of time cost calculations, we dene EMAC , ESHA1, ERC5, EXOR
and EV ER as computational energy cost of performing hash based message authentication code
(HMAC), hash function (SHA-1), symmetric encryption (RC5), XOR operation, and digital sig-
nature verication with ECDSA, respectively. Following this convention the computational energy
costs of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes are presented in Table 3.8. Since TJY and BGR
7Note that this gure is plotted in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 3.3 Comparison of total computational time costs (CH + s) of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and
BGR schemes7.
Figure 3.4 Comparison of computational time costs on sensor nodes of TLUA, TTUA and TJY
schemes.
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Table 3.8 Comparison of computational energy cost on each sensor node and CH in TLUA, TTUA,
TJY and BGR schemes, provided as analytically.
Scheme Phase Cluster head Sensor node
TLUA reg. 0 0
aut. 1EV ER + 1ESHA1 + 1EMAC 1EMAC
TTUA reg. 1ERC5 + 1ESHA1 0
aut. 1ESHA1 + 3EMAC 1EMAC
TJY reg. N/A 1ESHA1
aut. N/A 2ESHA1 + 2EXOR
BGR reg. N/A 0
aut. N/A 2EV ER + 1ESHA1
Table 3.9 Energy spent on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes) for processing each security primitive.
Operation Energy
ESHA1 5:9Ws=byte
EMAC 9:0Ws=byte
EXOR  0Ws=byte
EV ER 45:09mWs
schemes do not require any CHs in their network, we will denote their energy cost as N=A in the
table.
According to practical implementations on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes), the computational
energy spent for each security primitive are as shown in Table 3.9.
According to practical implementations on PDA devices (CHs) (i.e., iPAQ H3670), the energy
spent for each security primitive are summarized in Table 3.10.
By using practical results of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 we updated Table 3.8 as shown in Table
3.118. These results are very consistent with our ndings for time cost calculations in previous
section.
8Throughout these calculations we kept data size xed as 20 bytes.
Table 3.10 Energy spent on iPAQ PDA devices (CHs) for processing each security primitive [61].
Operation Energy
ESHA1 0.76 Ws=byte
EMAC 1.16 Ws=byte
ERC5 0.79 Ws=byte
EV ER 196.23 mWs
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Table 3.11 Comparison of computational energy cost on each sensor node and CH in TLUA, TTUA,
TJY and BGR schemes, provided as numerically.
Scheme Phase Cluster head Sensor node TOTAL
TLUA reg. 0 0 0
aut. 196:27mJ 180J 196:45mJ
sub-total 196:27mJ 180 J 196:45mJ
TTUA reg. 31J 0 31J
aut. 84:8J 180J 269:6J
sub-total 115:8J 180 J 295:8J
TJY reg. 0 118J 118J
aut. 0 236J 236J
sub-total 0 354 J 354J
BGR reg. 0 0 0
aut. 0 90:298mJ 90:298mJ
sub-total 0 90.298 mJ 90:298mJ
Table 3.12 Comparison of communication cost for TLUA and TTUA schemes.
Phase TLUA TTUA
Registration 0 Cbr
Authentication 2CU A + 2CA s 2CU A + 2CA s
Total 2CU A + 2CA s Cbr + 2CU A + 2CA s
According to these results we see that TTUA is the most energy ecient scheme and BGR is
the worst (almost 300 fold more energy consumption). Although our TLUA scheme is using PKC,
its performance results are very close to the SKC based schemes (TTUA and TJY) owing to the
heterogeneous network architecture. To provide a better comparison, we plotted the total energy
cost (in microJoules) of each scheme as shown in Figure 3.5.
In our TLUA scheme, CHs are not involved in the registration phase, therefore the energy
cost is zero. The authentication phase spends almost 200 milliJoules for TLUA scheme and 300
microJoules for TTUA scheme. Which means that TLUA scheme spends more (almost 650 fold)
energy than TTUA scheme for the authentication phase, which is expected. This is the trade o
for changing cryptography approach from SKC to PKC. But keeping in mind that most (> 99%) of
this energy is spent on the CH. In our TLUA scheme, energy spent on the sensor node is same as
the one on TTUA scheme, which is 180 microJoules. Compared to BGR scheme (which requires 90
milliJoules),TLUA scheme is very energy ecient (500 fold) on the sensor node.
10Note that this gure is plotted in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 3.5 Comparison of total energy costs (CH + s) of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes10.
Figure 3.6 Comparison of energy costs on sensor nodes of TLUA, TTUA, and TJY schemes.
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Figure 3.7 Comparison of energy consumptions on sensor nodes for three dierent schemes.
3.5.4 Communication
For communication cost, we are interested in the communications involving either CHs or sensor
node s. To calculate communications cost, we dene a number of notations as follows (all of these
are in number of hops):
 Cbr: Communication cost for broadcasting user ID and password to all CHs
 CU A: Communication cost between the user and the cluster head A
 CA s: Communication cost between cluster head A and sensor node s
For registration phase, TLUA has no cost on CHs or sensor nodes, whereas TTUA needs to
broadcast user ID's and passwords to all CHs. For authentication phase, both schemes have the
same cost, 2 messages sent between user and CH, and 2 messages sent between CH and sensor node.
The communication costs of the both schemes are summarized in Table 3.12. This table provides
the communications between; 1) the users and CHs, 2) CHs and sensor nodes (s).
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According to the comparison of Table 3.12, we can conclude that both TLUA and TTUA schemes
have same communication cost for the authentication phase. However, for the registration phase
TTUA scheme requires a costly network-wide broadcast message, where as TLUA scheme requires
none. So as a summary, our TLUA scheme outperforms TTUA scheme in terms of communications
overhead.
3.6 Performance Evaluation by Simulation
We used SENSE (Sensor Network Simulator and Emulator) [64] to simulate and compare energy
consumption and delay between TLUA [27], TTUA [7], and TJY [6] schemes. The simulation results
show that the average energy consumption and delay time of dierent network topologies. Because
cluster heads are much more powerful than sensor nodes, we only considered energy consumption
of the sensor nodes. For each network topology, user's location and the login-node are randomly
changed within the sensor eld.
3.6.1 Simulation Model
The network deployment is similar to [50] with a BS and 300 sensors randomly distributed in a
300 m  300 m area. There are additional 20 CHs in the sensor eld [50]. The transmission range of
a sensor s and a CH is 60 m and 150 m, respectively. Sensors and CHs are formed in clusters. Each
cluster has one CH. Sensors in the same cluster are connected with its CH via one or more hops.
We use the same energy model used in ns-2.1b8a [65] that requires 0.66 W , 0.359 W , and 0.035 W
for transmitting, receiving, and idling, respectively. We set the power consumption rate for SHA-1
and CBC-MAC calculation as 0.48 W according to [50] and [66]. As analyzed in [3] and [67], we set
the time consumption for computing a CBC-MAC and a SHA-1 as 7.1 ms and 3.5 ms, respectively.
The simulation uses MAC 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). Two-ray ground is used
as the radio propagation model. For routing in TLUA, TTUA and TJY schemes, we applied Ad hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol. User ID length is 8 bytes, SHA-1 value is 20 bytes.
As discussed in [3], the choice of 4 bytes MAC is not security detrimental in the context of sensor
networks. So we applied 4 bytes CBC-MAC for every message and ran the simulation with ve
dierent network topologies. For each topology, ve scenarios are applied, in which user's location
and the login-node is randomly selected. For TJY scheme, we set the gate-way node in the center
of the sensor eld. We then averaged the results from those scenarios.
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Figure 3.8 Comparison of computational times on the authentication phase for three dierent
schemes.
3.6.2 Results
Our simulation results are shown in Figure 3.7 (this graphic compares total energy consumption
on the sensor nodes for the authentication and registration phases) and Figure 3.8 (this graphic
compares overall computational times for the authentication and registration phases). For one
registration, the user is authenticated 1, 5, 10, and 20 times and in the graphs it is shown on the
x-axis, respectively.
Figure 3.7 shows that the energy consumption (the energy consumption on sensor nodes for
computation processes and for communication packets) of TLUA and TTUA is almost same and
they are about half of TJY scheme. This is because computation cost of TLUA and TTUA are less
than TJY scheme and they do not require any extra communication with the gate-way node during
authentication process. However, TLUA and TTUA consume the same amount of energy because in
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both schemes the communication cost between the user and targeted sensor, and the computational
cost of the sensors are the same. This is consistent with our analytical results (See Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.8 shows that total delay time of TLUA is slightly greater than of TTUA but far less
than TJY. This is consistent with our analytical results (See Figure 3.4). Although we used ECC
signature verication in our scheme, this did not drop the overall performance signicantly, owing to
CHs with high processing speed (ECC signature verication takes about 1.65 ms on CH equipped
with iPAQ [68]). 0.2 sec total delay of TLUA scheme is very compatible with TTUA scheme and
way much better than TJY and BGR schemes. Furthermore, if the processing speed of the CH is
increased (i.e., more powerful mobile devices), the delay on CH would be decreased dramatically,
and our scheme would perform better than TTUA scheme.
3.7 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
In this chapter, a novel IPS for heterogeneous WSNs, named as Two Level User Authentication
(TLUA) scheme, is presented and then its performance is compared to the current state-of-the-art
schemes in the literature. Proposed scheme employs both PKC and SKC approaches, so that it
takes advantage of both schemes. Analysis and simulation results have shown that TLUA scheme
is not only more secure and yet scalable than existing SKC based schemes, but also requires lesser
processing power and provides higher energy eciency than existing PKC based schemes. Proposed
scheme brings advantages (scalability, exibility) of PKC, without requirement of extra cost (in
terms of energy) on the sensor nodes. Besides, time cost of the proposed scheme is very negligible
compared to the other PKC based schemes (namely BGR scheme).
As a future work, hardware implementation (with real sensor devices) of the proposed TLUA
scheme would be investigated.
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CHAPTER 4 :
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Owing to their easy and cheap deployment features, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)1are ap-
plied to various elds of science and technology: To gather information regarding human activities
and behavior, such as health care, military surveillance and reconnaissance, highway trac; to mon-
itor physical and environmental phenomena, such as ocean and wildlife, earthquake, pollution, wild
re, water quality; to monitor industrial sites, such as building safety, manufacturing machinery
performance, and so on. [69]
On the other hand, security in WSNs is an important issue, especially if they have mission-critical
tasks [70]. For instance, a condential patient health record should not be released to third parties
in a heath care application. Securing WSNs is critically important in tactical (military) applications
where a security gap in the network would cause causalities of the friendly forces in a battleeld.
Solutions to security attacks against networks (wireless and/or wired) involve three main com-
ponents [71]:
 Prevention (defense against attack): This step aims to `prevent' any attack before it
happens. Any proposed technique will have to defend against the targeted attack.
 Detection (being aware of the attack that is present): If an attacker manages to pass the
measures taken by the `prevention' step, then it means that there is a failure to defend
against the attack. At this time, the security solution would immediately switch into
the `detection' phase of the attack in progress and specically identify the nodes that are
being compromised.
1See Appendix for the list of abbreviations used throughout this survey.
51
 Mitigation (reacting to the attack): The nal step aims to `mitigate' any attack after it
happens by removing (revoking from the network routing tables) the aected nodes and
securing the network.
Intrusion is an unauthorized (unwanted) activity in a network that is either achieved passively
(e.g. information gathering, eavesdropping) or actively (e.g. harmful packet forwarding, packet
dropping, hole attacks). In a security system, if the rst line of defense, \Intrusion Prevention,"
does not prevent intrusions, then the second line of defense, \Intrusion Detection," comes into play.
It is the detection of any suspicious behavior in a network performed by the network members. In
any security plan, intrusion detection systems provide some or all of the following information to the
other supportive systems: identication of the intruder, location of the intruder (e.g. single node
or regional), time (e.g. date) of the intrusion, intrusion activity (e.g. active or passive), intrusion
type (e.g. attacks such as worm hole, black hole, sink hole, selective forwarding, etc.), layer where
the intrusion occurs (e.g. physical, data link, network). This information would be very helpful
in mitigating (i.e., third line of defense) and remedying the result of attacks, since very specic
information regarding the intruder is obtained. Therefore, intrusion detection systems are very
important for network security.
WSNs have unique characteristics such as limited power supplies and energy, low transmission
bandwidth, small memory size and data storage. Due to these restricted operating conditions (con-
strained computational and energy resources along with an ad hoc communication environment)
of WSNs, most of the security techniques (including intrusion detection techniques) devised for
traditional wired/wireless networks are not directly applicable to a WSN environment [24].
Designing an eective and ecient intrusion detection technique that is applicable to WSNs is a
very big challenge, which motivated us to work on this research area. The rst task of any research
is to conduct an extensive literature review, which led us to the preparation of this survey as the
rst outcome of our research.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, a brief overview of IDSs, their
classications and their requirements is provided. Section 4.3 includes a brief survey of IDSs proposed
for MANETs, followed by the comments regarding their applicability to WSNs. Section 4.4 species
the challenges and restrictions of WSNs and highlights the dierences compared to the other types of
networks (wired/wireless). Then, a detailed literature review on IDSs devised for WSNs is provided
along with comments on their prominent and lacking features. Finally, our paper is concluded by
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comparing existing approaches, highlighting their lacking points and providing a general model for
an IDS that would be applicable to WSNs.
4.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
In a network or a system, any kind of unauthorized or unapproved activities are called intru-
sions. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a collection of the tools, methods, and resources to
help identify, assess, and report intrusions. Intrusion detection is typically one part of an overall
protection system that is installed around a system or device and it is not a stand-alone protection
measure [72]. In [73], intrusion is dened as: \any set of actions that attempt to compromise the
integrity, condentiality, or availability of a resource" and intrusion prevention techniques (such as
encryption, authentication, access control, secure routing, etc.) are presented as the rst line of
defense against intrusions. However, as in any kind of security system, intrusions cannot be totally
prevented. The intrusion and compromise of a node leads to condential information such as se-
curity keys being revealed to the intruders. This results in the failure of the preventive security
mechanism. Therefore, IDSs are designed to reveal intrusions, before they can disclose the secured
system resources. IDSs are always considered as a second wall of defense from the security point of
view. IDSs are cyberspace equivalent of the burglar alarms that are being used in physical security
systems today [74]. As mentioned in [73], the expected operational requirement of IDSs is given as:
\low false positive rate, calculated as the percentage of normalcy variations detected as anomalies,
and high true positive rate, calculated as the percentage of anomalies detected".
4.2.1 Requirements of IDSs
The IDS being designed, should satisfy following requirements:
 not introduce new weaknesses to the system,
 need little system resources and should not degrade overall system performance by intro-
ducing overheads,
 run continuously and remain transparent to the system and the users,
 use standards to be cooperative and open,
 be reliable and minimize false positives and false negatives in the detection phase.
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Figure 4.1 Classication of IDSs.
4.2.2 Classication of IDSs
As shown in Figure 4.1, IDSs can be classied as follows [75], [76], [77]:
Intruder Type: Intruders to a network can be classied into two types:
 An outsider using dierent means of attacks to reach the network.
 A compromised node that used to be a member of the network. According to [78], internal
attacks against ad-hoc networks use two types of nodes:
{ Selsh node: Uses the network resources but does not cooperate, saving battery
life for their own communications. It does not directly damage other nodes.
{ Malicious node: Aims at damaging other nodes by causing network Denial-of-
Service (DoS) by partitioning, while saving battery life is not a priority.
An IDS can detect either external intruders, internal intruders, or both; according to its design
aspects. But keeping in mind that internal intruders (insider attack) are not easy to detect, since
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they have the necessary keying materials to neutralize any precautions taken by the authentication
mechanisms.
Intrusion Type: Intrusions in a network may happen in various ways:
 Attempted break-in: An attempt to have an unauthorized access to the network.
 Masquerade: An attacker uses a fake identity to gain unauthorized access to the network.
 Penetration: The acquisition of unauthorized access to the network.
 Leakage: An undesirable information ow from the network.
 DoS: Blockage of the network resources (i.e., communication bandwidth) to the other
users.
 Malicious use: Deliberately harming the network resources.
IDSs may provide partial detection solution to those attacks. But of course, all system administrators
would like to have a perfect IDS that would able to detect all of the intrusions listed above.
Detection Methodologies: IDSs are functionally categorized into three groups: anomaly based
detection, misuse based detection, and specication based detection:
 Anomaly Based Detection: This is based on statistical behavior modeling. Normal op-
erations of the members are proled and a certain amount of deviation from the normal
behavior is agged as an anomaly. The disadvantage of this detection type is that the nor-
mal proles must be updated periodically, since the network behavior may change rapidly.
This may increase the load on the resource constrained sensor nodes. According to [15],
this model detects intrusions in a very accurate and consistent way (low false positive and
false negative rates) under the condition that the network being observed follows static
behavioral patterns. The advantage of this detection type is that it is well suited to detect
unknown or previously not encountered attacks. According to Garcia-Teodoro et al. [79],
anomaly based IDSs are further divided into three categories according to the nature of
the processing involved in the behavioral model considered. These categories are modied
according to [74] and the nal categorization is illustrated in Figure 4.2:
{ Statistical based: In statistical based anomaly detection, the network trac is
captured and then a prole representing its stochastic behavior is generated.
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Figure 4.2 Classication of anomaly based IDSs according to their detection algorithms.
As the network operates in normal conditions (without any attack), a reference
prole is created. After that, the network is monitored and proles are gen-
erated periodically and an anomaly score is generated by comparing it to the
reference prole. If the score passes a certain threshold, the the IDS will ag
an occurrence of the anomaly.
Statistical based anomaly detection is divided in three subcategories:
 Univariate: Parameters are modeled as independent Gaussian ran-
dom variables.
 Multivariate: Correlations between two or more metrics are also con-
sidered here.
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 Time series model: Here, an interval timer is used along with an
event counter that takes into account the order and inter-arrival times
of the observations and also their values.
Statistical methods for anomaly detection are very well dened in [80] and
here an example methodology for the detection of packet dropping attacks is
summarized: Forwarding percentage (FP) of node m is the ratio of forwarded
packets by m over the packets that are transmitted from M to m and m should
forward, observed for a sucient period of time (). It is calculated as follows:
FPm =
packets actually forwarded
packets to be forwarded
(4.1)
=
#(m;M) #([m];M)
#(M;m) #(M; [m])
Where:
 m: monitored node
 M: monitoring node
 #(m,M): the number of outgoing packets from m of which node M
is the next hop
 #([m],M): the number of outgoing packets from m of which node m
is the source and node M is the next hop
 #(M,m): the number of outgoing packets from M of which node m
is the next hop
 #(M, [m]): the number of outgoing packets from M of which node
m is the nal destination
 FPm: forwarding percentage of node m
If the denominator of equation (1) is not zero and if FPm = 0, then this event
is detected as \Unconditional Packet Dropping" and m is identied as attacker.
If the denominator of equation (1) is not zero and if FPm is less than a certain
threshold (TFP ) and following condition (2) holds then this event is detected
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as \Random Packet Dropping" and m is identied as attacker.
0 < FPm < TFP < 1 (4.2)
{ Knowledge based: Knowledge based anomaly detection rely on the availability
of the prior knowledge (data) of the network parameters in normal operating
condition as well as the one under certain attacks.
 Expert Systems: It is based on rules classication of audit data.
 Description languages: Diagrams (such as Unied Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) diagrams) are generated based on the data specica-
tions.
 Finite State Machine: States and transitions are dened according
to the available data set.
 Data clustering and outlier detection: Observed data are grouped
into clusters according to a specied similarity or distance measure.
Points that do not belong to any cluster are named as the outliers.
{ Machine learning based: In machine learning based anomaly detection, an ex-
plicit or implicit model of the analyzed patterns is generated. These models are
updated periodically, in order to improve the intrusion detection performance
on the basis of the previous results.
 Bayesian networks: It is based on probabilistic relationships among
the variables of interest.
 Markov models: It is based on stochastic Markov theory in which the
topology and capabilities of the system are modeled as states that
are interconnected through certain transition probabilities.
 Fuzzy logic: It is based on approximation and uncertainty.
 Genetic algorithms: It is inspired by the evolutionary theory of bi-
ology.
 Neural networks: It is based on the human brain foundations.
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 Principal Component Analysis (PCA): Its is based on a dimension-
ality reduction technique known as PCA.
 Misuse Based (Signature Based or Rule Based) Detection: The signatures (proles) of
the previously known attacks are generated and are used as a reference to detect future
attacks. For instance, a typical example of a signature would be: \there are 3 failed login
attempts within 5 minutes" for the brute force password attack. The advantage of this
type of detection is that it can accurately and eciently detect known attacks; hence they
have a low false positive rate. The disadvantage is that if the attack is a new kind (that
was not proled before), then the misuse detection would not able to catch it. Sobh [75]
pointed out that these systems are very much like the anti-virus systems, which can detect
most or all known attack patterns, but are of little use for the attack methods that are
unknown yet. On the other hand, in [81], the authors present the following rules in order
to monitor the network anomalies:
{ Interval rule: delay between the arrivals of two consecutive messages must be
within certain limits.
{ Retransmission rule: the transit messages should be forwarded by the interme-
diate nodes.
{ Integrity rule: the original message from the sender must not deviate when it
arrives to the receiver.
{ Delay rule: the retransmission of a message must occur after a certain wait
time.
{ Repetition rule: same message can only be transmitted from the same node in
certain number of counts.
{ Radio transmission range: the messages should be originated from the neigh-
boring nodes only.
{ Jamming rule: the number of collisions for a packet transmission must be lower
than a threshold.
 Specication Based Detection: A set of constraints that describe the correct operation
of a program or protocol is dened. Then execution of the program with respect to the
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dened constraints is monitored [76]. This methodology was introduced in [82], which
provided the capability to detect previously unknown attacks, while exhibiting a low false
positive alarm rate.
Sobh [75] identied the main distinction among the rst two methods as: \anomaly detection
systems try to detect the complement of bad behavior but misuse detection systems try to recognize
known bad behavior".
Specication based intrusion detection techniques combine the advantages of both misuse and
anomaly based detection techniques, by using manually developed specications and constraints to
characterize legitimate system behavior. Specication based intrusion detection techniques are sim-
ilar to anomaly based detection techniques, in that both of them detect attacks as the deviations
from a normal prole. Since specication based detection techniques are based on manually devel-
oped specications and constraints, they have low false alarm rate compared to the high false alarm
rated anomaly based detection techniques. On the other hand, the cost to achieve the mentioned
low false alarm rate is that the development of detailed specications and constraints would be very
time consuming [83].
Source of the Audit Data: IDSs can be categorized into two groups according to the source of
the audit data (depending on the location of the data to be analyzed):
 Host based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS): HIDS is concerned with the events on
the host that they are serving. They are capable of (but not limited to) detecting the
following intrusions: changes to critical system les on the host, repeated failure access
attempts to the host, unusual process memory allocations, unusual CPU activity or I/O
activity. HIDS achieves this by either monitoring the real-time system usage of the host
or by examining log les on the host.
 Network based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): NIDS passively or actively listens to
the network transmissions, captures and examines packets that are being transmitted.
NIDS can analyze an entire packet, payload within the packet, IP addresses or ports.
Computing Location of the Collected Data: IDSs are divided into four categories according to
the computing location of the collected data:
 Centralized IDS: A centralized computer monitors all the activities in the network and
detects intrusions by analyzing the monitored network activity data.
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 Stand-alone IDS: An IDS runs on each node independently and every decision is based on
the information collected at its own node. Members of the network are not aware of the
intrusions happening around them because stand-alone IDS do not allow individual nodes
to cooperate or share information among each other. They work as if they are alone.
 Distributed and Cooperative IDS: This is proposed for at network infrastructures. Each
node runs an IDS agent which participates (cooperatively participating in the global
intrusion detection decisions and actions) in the intrusion detection and response of the
overall network. If a node detects an intrusion with weak or inconclusive evidence, it can
initiate a cooperative global intrusion detection procedure. If a node detects an intrusion
locally with sucient evidence, it can independently alert the network regarding an attack.
 Hierarchical IDS: This is proposed for multi-layer (clustering) network infrastructures.
Cluster heads (CHs) are responsible for monitoring their member nodes, as well as par-
ticipating in the global intrusion detection decisions.
 Mobile Agent based IDS: Each mobile agent is assigned to perform a specic task of
the IDS on a selected node; and the intrusion detection is performed by the cooperative
action of these selected nodes. After a certain time period or after a specic task is
done, agents may relocate to other pre-dened nodes in order to increase network lifetime
and/or eciency of the IDS. Specications of mobile agents are provided as follows:
{ Mobility: Mobile agent brings the code to the data on a remote host for asyn-
chronous execution. This would help to reduce the amount of the exchanged
data signicantly.
{ Autonomy: Mobile agents are given a mission upon their creation: they should
be capable of achieving their tasks without any external help.
{ Adaptability: Mobile agents should adapt their behaviors according to the
information they gather while performing their tasks.
Infrastructure: Anantvalee et al. [76] divided IDSs (for MANETs) into two groups according to
their network infrastructures:
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 Flat: All nodes are considered as equal in capabilities and they may participate in routing
functions. This infrastructure is suitable for civilian applications, such as networking in
a classroom or a conference.
 Clustered: All nodes are not considered as equal. Nodes within transmission range are
grouped into a cluster and they elect a node as cluster head (CH) to centralize routing
information for that cluster. Generally, CHs consist of more powerful devices and backup
batteries, resulting in a longer transmission range. Therefore, CH nodes form a virtual
backbone of the network. Depending on the routing protocol, intermediate gateways may
relay packets in between the CHs. This kind of infrastructure model is very suitable for
military applications because of having a better command/control hierarchy.
Usage Frequency: According to the usage frequency, IDSs are divided into two categories:
 Continuous (on the y): The IDS monitors the network continuously.
 Periodical: The IDS monitors the network in certain periods of time.
4.2.3 Decision Making in the IDS
There are two types of decision making mechanisms for IDSs:
 Collaborative decision making: All (or some) of the members of the network collaborate
to conclude a decision regarding an event. For instance, in the case of majority voting,
the nal decision is made in favor of the majority of the members ending up with either
of two decisions: \the event is an intrusion" or \the event is not an intrusion"
 Independent decision making: Each member concludes a decision regarding the events
surrounding them.
According to [74], an IDS concludes either of four decisions (with non-zero probabilities) mentioned
below as a result of the decision making process over an event:
 Intrusive but not anomalous (false-negative): There is an intrusion to the system, but the
IDS fails to detect it and concludes the event as non-anomalous one.
 Not intrusive but anomalous (false-positive): There is no intrusion to the system, but the
IDS mistakenly concludes a normal event as an anomalous one.
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 Not intrusive and not anomalous (true-negative): There is no intrusion to the system,
and the IDS concludes the event as non-anomalous one.
 Intrusive and anomalous (true-positive): There is an intrusion to the system, and the IDS
concludes the event as an anomalous one.
For IDSs in WSNs, due to the nature of wireless communications, the following situations would
result in false positives and that is why they need to be considered in the decision making model [78]:
 collisions
 packet drops
 limited transmission power
 fading battery power
4.2.4 Intrusion Response
When an attack is possible to happen, the IDS does not take preventive measures, since the
prevention part is left to the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The IDS works in a reactive way
compared to the proactive way of the IPS. Whenever the intrusion alert is generated by the IDS,
the following action(s) would be taken according to the system specications:
 An audit record should be generated.
 All the network members, the system administrator (if it exists) and the base station (if
it exists) should be alerted about the intrusion. If possible, location and identity of the
intruder should be provided in the alert message.
 If it exists, a mitigation method should be induced in order to stop the intrusion. For
example, an automated corrective action should be generated through a collaborative
action of the network members (especially the neighboring members to the incident).
4.2.5 Related Work and Suggested Readings
Readers, who are interested in the IDSs, can nd more information (general information or
specic areas other than WSNs) in the following papers:
 A very good classication of the IDSs is provided by Sobh [75].
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 Classication of the IDSs for MANETs are provided by Ngadi et al. [72], Anantvalee and
Wu [76], and Albers et al. [77].
 Garcia-Teodoro et al. [79], provided a survey of techniques, systems and challenges on the
anomaly based NIDS.
 A brief survey of IDSs that are proposed for WSNs is provided in [84] and in contrast,
our paper provides an extended survey with in-depth details comparing the proposed
methods.
 A survey of IDSs for Collaborative systems is provided in [85]. A more specic survey on
alert correlation in collaborative intelligent IDSs is presented in [86]. Another work on
decentralized multi-dimensional alert correlation for collaborative IDSs is provided in [87].
 A survey of IDS in Cloud computing is provided in [88], which would be helpful to secure
next generation networks.
 Garcia et al. [89] provides details of postmortem intrusion detection for Cyber security
systems and computer forensics. They show a classier method for analyzing log les by
using hidden Markov model.
 Evasion techniques that are threatening IDS are presented in Cheng et al.'s work [90].
They provide details of 5 dierent techniques (DoS, packet splitting, duplicate insertion,
payload mutation, shellcode mutation) and assess the eectiveness of these techniques on
3 most recent IDSs.
 Please note that the IDS that are investigated in this survey are related to information
and computer security; and they are not related to the topic of \Intrusion detection for
perimeter protection". Readers, who are interested in the later topic, please refer to the
works presented in [91] and [92].
 Survey presented in this chapter does not include the methodologies and ideas that are
proposed to secure the IDSs. Readers, who are interested in that topic may refer to
Shakshuki et al.'s work [93].
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Figure 4.3 Building blocks of an IDS agent.
4.3 IDSs Proposed for MANETs and Their Applicability to WSNs
The IDSs for MANETs are very well investigated and here a summary of the literature is provided,
in order to help the reader with a better understanding of the current state of the art. Following
each review, we will discuss about each proposed IDS on the applicability to WSNs.
4.3.1 Agent Based Distributed and Collaborative IDSs
The rst article on intrusion detection for MANETs was written by Zhang and Lee [94]. They
proposed an agent based distributed and collaborative IDS which is compliant with the Wireless
Ad Hoc Network operating conditions. As also mentioned in [76], the IDS agent described in [94]
is composed of six blocks as shown in Figure 4.3: The local data collection block is responsible
for collecting real-time audit data (user activities, system call activities, communication activities,
and other traces) within its radio receiver range. This real-time audit data is analyzed by the local
detection engine for the evidence of any kind of anomaly. In case of any anomaly detection, this block
informs the local response and global response blocks (either one of them or both, depending the type
of attack) in order to take a response against the anomaly (a possible intrusion). If the detection is
inconclusive and needs more evidence, cooperation is conducted by the cooperative detection engine
block and the communications with the neighboring agents needed for this cooperation is done
through the secure communication block. For each agent, there is a module to detect anomalies,
called the \local detection engine". These modules have two components, namely:
 features: describes a logical event in the network such as the percentage of the route
changes of a node's routing table.
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 modeling algorithm: uses features as an input to the rule based pattern matching al-
gorithm and then species whether the incidence is a normal or not according to the
predened matching criterion.
In their model, every node participates in the decision making process. After a certain threshold, the
local IDSs trigger the global IDS which necessitate collaborative decision of the nodes neighboring
the agged node. This decision is made through a majority voting process. Detection is made by
using the means of \entropy": The higher the entropy, the higher is the probability of anomaly. The
proposed method is useful to detect only the attacks against the routing protocols; i.e., mis-routing,
false route updating, packet dropping, DoS.
After anomalies are detected, depending on the level of the anomaly, either a local response
is created or a global (collaborative) response is created among with the neighboring nodes. And
communications pertaining to this global response should be assessed through secure communication
links among the nodes. According to the authors, determining the features that would lead the
modeling algorithm to detect anomalies with low percentage of false positive detection rates is a
non-trivial task.
The authors used two types of classiers: Decision tree and Support Vector Machine. Updates
of the routing tables are chosen as a trace data in three ways: percentage of the changed routes,
percentage of changes in the sum of hops of all the routes, and the percentage of newly added routes.
Trace analysis and anomaly detection are the two main methods for the IDS that are used by the
authors. Data obtained from normal network routing operation is fed to the training algorithm to
obtain reference values of the classiers. Then deviations (correlate) from normal prole classiers
are used to determine the anomalies in the network routing.
The devised method was tested on the ns-2 simulator for the following MANET routing protocols:
DSR (Dynamic Source Routing; a reactive, source initiated, on-demand routing protocol), AODV
(Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector; a reactive, source initiated, on-demand routing protocol),
and DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector; a proactive, table-driven, routing protocol).
According to the results, their algorithm performs better for on-demand protocols than proactive
protocols, because it is easier to observe the correlation between the trac patterns and routing
message ows in on-demand protocols.
As an extension to their previous work, Zhang et al. [73] introduced the idea of multi-layer
integrated intrusion detection and response, which is built upon the distributed and collaborative
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agent based IDS proposed in [94]. In the latest proposal, the intrusion detection module at each layer
still needs to function properly, but detection on one layer can be initiated or aided by evidence from
other layers. By this way, the authors claim that their IDS can achieve better performance in terms
of both higher true positive and lower false positive detection rates. The proposed schemes [73, 94]
might be applicable to WSNs in a sense that special care needs to be taken: As an example, they
might be applied to a hierarchical WSN, where CHs might run the proposed schemes in a global
sense and the sensor nodes in a local sense (division of the labor).
Following the works of Zhang et al. [73, 94], Albers et al. [77] improved the distributed IDS
structure by including mobile agents with the design. Mobile agents bring the code to the data, as
opposed to traditional approaches where data is conveyed towards the computation location. By this
way, asynchronous execution of the agent is performed on a remote host. This decreases the amount
of data trac (involving the agents) in the network signicantly. On the other hand, it increases the
individual work load of each node, which is not desirable in WSNs. Besides, transmission of mobile
code (an executable portion of the IDS is transferred to the nodes for on-site data processing) would
decrease the bandwidth of the WSN, where bandwidth eciency is of prime importance.
Kachirski and Guha [95] further improved the mobile agent notion of [77] by providing ecient
distribution of mobile agents with specic IDS tasks (network monitoring, host monitoring, decision
making and action taking) according to their functionality across the wireless ad hoc network. This
way, the workload of the proposed IDS is distributed among the nodes to minimize the power
consumption and IDS related processing times by all nodes. Therefore, this scheme is applicable
to WSNs. Another improvement is to restrict computation-intensive analysis of overall network
security to a few nodes only.
4.3.2 Clustering (Hierarchical) based IDSs
In Kachirski and Guha's approach [15], regular nodes do not participate in the global decision
making process. Only the CHs are responsible for the global decision making process and the
response. The main reason for this is to reduce the energy consumption. They wanted to conserve
the energy of the majority of the nodes, by simply assigning them as subordinates under CHs.
In [80], clustering is used to select a single layer of sparsely positioned promiscuous monitors.
These monitors are used to determine routing misbehavior via statistical anomaly detection. To
conserve resources, a cluster based detection scheme is used in which a node is periodically selected
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as the intrusion detection monitoring agent within each cluster. In the proposed architecture, a
detection agent runs on each monitoring node to detect local intrusions and then it collaborates
with other agents to investigate the source of intrusion and coordinate responses.
In [96], the authors proposed a scheme that applies decentralized, cooperative intrusion detec-
tion approach for clustered MANETs. Dynamic hierarchy is used as an organizational model which
allows higher-layer nodes to selectively aggregate and reduce intrusion detection data as it is re-
ported upward from the leaf nodes to a root. This infrastructure not only allows intrusion detection
observations to be gathered eciently from the network, but also provides incremental aggregation,
detection, and correlation as well as ecient dissemination of intrusion response and management
directives. The proposed scheme is tested for the following three scenarios:
 Intentional data packet dropping
 Attacks on MANET routing protocol
 Attacks on network and higher-layer protocols
Clustering based IDSs would be benecial for WSNs if they are applied with special care. Be-
cause, CHs would deplete their energies faster than the other nodes which may cause segmentations
(groups of nodes that are disconnected from each other) in the network. Therefore, extra batteries
might be installed on CHs in order to help them to live longer, or CHs would be elected periodically
in a sense that the node with the highest energy at each period would become the CH.
4.3.3 Statistical Detection based IDSs
Puttini et al. [97] provides an intrusion detection algorithm based on Bayesian classication
criteria. Their design is based on statistical modeling of reference behavior using mixture models
in order to cope with an observable trac composed of a mixture of dierent trac proles due to
dierent network applications. It is focused on the detection of packet ooding, an example of a DoS
attack, and scanning of attacks against MANETs. The proposed model builds a behavioral model
that takes into account multiple user proles and uses a posteriori Bayesian classication of data as a
part of the detection algorithm. In [32], the authors use estimated congestion at intermediate nodes
to make decisions about malicious packet dropping behavior. They suggest that trac transmission
patterns should be used in concert with suboptimal MAC to preserve the statistical regularity
from hop to hop. The proposed intrusion detection technique is a general one which is suitable
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for networks that are not bandwidth limited but have strict security requirements such as tactical
networks. Therefore it is not applicable to WSNs that have limited bandwidth. Statistical methods
require too much data processing in order to sift the information that is valuable for statistics.
Therefore, they are not applicable to WSNs.
4.3.4 Misuse Detection based IDS
Nadkarni and Mishra [98] proposed an IDS based on a misuse detection algorithm. Their imple-
mentation focused on distance-vector routing protocols such as DSDV protocol. Their implemen-
tation aimed at detecting DoS and replay attacks as well as compromised nodes. Their simulation
results have provided signicant results about not only the accuracy and robustness of the scheme
but also the non-degradability of network performance. On the other hand, DSDV requires regu-
lar update for its routing tables which would not only deplete the energy resources of the nodes
faster but also consume a portion of the valuable available bandwidth. Therefore, application of this
algorithm to WSNs is not recommended.
4.3.5 Reputation based IDS
A reputation based IDS scheme promotes node cooperation through collaborative monitoring of
the nodes and a grading system associated with the results of the collaborative monitoring.
Michiardi and Molva [78] used the concept of reputation in order to evaluate a member's con-
tribution to the network. The higher a member's reputation, the more selected connections can
be made with other members of the network. This means that, members of the network would
rather communicate with that particular node compared to the lower reputation ones, which would
encourage members to increase their reputations. The authors dened three types of reputations:
 Subjective reputation: evaluated considering the direct interaction between a subject and
its neighbors.
 Indirect reputation: evaluated by the non-neighbor members of the community.
 Functional reputation: subjective and indirect reputations calculated with respect to
dierent functions (packet forwarding, route discovery, etc.).
Their collaborative reputation evaluation system consists of two basic components:
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 Reputation Table: A data structure, stored on each node which includes the reputation
data pertaining to a node.
 Watchdog Mechanism: Calculates pre-dened functional reputations according to the
data stored at the reputation table and then detects misbehaving nodes. Detection is
based on a threshold value (e.g. zero) of the reputation; if the reputation of a specic
member drops below the threshold value, then the watchdog mechanism will deny any
communications with that member.
DoS attacks were also of concern to them. Therefore, they proposed a generic mechanism based
on reputation to enforce cooperation among the nodes. Besides, this reputation mechanism prevents
DoS attacks resulting from selsh nodes.
CONFIDANT protocol [99] works as an extension to reactive source routing protocols, such as
DSR, and uses a reputation based system that rates nodes based on their malicious behavior. Alarm
messages coming from other nodes are evaluated and the reputation of the node under investigation
is updated only if the messages are coming from the fully trusted nodes. A neighborhood watching
scheme is used to detect intrusive activity made by the next node on the source route. When a
node detects a malicious neighbor, it sends an alarm message to other nodes on its list of trusted
neighbors. The overall protocol may be summarized in one sentence as: \Cooperation of nodes for
the sake of fairness".
Both of the proposed schemes of [78] and [99] are applicable to WSNs with a slight modication:
The renewal period of the reputation tables would be decreased, in order to increase the bandwidth
eciency.
4.3.6 Zone based IDS
With Zone based IDS of Sun et al. [100], the network is divided into non-overlapping zones and
each IDS agent broadcasts locally generated alerts inside the zone. Gateway zones are responsible
for aggregation and correlation of locally generated alerts. Only gateway nodes can generate network
wide alarms. Alerts indicate possible attacks and are generated by local IDS agents, while alarms
indicate the nal detection and can be generated only by gateway nodes.
The functionality of their proposed local aggregation and correlation engine is; to locally aggregate
and correlate the detection results of detection engines. Whereas, the functionality of their proposed
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global aggregation and correlation engine in gateway nodes is; to aggregate and correlate the detection
results from local nodes in order to make nal decisions.
Local alerts are generated according to two detection criteria: 1) Percentage of change in route
entries, which represents the deleted and newly added routing entries in a certain time period; 2)
Percentage of change in number of hops, which represents the change of the sum of hops of all
routing entries in a certain time period.
According to the authors simulations (performed on GloMoSim network simulator); as the mo-
bility decreased, their model responded with fewer false positives. Besides, aggregation algorithm
of gateway nodes achieved much lower false positives than the IDS of local nodes, because they can
collect information from a wider area and make more accurate decisions.
The proposed model detects intrusions in the routing layer of the OSI stack; it ignores other
layers. Since the attacks happening in other layers would not be detected by this model, it is a
partial IDS.
The proposed scheme requires each node to have the geographical information surrounding them.
Although this is possible by attaching a global positioning system (GPS) receiver to the nodes in
MANETs; it is infeasible in WSNs, because (most) sensor nodes are not generally equipped with
GPS.
4.3.7 Game Theory based IDSs
In [101] and [102], the authors present a game-theoretic method to analyze intrusion detection
in MANETs. They use game theory to model the interactions between the nodes of an ad hoc
network. They model the interaction between an attacker and an individual node as a two player
non-cooperative game. According to their assumptions, as long as the beliefs are consistent with
the information obtained and the actions are optimal given the beliefs, the model is theoretically
consistent.
The proposed schemes need a central processing unit, in order to process all the observations
collected by the monitoring mechanism. This requires a high speed microprocessor as well as a large
memory space to store the data to be processed. Therefore, in order to apply these schemes to
WSNs, one should pick a centralized WSN, where a base station (BS) equipped with a computer
that has high speed processing power and large memory. Besides, the schemes should be modied
to decrease the trac load in between each node and the BS. For example, a logging mechanism can
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be used, where each node may store information regarding the data interactions with other nodes
(and also if possible with the attackers). Then these logs may be sent to the BS, for the application
of the game theory based detection.
4.3.8 Genetic Algorithm based IDS
Sen and Clark [103] investigated the use of evolutionary computation techniques to discover
detectors suited to complex (lack of central computing unit, highly mobile nodes, limited resources)
MANET environment. Authors applied grammatical evolution and genetic programming techniques
to detect ad hoc ooding and route disruption attacks on AODV. Authors showed that their evolved
programs performed good on simulated networks with varying mobility and trac patterns.
Although this methodology might be very promising for MANETs where most of the nodes (e.g.
PDAs) are powerful enough to run such energy consuming algorithms; it is not applicable to WSNs
where sensor nodes have limited capacity on data processing along with the data storage.
4.3.9 Other Works
In [104], the watchdog mechanism is implemented on top of DSR protocol to verify that when
a node forwards a packet, the next node in the path also forwards the packet; otherwise the next
node is announced as misbehaving. Watchdogs run on each node, listens to transmissions of the
neighboring nodes in a promiscuous mode. Watchdogs may not always be eective because of the
packet collisions. The proposed watchdog mechanism is applicable to WSNs.
Wai et al. [105] proposed a hybrid IDS that can both work on wired networks as well as wireless
ad hoc networks. The proposed model promises to use both anomaly and misuse detection algo-
rithms. Both the details of the proposed model and the implementation results were not provided,
thus making it impossible to compare its performance to the previously proposed models. Besides,
the proposed scheme requires an end-to-end secure communication channel between nodes, which
generally does not exist in WSNs.
MANETs became very useful for tactical networks such as command posts, vehicle convoys,
autonomous robot systems, and also for infantry troops. The authors of MITE (MANET Intrusion
Detection for Tactical Environments [106]) aim at developing prototypical solutions for intrusion
detection in MANETs, especially in tactical scenarios. The results of MITE have been realized and
evaluated as real-world implementations besides the simulation results. The authors proposed a
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robust and resource saving sensor detector infrastructure as well as supporting components. The
TOGBADmodule of the proposed scheme uses a signicant amount of the network trac. Therefore,
it is not applicable to WSNs, where the bandwidth is a scarce resource and needs to be utilized very
eciently.
Wei and Kim [107] used trac prediction to detect intrusions in Wireless Industrial Networks.
Authors proposed a data trac prediction model based on autoregressive moving average (ARMA)
using the time series data. According to their simulations, the model quickly and precisely predicted
the network trac and sifted out the attackers. Although the achievements seems promising; the
proposed method brings extensive trac load to the network for the sake of the monitoring data
packets and also requires a centralized processing unit to store and analyze the whole trac data,
which are not provided in WSNs.
Readers, who are interested in IDSs designed for MANETs would nd more information in the
following papers:
 Brutch and Ko [82] provided a brief overview of research eorts on IDS for wired networks
and wireless ad hoc networks. Besides, they provide classications and dierent architec-
tures of IDSs and highlight on their limitations in wireless ad hoc operation environment.
They mention the methods to detect the attacks against the routing infrastructure and
also methods to detect the attacks against mobile nodes.
 Mishra et al. [108] provided a brief introduction of MANETs and IDSs, and then summa-
rized the key features of the IDSs proposed in the literature. They provided a survey on
IDSs devised for MANETs.
 Sun et al. [83] provided a brief overview of intrusion detection techniques and a thorough
survey on IDSs in MANETs. They also provided a literature overview of intrusion preven-
tion algorithms proposed for WSNs. The article is written from the point view of secure
in-network data aggregation.
 Sen and Clark [109], provided a survey of IDSs for MANETs. According to the authors,
intrusion detection for MANETs is a complex and dicult task due to the dynamic nature
of MANETs, their highly constrained nodes and the lack of central monitoring points.
 Ngadi et al. [72] also provided a brief survey of IDSs for MANETs.
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Table 4.1 Proposed IDSs for MANETs and their applicability to WSNs.
Proposed system Detection technique Applicability to WSNs
Zhang and Lee [73, 94] distributed and collaborative applicable with modication
Albers et al. [77] distributed and collaborative not applicable
Michiardi and Molva [78] reputation applicable with modication
Kachirski and Guha [15] clustering applicable with modication
Kachirski and Guha [95] distributed and collaborative applicable
Huang and Lee [80] clustering applicable with modication
Sterne et al. [96] clustering applicable with modication
Puttini et al. [97] statistical not applicable
Rao and Kesidis [32] statistical not applicable
Nadkarni and Mishra [98] misuse not applicable
CONFIDANT protocol [99] reputation applicable with modication
Sun et al. [100] zone based not applicable
Patcha and Park [101, 102] game theory applicable with modication
Marti et al. [104] watchdog applicable
Wai et al. [105] hybrid not applicable
MITE protocol [106] network monitoring not applicable
Sen and Clark [103] genetic algorithms not applicable
Wei and Kim's [107] autoregressive moving average not applicable
4.3.10 Summary and Future Remarks
In this section, we present IDSs that are proposed for MANETs and discuss their applicability
to WSNs. Some systems would be applicable directly (generic proposals), some would be applicable
with major modications, while the rest would not be applicable to WSNs (specic proposals),
simply because of the unique design requirements of WSNs. Table 4.1 summarizes the schemes
discussed so far, in terms of their detection technique and their applicability to WSNs.
Clustering (hierarchical networking) would be benecial in adapting MANET IDS schemes to
WSNs. For instance, consider the application of agent based IDS of [73] to a clustered WSN. The
proposed IDS scheme would be divided into two categories as follows: Global IDS agents would be
installed (with a full version of the scheme) on CHs; whereas local IDS agents would be installed
(with a light version of the scheme excluding the global components) on each sensor node as shown
in Figure 4.4. After two or more local IDS agents report the occurrence of an event, a global IDS
agent would take charge and run a global detection sequence throughout the network. By running
the full version of the scheme only on CHs and running the lighter version on the sensor nodes, the
energy consumption of the whole scheme on the WSN would be signicantly decreased and as a
result; total life time of the network would be increased.
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Figure 4.4 Application of an IDS devised for a MANET to a WSN by using clustering approach.
4.4 IDSs proposed for WSNs
Intrusion detection in WSNs is becoming a key research topic addressed in the literature. There-
fore, in this section, the research done so far in this eld is summarized. Before starting, in Section
4.4.1, the unique challenges of WSNs that make it dicult to apply traditional (designed for wired
or generic wireless networks) IDSs are presented. WSNs are special version of MANETs, with very
specic design restrictions. Therefore, in Section 4.4.2, the key dierences of both networks will
be mentioned. Finally, in Section 4.4.3, the state-of-the-art IDSs in the literature of WSNs will be
provided. Following all the reviews, we will discuss about advantages and disadvantages of each
scheme by providing them in a comparable chart.
4.4.1 Constraints and Research Challenges in WSNs
The proliferation of WSNs led researchers to develop strategies about providing stable commu-
nications and networking for distributed network environments, and also about how to secure these
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strategies with limited resources. The lack of xed infrastructure (i.e., gateways, routers, base sta-
tions, etc.) makes the design of security related models and algorithms for WSNs more dicult.
Bandwidth, throughput, battery life are the scarce resources that need to be used with great con-
sideration. Following is a brief list of constraints and the corresponding challenges they bring to
WSNs:
 There is no infrastructure in WSNs to support operations such as communications, rout-
ing, real time trac analysis, encryption, etc.
 Nodes are prone to physical capture, tampering or hijacking which compromises network
operations.
 Compromised nodes may provide misleading routing information to the rest of the WSN
leaving the network un-operational (blackhole, wormhole, sinkhole attacks).
 Wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping, which would reveal important
data to adversaries and/or to jamming/interfering, which would cause DoS in the WSN.
 There is no trusted authority; decisions have to be concluded in a collaborative manner.
In designing an IDS for WSNs, these constraints and challenges should be considered.
4.4.2 Dierences between MANETs and WSNs
Roman et al. [110], highlighted the fact that the IDSs that are designed for MANETs cannot
be applied to WSNs directly. Since MANETs are mobile and IDSs for them are designed in the
same manner, they will be less eective in a stationary network such as WSNs. Following are basic
distinctive features that dierentiate WSNs from MANETs:
 Mobility: Compared to mobile MANET nodes, WSN nodes are generally stationary.
 Computational capacity: WSN nodes have limited computational power compared to the
MANET nodes. A typical sensor node such as MICAz [111] runs an Atmel ATmega128L
processor with a maximum speed of 16 MHz [112], whereas a typical MANET node, such
as generic commercial laptop, may have a processor with a maximum speed of 4 GHz [113].
 Communications range: The range of communication is around 20-30 meters for WSN
nodes (for MICAz [111]), whereas it is up to 100 meters for MANET nodes (for XBee
WiFi module [114]).
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 Communications bandwidth: The communication bandwidth is limited to 250 kbps (for
a typical MICAz mote [111]) data rate in WSNs, whereas it goes up to 65 Mbps (for a
typical XBee WiFi module [114]) data rate in MANETs.
 Lifetime of the power source: WSN nodes have a very limited power source, such as 2 AA
sized batteries for MICAz motes [111] (with an approximate energy capacity of 10 Wh),
whereas MANET nodes generally have a bigger battery, such as laptop batteries (with
an approximate energy capacity of 150 Wh). Obviously, this would aect their lifetime
directly. Assuming that their power consumption rates are same, MANETs would have
approximately 15 times more life time compared to WSNs.
 Autonomy: In MANETs, every node is managed by a human user, whereas in WSNs
every node is autonomous in a sense that it receives and sends data from/to the base
station (BS). That BS is generally managed by a human but not the sensor nodes.
 Node density: Node density in WSNs is higher than that in MANETs. On the other
hand, WSNs nodes are more susceptible to hardware failures (battery constraints, lacking
physical security, etc.), which would decrease the node density with advancing time.
Before adapting an IDS that is designed for a MANET to a WSN, these distinctive features
should be considered.
4.4.3 Proposed Schemes
Clustering (Hierarchical) based IDSs: In [9], a hierarchical framework for intrusion detection
as well as data processing is proposed. Throughout the experiments on the proposed framework,
they highlighted the signicance of one-hop clustering. The authors believed that their hierarchical
framework was useful for securing industrial applications of WSNs with regard to two lines of defense.
In [10], the authors proposed an isolation table to detect intrusions in hierarchical WSNs in an
energy ecient way. Their proposal required two-levels of clustering. According to their experiment,
their isolation table intrusion detection method could detect attacks eectively. The problem with
this proposal is as follows: The authors claim that each level monitors the other level and report
any anomalies to the base station. Since it is a hierarchical network, any alert generated by the
lower level nodes must pass through the higher level nodes. In the case that the higher level node
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is the intruder, it will not allow the BS to be aware of its misbehavior by simply blocking the alert
messages it receives from the lower level nodes.
In [14], an IDS based on clustering approach was proposed. Their proposal also ensured the
security of the CHs. In their approach, members of a cluster monitor their CH in a time scheduled
manner. In this way, energy for all cluster members is saved. On the contrary, cluster members
are monitored by the CH, not by the contribution of cluster members. This also saves the energies
of the cluster members. Through simulations, the authors showed that their proposed algorithm is
much more ecient compared to other algorithms in the literature. The problem with this approach
is its key management mechanism. It's a part of the IDS and helps the IDS to establish pairwise
keys among the nodes. The IDS uses these keys through the authentication of the messages. The
key management assumes that the nodes are stationary (non-mobile) and the new nodes cannot be
added after the pairwise keys are established. This constitutes a handicap for the model considering
the fact that WSN may periodically require deployment of the new nodes.
In [115], the authors incorporated a hierarchical IDS model in which the network is divided into
clusters and for each cluster, a CH is elected. They issued centralized routing, meaning that every
packet of transmitted data will be forwarded to the CH and then to the base station. Their proposal
included a method to place intrusion detectors in the CHs so that the entire network is covered with
a minimum number of detectors. The authors did not provide any simulation results or any real
experimental data. So, it is not clear whether the system would perform as promised.
In [11], a distributed cluster based anomaly detection algorithm was proposed. They minimized
the communication overhead by clustering the sensor measurements and merging clusters before
sending a description of the clusters to the other nodes. The authors implemented their proposed
model in a real-world project. They demonstrated that their scheme achieves comparable accuracy
when compared to centralized schemes with a signicant reduction in communication overhead.
Distributed and Collaborative IDSs: Krontiris et al. [116] proposed a distributed IDS for WSNs
based on collaborative neighborhood watching. In a simulation environment, the authors evaluated
the eectiveness of their IDS scheme against blackhole and selective forwarding attacks.
In [117], a solution to the problem of cooperative intrusion detection in WSNs was proposed,
where the nodes were equipped with local detector modules and have to identify the intruder in
a distributed way. The detector modules triggered suspicions about an intrusion in the sensor's
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neighborhood. The authors presented necessary and sucient conditions for successfully exposing
the attacker and a corresponding algorithm that is shown to work under a general threat model.
In [81], the proposed IDS used a specication based detection algorithm. The authors used a
decentralized approach of detection in which intrusion detectors were distributed among the network
(their distance was one-hop, covering the entire network). The collected information and its pro-
cessing were performed in a distributed fashion. They claimed that this distributed approach was
more scalable and robust compared to a centralized approached owing to the fact that the intrusion
detectors had dierent views of the network by being distributed to all over the network.
Statistical Detection based IDSs: Ngai et al. [118] presented an algorithm to detect the intruder
in a sinkhole attack. The proposed algorithm rst nds a list of suspected nodes and then eectively
identies the intruder in the list through a network ow graph. The algorithm implements a mul-
tivariate technique (statistical - parametric technique) based on the chi-square test. Eectiveness
and accuracy of the proposed algorithm is veried by both numerical analysis and simulations. The
authors claimed that their algorithm's communication and computational overheads are reasonable
for WSNs.
In the proposed algorithm of [119], the sensor network adapts to the norm of the dynamics in
its natural surroundings so that any unusual activities can be singled out. In order to achieve this,
they employ a hidden Markov model. The authors claimed that their proposed algorithm is easy
to employ, requiring minimal processing and data storage. The functionality and practicality of the
algorithm is shown through experimental scenarios. The proposed algorithm sifts out any unusual
readings by using the statistical approach. So it is a very specic kind of IDS that is mainly focused
on the accuracy of the data gathered rather than the security of the nodes or the links.
In [120], the authors proposed a real time, node based anomaly detection algorithm that observes
the arrival processes experienced by a sensor node. They developed an arrival model for the trac
that can be received by a sensor node and devised a scheme to detect anomalous changes in that
arrival process. The detection algorithm kept short term statistics using a multi-level sliding window
event storage scheme. In this way the algorithm could compare arrival processes at dierent time
scales. The authors claimed that their algorithm was resource aware and has low complexity.
Game Theory based IDS in WSNs: In [12] and [13], Agah et al. considered attack and detection
as both participants of the game and formulated strategies for both parties. In order to increase
detection probability, strategies were normalized into a non-cooperative, non-zero game model. Both
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schemes focused on determining the weakest node in the network and then providing strategies to
defend that node. The problem with this approach was that there might be multiple intrusions to
the WSN and only one of them would be caught by the IDS while leaving others undetected.
Anomaly Detection based IDSs: In [121], Rajasegarar et al. provided a survey article about the
state of the art in anomaly detection techniques for WSNs. They suggested for the researchers (for
anomaly detection) to consider the inherent limitations of WSNs in their design so that the energy
consumption in sensor nodes is minimized and the lifetime of the network is maximized. In [122],
the same authors proposed a solution to the problem of minimizing the communication overhead in
the network while performing in-network computation when detecting anomalies. Their approach
to this problem is based on a formulation that uses distributed one-class quarter-sphere support
vector machines to identify anomalous measurements in the data. Data vectors are mapped from
the input space to a higher-dimensional space for further investigations. The authors implemented
their proposal in a real-world project and they claimed that their model was energy ecient in terms
of communication overhead while achieving comparable accuracy to a centralized scheme.
Bhuse and Gupta [123] proposed lightweight methods to detect anomaly intrusions in WSNs.
Their main idea was to re-use the already available system information (such as neighbor lists,
routing tables, sleep/wake-up schedules, receive signal strength indication, MAC layer transmission
schedules) that was generated at various OSI layers of a network protocol stack, especially the
physical, MAC and routing layers. In order to have a better detection rate, the authors proposed
multiple detectors monitoring dierent layers of the OSI stack. This is not feasible for WSNs,
because intrusion monitoring in dierent layers and sustaining the coordination of these monitors
may rapidly deplete the scarce resources of the WSN. Besides, the authors proposed their schemes
for outsider attacks only, ruling out the insider attacks. This is inadequate choice, because sensor
nodes in a WSN are very vulnerable to insider attacks such as physical capture attack, Sybil attack,
etc.
Onat and Miri [124] provided an IDS for WSNs that was based on detection of packet level
receive power anomalies. The detection scheme was focused on transceiver behaviors and packet
arrival rates of the neighboring nodes of a particular node. WSNs are rarely mobile and therefore
they have a stable communication pattern when compared to MANETs. The authors exploited this
specic distinction. Each node built a simple statistical model of its neighbors' behavior and used
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this statistics to detect any abnormal changes in the future. The proposed model worked well to
detect impersonation attacks.
Watchdog based IDS: Roman et al. [110] provided guidelines about application of IDSs (that
are designed for MANETs) to static WSNs. Then they propose an IDS for WSNs called `sponta-
neous watchdogs', in which the neighbors are optimally monitored and where some nodes choose to
independently monitor the communications in their neighborhood.
Reputation (Trust) based IDS: Wang et al. [125] proposed an IDS for WSNs that uses packet
marking and then heuristic ranking algorithms to identify most likely bad nodes in the network.
Each packet is encrypted and padded so as to hide the source of the packet. The packet mark is
added in each packet such that the data sink can recover the source of the packet and then gure
out the dropping ratio associated with every sensor node. According to their simulations, most of
the bad nodes could be identied by their heuristic ranking algorithm with small false positive rate.
Bao et al. [126] proposed a hierarchical trust management for WSNs to detect selsh and ma-
licious nodes. Authors developed a probability model utilizing stochastic Petri nets technique to
analyze the protocol performance and validated subjective trust against objective trust obtained
based on ground truth node status. Their trust-based IDS algorithm outperforms anomaly-based
IDS algorithms in the detection probability percentage while maintaining suciently low false pos-
itive rates.
4.4.4 Issues and Comments Concerning the Proposed Schemes
IDSs proposed for WSNs are summarized in Table 4.2 including their required network archi-
tecture, detection technique and highlighting features of each scheme. Accordingly, the following
conclusions are drawn for the proposed IDSs in WSNs:
 In hierarchical, clustering based IDSs, clustering algorithms may consume considerable
amount of the network's energy through the formation of the clusters. After the clusters
are formed and the CHs are elected, CHs may constitute a single point of failure and they
have to be secured. Besides, if the CH is not a special node (more powerful), then the
overhead of being a CH will diminish its resources very quickly.
 Agent based IDSs reduce the network load and latency. On the other hand, they cause
high energy consumption of the nodes they are working on. Communication cost between
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Table 4.2 Comparison of the IDSs proposed for WSNs.
Proposed
system
Architecture Detection technique Highlighting features
Da Silva et
al. [81]
Distributed Rule based approach (in-
terval rule)
Scalable, robust and fast intrusion detection.
Roman et
al., [110]
Distributed
and Coopera-
tive
Spontaneous watchdogs Relies on the broadcast nature of sensor communi-
cations and takes advantage of the high density of
sensors being deployed in the eld.
Chen et al.
[10]
Hierarchical Rule based approach Uses monitoring group of nodes and routing tables
for detection
Su et
al. [14]
Hierarchical Rule based approach
(packet dropping rate)
Saves energy, extends the network lifetime. On the
other hand, new nodes cannot be added to the net-
work.
Strikos
[115]
Hierarchical Rule based approach Combined already existing approaches, in order to
achieve a more complete solution. Neither simula-
tion results, nor real world experimental results are
provided.
Rajasegarar
et al. [11]
Hierarchical Specication based ap-
proach, data clustering
(standard deviation from
the average inter-cluster
distance)
Achieved comparable performance with the central-
ized schemes.
Krontiris et
al. [116]
Distributed
and Coopera-
tive
Rule based approach
(packet dropping rate)
Detects only blackhole and selective forwarding at-
tacks. Besides, proposed solution works only when
there is one attacker.
Krontiris et
al. [117]
Distributed
and Coopera-
tive
Specication based ap-
proach
Proposed solution works only when there is one at-
tacker.
Ngai et al.
[118]
Centralized
(BS)
Statistical based anomaly
detection (parametric),
routing pattern anomalies
Specied to detect Sinkhole attacks only.
Doumit
and
Agrawal
[119]
Hierarchical Statistical anomaly based
approach (parametric),
hidden Markov model
Focused on the accuracy of the data gathered, rather
than the security of the nodes or the links.
Onat and
Miri [120]
Stand alone Statistical based anomaly
detection (real time trac
on the nodes, arrival pro-
cess)
Keeps short term dynamic statistics using a multi-
level sliding window event storage scheme. The
scheme works on each node, therefore the detections
are local and nodes are not aware of the attacks
globally (network-wide).
Agah et al.
[12, 13]
Hierarchical Game theory along with
Markov decision process
Only one of the clusters of the network is monitored
at a time. This leaves the rest of the network un-
protected.
Bhuse and
Gupta [123]
Stand-alone Rule based approaches (for
physical, MAC, routing
and application layers)
Proposed lightweight techniques that would detect
anomalies at all layers of a network stack in WSNs.
Onat and
Miri [124]
Distributed
and Coopera-
tive
Statistical anomaly based
approach (average receive
power and average packet
arrival rate)
Exploits the stability of the neighborhood informa-
tion of the WSN nodes.
Rajasegarar
et al. [122]
Distributed Anomaly based approach,
support vector machine
Minimizes communication overhead while perform-
ing in-network anomaly detection.
Wang et al.
[125]
Centralized
(data sink)
Reputation based ap-
proach
Uses heuristic ranking algorithms to identify most
likely bad nodes in the network.
Bao et al.
[126]
Hierarchical Reputation based ap-
proach
Uses high scalable cluster-based hierarchical trust
management protocol to eectively identifying the
selsh and malicious nodes.
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agents and coordinator, or in between agents, may cause congestion and bottle neck in
the network.
 Rule based IDSs are simple to install and easy to operate. On the other hand, they need
continuous rule updates in order to cope with the new released attacks.
 Data mining based IDSs can detect unknown attacks. Unfortunately they have high
computational complexity and high energy consumption requiring large amounts of data
samples. Besides, they also need ecient analytic tools to analyze mass audit data and a
mass storage.
 In game theory based IDSs, the detection rate can be adjusted by the network security
administrator through changing the parameters. The problem with this system is that it
is non-adaptive and requires human intervention for a stable operation.
4.5 Future Directions in the Selection of IDS for WSNs
Energy consumption of the IDSs is an important issue from a system design point of view. WSNs
consume energy through sensing the surrounding phenomena, processing the sensed information and
transmitting the resultant data. Therefore, the IDSs need to spend the least amount of energy as
possible to spare enough energy for the crucial operations of the WSN. As a result of this low energy
consumption requirement of WSNs, it is benecial to use a hierarchical model for IDSs. This means
that the network would be divided into clusters, each of which will have a CH. Accordingly, the
energy consumption will be minimized by avoiding the need for all the nodes to send data to the
BS. Besides, high energy consuming IDS algorithms would run only on the CHs which would save
energy on the rest of the nodes and ultimately increase the total lifetime of the network.
Since there are a variety of intrusion detection algorithms available, the selection of the intrusion
detection technique would be specic to the requirements of the intended application; i.e, the attacks
that need to be detected, the accuracy of the detection (percentage of the false positives and true
positives), and the duration of the detection time.
Our suggestion for the selection of the IDS for WSNs will be application specic (various sug-
gestions for dierent applications):
 For the mobile applications, where sensor nodes are in movement, we recommend the
usage of distributed and cooperative IDS schemes, as they are scalable, robust and fast.
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Da Silva et al.'s [81], Roman et al.'s [110] and nally Onat and Miri's [124] proposed
schemes are recommended as the most promising ones among those presented in Table
4.2.
 For the stationary applications, where there is a centralized computing unit at BS or at
data sink, we recommend the usage of centralized IDS schemes, as they are powerful and
can detect whole range of attacks. Among the schemes presented in Table 4.2, Wang et
al.'s [125] proposed scheme is recommended for adopting or can be a good starting point
to build on it.
 For the cluster based applications, where the network is divided into clusters, the usage
of hierarchical IDS schemes is suggested. Among the schemes presented in Table 4.2,
Su et al.'s [14] work is recommended, if the network is stable and no nodes are to be
added. Otherwise, Bao et al.'s [126] work is suggested, as it is ecient for the scalable
and dynamic network topologies.
For the researchers that are considering to simulate and compare the performances of the various
IDS schemes, Adaobi et al.'s work [127] would be a good starting point. In their work, authors
provide a case scenario on how to simulate an attack against a WSN and evaluate the performance
of an anomaly-based IDS. Authors simulate their scenario in ns-2 simulation environment [65], with
AODV protocol. They provide 4 metrics (namely, true positives, true negatives, false positives, and
false negatives) calculated by analyzing the packet delivery ratio while changing the pulse rate.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper published regarding the eects of the IDSs on
the energy consumption of WSNs. For the researchers that are considering to evaluate the cost of
the IDS schemes on the WSNs, this would be a good topic to research.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter; IDSs along with their classications, design specications and requirements,
are briey introduced. Secondly, IDSs that are proposed for MANETs are presented and their
applicability to WSNs, are discussed. Thirdly, IDSs proposed for WSNs are discussed and their
distinctive features are highlighted in a comparable chart, followed by the comments regarding IDSs
that would be applicable to WSNs are presented. Finally, in order to help researchers in the selection
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of IDS for WSNs, recommendations of promising proposed schemes are provided along with future
directions for this research.
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CHAPTER 5 :
POWER AND CONNECTIVITY AWARE CLUSTERING FOR WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
5.1 Introduction
As mentioned in earlier chapters, WSNs are characterized by severely constrained computational
and energy resources, and an ad hoc network operational environment. They pose unique challenges,
due to limited power supplies, low transmission bandwidth, small memory sizes and limited energy;
therefore, networking techniques used in traditional networks cannot be adopted directly [24]. So,
new ideas and approaches (algorithms) are needed in order to increase the overall performance of
the network, especially in terms of total life-time. Clustering, is one of those techniques that is
very useful to WSNs in data aggregation, and is the main focus of this chapter.
A clustered-WSN is typically as shown in Figure 5.1. Each cluster is a group of interconnected
sensor nodes with a dedicated node called cluster head (CH). CHs are responsible for the management
of the cluster such as scheduling of the medium access, dissemination of the control messages, and
the most importantly, data aggregation [23]. The size of a cluster is dened as the hop distance from
the CH to the farthest node in the cluster. For example, in a 3-hop cluster, the distance between
the CH and the farthest node is 3-hops (4 nodes are in the path including the end points). The
clustered network shown in Figure 5.1 has a 1-hop distance in between CHs and the member sensor
nodes.
Clustering is the process of grouping the nodes in a network that are within a specied hop
distance or have some shared common properties into clusters and electing CHs for each cluster.
This election can be made permanent (static clustering) or repeated in some certain time intervals
(dynamic clustering). Clustering is used in many applications of wireless sensor networks in order
to reduce the trac load on the nodes through data aggregation process, to prolong total network
life-time, to balance the data trac in the network and nally to increase the scalability (allows the
deployment of hundreds or thousands of nodes). Besides, clustering helps us to increase security of
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Figure 5.1 A typical clustered WSN.
the network by allowing implementation of complex cryptography algorithms. By using clustered
networking approach, power consuming algorithms (such as data aggregation) would be run on the
CHs and this would help us to signicantly improve the total life-time of the network.
In this chapter, we investigate clustering algorithms that are proposed for WSNs and propose
a new clustering algorithm that is both power and connectivity aware. The rest of the chapter is
organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides a description of the related work available in the litera-
ture. Section 5.3 presents Kachirski et al.'s connectivity aware clustering algorithm and Section 5.4
provides the revised and improved version of that algorithm. Our proposed power and connectivity
aware clustering algorithm is presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides the comparison of both
schemes and also presents the details of our simulation environment. In Section 5.7, we discuss the
observations regarding the eects of the clustering on the performance of the WSNs. Finally, Section
5.8 concludes the chapter and outlines future work.
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5.2 Related Work
There are plenty of clustering algorithms available in the literature that are proposed for wireless
networks. In this section, we present the most widely used clustering algorithms and mention their
advantages and disadvantages:
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [17], is a distributed clustering algorithm
in which nodes make autonomous decisions without any centralized control. Cluster formation is
cyclically performed and history information of the previous CHs are stored. CHs are assigned as
a result of a random procedure, where each node can declare itself as a CH with some probability.
Energy levels of the nodes are included as a factor in the CH selection whilst connectivity of the
nodes are ignored. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that every node is within K-hops of a CH. This
is the main concern of LEACH, which may cause some nodes to be segregated from the rest of the
network during the time period in between the two election cycles. Another drawback of LEACH
is due to the assumptions that not only the network size and the number of CHs are known in
advance but also all nodes are very well synchronized (in order to ensure that CHs can be re-elected
periodically to balance the energy consumption). These are very specic assumptions that might
not t well to the real life applications of WSNs.
In [18], Bandyopadhyay et al. propose a distributed and randomized clustering algorithm similar
to the LEACH. The proposed algorithm also aimed at energy eciency and its dierence from the
LEACH is that it provides hierarchical (multi-level) clustering as well. Other than that, the proposed
algorithm holds the same concerns and the drawbacks as LEACH does.
In [21], Jia et al. present an energy consumption balanced clustering algorithm (LEACH-EP) for
WSNs that is based upon LEACH algorithm. It introduces energy factor in CH electing threshold,
and optimizes the election probability of CH. As in the case of LEACH, LEACH-EP comes with
specic assumptions as well.
Energy Ecient Clustering Scheme (EECS) [20] is also based upon LEACH algorithm and aims
at energy eciency. Its dierence from the LEACH is the set-up phase of the clusters (cluster
formation). The proposed algorithm holds the same concerns and the drawbacks as LEACH does.
In Hybrid, Energy-Ecient, Distributed Clustering (HEED) [19] approach; CHs are periodi-
cally selected according to a hybrid of their residual energy and a secondary parameter, such as a
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node's proximity to its neighbors or node degree. HEED does not make any assumptions about the
distribution or the density of the nodes, nor their connectivities.
Evenly Distributed Clustering (EDC) algorithm [16] distributes clusters uniformly and minimizes
the number of clusters. It considers the connectivity of the nodes with the K-hop parameter. It is a
heuristic approach, in which each node only exchanges its head selection with its neighbors. Based
on neighbors' selection results, each node chooses the nearest head as its CH. The drawback of this
algorithm is that it does not consider the density of the nodes in a network. In order to increase
the life-time of the network, it is important to elect more CHs in the dense areas of the network.
However, the algorithm is aimed at distributing the cluster heads evenly to the network deployment
eld.
In [23], Brust et al. present algorithms for cluster head candidate selection that are based on
topology (location) of the nodes. The algorithms aim to avoid selecting nodes located close to
the network partition border because those nodes are more likely to move out of the partition,
thus cause a clusterhead re-election. By using the connectivity information, they propose three
algorithms to nd the strong, weak, bridge and board nodes in the network. Authors do not provide
any information on how to select the CHs among their selection of nodes (strong, weak, bridge and
board nodes). Overall, this classication of nodes for CH selection would be useful for the mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs) where mobility is the prime factor that changes the network topology.
However, the network topology in WSNs is quite stable compared to MANETs, and therefore this
kind of node classication is unnecessary for CH selection.
Energy Ecient Unequal Clustering (EEUC) [22] is proposed for periodically data gathering
WSNs. It partitions the nodes into clusters of unequal size, and clusters closer to the base station
have smaller sizes than those farther away from the base station. This way, CHs closer to the base
station can preserve some energy for inter-cluster data forwarding.
Hierarchical clustering proposed in [9] is a framework based on two-level clustering; multi-hop
clusters for data aggregation (the rst level clustering) and 1-hop clusters for intrusion detection
(the second level clustering). Although the idea sounds promising in some applications of WSNs
(especially the industrial applications); the details of the formation algorithms for the multi-level
clustering were missing (we assume that this was left as a future work).
Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm is based on the connectivity of the nodes in the network.
The higher connectivity (neighbors) a node has, the higher probability of it to be elected as the CH
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of a certain neighborhood (cluster). This algorithm is one of the best choice for us to work on for
several reasons: First of all, it did not require probabilistic approach on clustering and therefore the
result of the clustering would cover the whole network. Secondly, the connectivity of the nodes are
the main concern on the election of CHs, which is reasonable. In general the nodes that have more
connections would be rather elected as CHs. Finally, the algorithm is easily implementable, which
allows the proof of the theoretical work on both hardware and simulation environment.
The only missing part in Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm was the power awareness.
Therefore, in this article, we propose our clustering algorithm that is built upon the revised version
of Kachirski et al.'s algorithm. Our algorithm is both power and connectivity aware, that is why, it
provides maximum throughput while saving energies of the nodes, therefore signicantly increases
the life-time of the network.
5.3 Kachirski et al.'s Connectivity based Approach for Clustering
Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm is based on the connectivity of the nodes in the
network. The higher connectivity (neighbors) a node has, the higher probability of it to be elected
as the cluster head (CH) of a certain neighborhood (cluster).
In order to demonstrate the principles of the algorithm, consider the network shown in Figure 5.2.
Here we assume that each node has 1 hop1 connectivity, meaning that each node can communicate
with its direct neighbors that are in 1  hop communications distance (in terms of radio range). In
order to elect the CHs, these are the steps to be followed:
1. Let Ci denote the number of established connections (nodes that are one-hop away in our
case) for node i, with total number of N nodes in the network. Each node calculates its
own Ci value (as shown in Figure 5.3, note that the numbers written each node represents
total number of neighbors for each node) and sends it to all its neighbors.
2. After receiving Ck values from its neighbors k (where k 6= i, for all i = 1 : : : N), a node i
calculates the connectivity index (Si) as shown in Equation 5.1:
Si = Ci +
X
k
Ck (5.1)
1The same method would be applied in the case of multiple-hop (2,3,. . . , etc.) connections if needed.
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Figure 5.2 A typical 9-node WSN.
Figure 5.3 Established connections graph, indicating total number of one-hop neighbors for the
WSN shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.4 Connectivity index graph (1-hop) of the WSN shown in Figure 5.2.
Each node calculates its own connectivity index according to Equation 5.1. For the
network shown in Figure 5.3, the connectivity indices would be as shown in Figure 5.4.
3. Each node broadcasts its connectivity index (Si) to all other nodes with a time to live
(TTL) value equivalent to time spent through one hop communication.
4. Each node then has to participate in a voting session in which the cluster head will be
determined. Each node votes for the node that has the highest Si value, as a result of the
broadcast operation in Step-3.
5. After the voting procedure, if a node receives at least one vote, it is assigned as the
cluster head. After the voting session, the network members in Figure 5.4 select their
cluster heads as shown in the Figure 5.52.
5.4 Revised Version of Kachirski et al.'s Connectivity based Approach for Clustering
In the specic case of the network shown in Figure 5.2, there are nine members of the network
and three members (out of nine) are elected as cluster heads, as a result of the voting procedure (see
Figure 5.5). As the network connectivity increases, we expect to have more connected members in the
network resulting in less number of selected cluster heads. As an example, for the same conguration
of the network in Figure 5.2, if we use 2  hop connectivity for the node communications, we obtain
92
Figure 5.5 Elected cluster heads (1-hop) (shown in yellow color) and associated number of votes,
after the voting session for the WSN shown in Figure 5.2.
the neighborhood graph as shown in Figure 5.6. By applying Equation 5.1 and then performing the
voting session, the connectivity index graph (denoted on the nodes) and the cluster head selections
would be as shown in Figure 5.72.
This is quite an interesting result, since we were expecting to have less cluster heads by increasing
the connectivity (number of maximum hops). This happens because of a fault in the voting procedure
of Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm: We realized that throughout the voting procedure,
nodes are not voting for themselves and this may result in more cluster heads to be elected than
needed. In order to x this problem, we revised Kachirski et al.'s clustering algorithm by letting the
nodes voting for themselves (if they have the highest connectivity index).
We applied the revised scheme to our example network (see Figure 5.2) and the result of the
voting scheme is shown in Figure 5.83. As a result, the total number of cluster heads is one, resulting
in less cluster heads (instead of three) as we expected.
2Cluster heads are highlighted with yellow color and also the votes they received are noted on top of them in red
color writing.
3Cluster heads are highlighted with yellow color and also the votes they received are noted on top of them in red
color writing.
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Figure 5.6 Established connections graph, indicating total number of two-hop neighbors for the
WSN shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.7 Connectivity index graph and elected cluster heads (2-hop) of the WSN shown in Figure
5.2.
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Figure 5.8 Elected cluster heads (2-hop) of the WSN shown in Figure 5.2 by using the Kachirski et
al.'s revised clustering scheme.
5.5 Our Power and Connectivity Aware Approach for Clustering
In WSNs, energy is one of the scarce resources that needs to be conserved. As a result of
the clustering algorithms, elected cluster heads become the highest energy consuming nodes of the
network, since they perform operations related to data aggregation, security, routing, etc., on behalf
of the other nodes.
Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm (see Section 5.3) and its revised version (see Section
5.4) does only consider a node's connectivity with its neighbors while determining a cluster head.
But it does not consider any parameter regarding the energies of the nodes.
In order to increase the total life-time of a WSN, energy (power) levels of the nodes also should
be considered while determining the cluster heads. Therefore, we propose a power and connectivity
aware clustering algorithm based upon Kachirski et al.'s [15] clustering algorithm. We achieve this
by introducing power level readings through connectivity index calculations (step-2). Our scheme
determines the cluster heads according to this calculations. Voting scheme follows the revised version
of the Kachirski et al.'s clustering algorithm (node may vote for themselves).
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The description of our proposed scheme is as follows:
1. Let Ci denote the number of established connections for node i, with total number of
N nodes in the network. Each node calculates its own Ci value and sends it to all its
neighbors.
2. After receiving Ck values from its neighbors k (where k 6= i, for all i = 1 : : : N), a node i
calculates the connectivity index (Si) as shown in Equation 5.2:
Si = Ci +
X
k
Ck +   Pi (5.2)
With the help of Equation 5.2, each node's connectivity index not only carries information
regarding its connectivity with its neighbors but also informs the power level of that
particular node4.
Consider the network shown in Figure 5.2. The connectivity indices and the voting results
were shown in Figure 5.8. Here, we re-calculate the connectivity indices for that network
according to Equation 5.2 as shown in Figure 5.9. Here, each green writing over the
nodes represents the power level (percentage) of that node at the time that the clustering
calculation is done.
3. Each node broadcasts its connectivity index (Si) to all other nodes with a time to live
(TTL) value equivalent to time spent through one hop communication.
4. Each node then has to participate in a voting session in which the cluster head will be
determined. Each node votes for the node that has the highest Si value (nodes are allowed
to vote for themselves), as a result of the broadcast operation in Step-4.
5. After the voting procedure, if a node receives at least one vote, it is assigned as the
cluster head. After the voting session, the network members in Figure 5.9 select their
cluster heads as shown in the Figure 5.105.
When a WSN uses our power and connectivity aware clustering approach, we expect two param-
eters to eect the total-life time of the network:
4In our calculations, Pi value represent the battery level of each particular node, i.e., 1:00 means the battery level
of the node is 100% of its maximum level.
5Cluster heads are highlighted with yellow color and also the votes they received are noted on top of them in red
color writing.
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Figure 5.9 Connectivity index graph (2-hop) of the WSN shown in Figure 5.2, as a result of our
power and connectivity aware clustering approach.
Figure 5.10 Elected cluster heads (2-hop) of the WSN shown in Figure 5.9 by using our power and
connectivity aware clustering scheme.
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Figure 5.11 Total life-time vs. beta, for the WSN shown in Figure 5.9 by using our power and
connectivity aware clustering scheme.
 Power factor (): An optimum value of  can be determined by xing every parameter
in the network and then by observing the total life time of the network with the change
of . Here, it is important to note that,  is not correlated to the connectivity term (Ck)
in Equation 5.2 (i.e., power level of a node is not directly related to the total number of
established connections to a node but to the throughput measured on those links).
 Period of clustering (): It is the time period that determines the renewal of the cluster
heads by re-applying the clustering algorithm. An optimum value of  can be determined
by xing every parameter in the network and then by observing the total life time of the
network with the change of  .
As an example, we simulated our power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm on the
network shown in Figure 5.9 with the simulator discussed in the next section (Section 5.6). Figure
5.11 shows the behavior of the total life time with the change of ; whereas Figure 5.12 shows the
behavior of the total life time with the change of  . According to the result of the simulations, we
may conclude that, for the network conguration of Figure 5.9 and the parameter selection shown
in Section 5.6.2; the optimum value of  is 200 (the total life-time curve in Figure 5.11 saturates
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Figure 5.12 Total life-time vs. period of clustering, for the WSN shown in Figure 5.9 by using our
power and connectivity aware clustering scheme.
for   200) and the optimum value of  is 45 (the total life-time curve in Figure 5.12 gets the
maximum value at  = 45 and starts decreasing as  becomes bigger or smaller than this value).
5.5.1 Applicability of Our Power and Connectivity Aware Clustering Algorithm to
Nowadays WSNs
Our power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm is very applicable to nowadays WSNs.
Because, current Commercial O-The-Shelf (COTS) nodes, such as Wasp motes [35], provide the
power reading of it's batteries (as a percentage) as an available information which could be sent to
other nodes. This information would be used directly by our power and connectivity aware clustering
algorithm in order to determine the cluster heads.
5.6 Comparison of Both Schemes in Terms of Total Life-time of the Wireless Sensor
Network
In order to evaluate and compare the eect of both Kachirski et al.'s (revised) and our power and
connectivity aware clustering algorithms on the total life time of the WSNs, we created a simulation
environment in MATLAB. The details of the simulation environment are as follows:
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Figure 5.13 Radio energy dissipation model used in our simulations [128].
5.6.1 Energy Consumption Calculations
For energy consumption calculations, we followed Heizelman et al.'s work [128]. We assume a
simplied model (since radio wave propagation is mostly non-stable and dicult to model) for the
radio hardware energy dissipation, where the transmitter dissipates energy by running the radio
electronics and the power amplier, whereas the receiver dissipates energy by running the radio
electronics only, as shown in Figure 5.13.
We consider two dierent channel models depending on the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver:
1. Near Field (free space - fs) Channel Model: If the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver is less than a threshold (d0) then this model is used (also called d
2 power-loss
model).
2. Far eld (multipath - mp) Channel Model: If the distance between the transmitter and the
receiver is greater than a threshold (d0) then this model is used (also called d
4 power-loss
model).
According to [21], the threshold value for the distance is calculated as follows:
d0 =
p
fsp
mp
(5.3)
where fs and mp are constants related to free space loss and multipath loss, respectively.
In order to transmit m-bit data to a distance of d, the radio spends:
ETx(m; d) = ETx elec(m) + ETx amp(m; d) =
8>><>>:
mEelec +mfsd
2; d < d0:
mEelec +mmpd
4; d  d0:
(5.4)
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In order to receive the same m-bit data, the radio spends:
ERx(m) = ERx elec(m) = mEelec: (5.5)
The energy spent on the radio electronics circuitry, Eelec, is due to the digital modulation
(transmitter-side), digital demodulation (receiver-side), error correction codes and ltering; whereas
the amplier energy, ETx amp is due to the electromagnetic spreading of the signal into the air and
depends on the distance as mentioned above (see Equation 5.3.).
Let's assume that each cluster head has N member nodes. Cluster head dissipates energy by re-
ceiving the data from member nodes, aggregating those data , and nally transmitting the aggregate
data to the BS. We assume that BS is located far away from the nodes and therefore transmission
between the cluster head and the BS follows the far eld channel model (d4 power-loss model).
During a single data frame, we calculate the energy dissipated in the cluster head as follows:
ECH = fEaggregating data from member nodesg+ fEtransmit aggregate data to BSg:
(5.6)
= fN(mEelec +mEDA)g+ fmEelec +mmp(dtoBS)4g:
where m represents total number bits in a data frame, mEDA represents the energy dissipated
during aggregating m-bit data and nally dtoBS represents the distance between the cluster head
and the BS.
Assume that each member node is located in the near eld of the cluster head, so that near eld
channel model (d2 power-loss model) will be used for calculating the energy dissipated during data
transmission from the member node towards the cluster head. Therefore, we calculate the energy
dissipated in each member node as follows:
Emember node = mEelec +mfs(dtoCH)
2: (5.7)
where dtoCH represents the distance between the member node and the cluster head and therefore
it takes dierent values for each node.
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Table 5.1 Values for the energy consumption related parameters used through our simulations.
Parameter Value
Eelec 50nJ=bit
fs 10pJ=bit=m
2
mp 0:0013pJ=bit=m
4
d0 87:7m
EDA 5nJ=bit=data
For all our simulations in the text, we followed [128] and used the values for the energy consump-
tion related parameters as shown in Table 5.1.
5.6.2 Simulation Parameters
Here are the parameters that we used during the simulation:
 Each node in the network is identical to each other and has a starting energy of 2 Joules.
 There is a base station (BS) located outside of the network to collect the data from cluster
heads.
 The deployment area is 100m x 100m.
 Data ow from nodes to cluster heads. Cluster heads aggregate the data and then forward
to the BS.
 The header size for each frame is 200 bits.
 The header size for each frame is 4000 bits.
 Data rate is 1 frame per 10 minutes (0.1 frames/min).
 We consider a packet drop rate of 5% for the transmission of each data frame due to the
collisions and multi-path fading.
 We consider a stationary network, meaning that both BS and the nodes are not moving.
 Since we will be comparing two clustering schemes, we ignored the cost associated with
the formation (voting and etc.) of the clusters.
 Each simulation is run 1000 times and an average value of the life time (that falls into 95%
condence interval) is calculated. For example, for the simulation result of Figure 5.19
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Figure 5.14 Distribution plot of the simulation time.
(Section 5.6.4), the distribution of the total life-time is shown in Figure 5.14. Here, the
lower bound and upper-bounds of the condence interval (95%) , as well as the mean value
are shown on the graph. Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the corresponding histogram
plot and quantile-quantile plot, respectively. In these gures, the rst plot represents our
simulation data, and the second plots represent the normal distribution (Gaussian) that
has the same mean value as of our data. From these gures, we observe that our simulation
result shows a normal distribution (in quantile-quantile plot, our data cumulates on the
x=y line). Therefore, we calculated the mean value for each simulation in this text to
represent all the values resulted in 1000 iterations.
5.6.3 Coordinates
Throughout our simulations, we assumed that both BS and the nodes are stationary, therefore
their coordinates are xed. For the following sections, coordinates of the nodes and the BS will be
as shown in Figure 5.17. Here, circular shapes represent the nodes (blue ones are the member nodes
and the red ones are the cluster heads) whereas the square shape represents the BS. The red lines
represent the connection between the cluster heads and the BS, whereas the blue lines represent
the connections between the cluster heads and their member nodes. The whole deployment area is
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Figure 5.15 Histogram plot of the simulation time compared to the normal distribution.
Figure 5.16 Quantile-Quantile plot of the simulation time compared to the normal distribution.
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Figure 5.17 Plot of coordinates of the nodes and the BS throughout the simulations.
100m x 100m and the location of the BS is [100m; 100m]. The nodes are deployed to the area with
the following boundaries: [10m; 10m]; [10m; 30m]; [50m; 10m]; [50m; 30m].
5.6.4 Energy Consumption of Kachirski et al.'s Clustering Algorithm (revised version)
We ran Kachirski et al.'s clustering algorithm (revised version) on our simulator with the pa-
rameters shown in Section 5.6.2 and the coordinates shown in Section 5.6.3. We consider 1-hop
connectivity for all nodes in the network. Figure 5.18 shows the total number of neighbors for each
node (including the connection paths), connectivity indices, results of the voting along with the
elected cluster heads.
Figure 5.19 shows the energy consumption performance of the mentioned algorithm with respect
to time. We stopped the simulation, whenever a single node dies (runs out of battery power), and
we call this time as the \total-life time of the network", since at this point the network starts to
disintegrate (segregation starts).
In Figure 5.19, we can see that node-8 depleted its energy faster than other nodes and therefore
determined the network's life-time as 163.77 hours.
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Figure 5.18 Cluster head selection of a 9-node WSN with Kachirski et al.'s algorithm (revised
version) for 1-hop connectivity case.
Figure 5.19 Energy consumption graph of Kachirski et al.'s clustering algorithm (revised version)
for 1-hop connectivity case.
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Figure 5.20 Cluster head selection of a 9-node WSN with our algorithm at time t = 0.
5.6.5 Energy Consumption of Our Power and Connectivity Aware Clustering Algo-
rithm
We ran our power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm (revised version) on our simulator
with the parameters shown in Section 5.6.2 and the coordinates shown in Section 5.6.3. We consider
1-hop connectivity for all nodes in the network. As mentioned in Section 5.5, we selected  as 200
and  is 45, in order to achieve the maximum life-time. Figures 5.20 and 5.21 show the result of the
clustering algorithm at times t = 0 and t = t1(t1 > 0), respectively. Figure 5.22 shows the energy
consumption performance of our algorithm with respect to time. In Figure 5.22, we can see that
node-8 depleted its energy faster than other nodes and therefore determined the network's life-time
as 316.66 hours.
In order to provide further proof of performance improvement on life time, we repeated the same
simulation setup with dierent network topologies with 7 nodes, 9 nodes and nally 15 nodes (see
Figure 5.23). We ran both clustering algorithms on these networks in 3 dierent maximum number
of hops: 1, 2 and 3. The resulting relative performance improvements on the life-time of the network
are as shown in Table 5.2. Accordingly we conclude that, as the maximum number of hops increases,
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Figure 5.21 Cluster head selection of a 9-node WSN with our algorithm at time t = t1(t1 > 0).
Figure 5.22 Energy consumption graph of our power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm
for 1-hop connectivity case.
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Figure 5.23 Dierent network topologies with 7 and 15 nodes.
Table 5.2 Relative performance improvements (%) on the life-time of the network when our algorithm
is used.
Maximum hops for 7-node network for 9-node network for 15-node network
1 hop 86 93 85
2 hops 234 313 256
3 hops 366 463 438
our clustering algorithm becomes more benecial. This is because, more nodes become eligible to be
elected as CHs as the maximum number of hops increases. According to our simulations, the relative
performance improvement of clustering algorithm varies between 85-93% for 1-hop neighborhood,
234-313% for 2-hop neighborhood, and nally 366-463% for 3-hop neighborhood, respectively.
5.7 Some Observations on the Eect of Clustering to the Network Performance
5.7.1 Eect of Maximum Number of Hops on Total Number of Cluster Heads
As the maximum number of hops increases, the nodes in the network achieve more communica-
tions with the other member nodes, and as a result the network requires less number of cluster heads.
To support this hypothesis, we have run the cluster head selection algorithm on a 15 nodes network
for 3 dierent maximum number of hops: 1,2 and 3. The resulting total number of neighbors, con-
nectivity indices, voting results and the elected cluster heads are shown in Figure 5.24, Figure 5.25
and Figure 5.26, respectively. Accordingly, Figure 5.27 shows the plot of maximum number of hops
vs. total number of elected CHs, for a 15 node network.
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Figure 5.24 Clustering of 15-node network, 1-hop communications case.
Figure 5.25 Clustering of 15-node network, 2-hop communications case.
110
Figure 5.26 Clustering of 15-node network, 3-hop communications case.
Figure 5.27 Maximum number of hops vs. total number of CHs for a 15 node network.
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Figure 5.28 Coordinates of the nodes and the BS.
5.7.2 Eect of Total Number of Cluster Heads (maximum hops) on Total Life-time of
the Network
The coordinates of the BS and the WSN nodes are as shown in Figure 5.28. BS is located in
the far eld of the WSN, meaning that the distance between CHs and the BS is greater than 87.7
meters. The simulation parameters are as same as shown in Section 5.6.2.  is chosen as 200 and
the  as 40 frames. By using these parameters and coordinates, we run the simulation for 10 cases of
the maximum hops: 0,1,...,8 and 9. Figure 5.29 shows the behavior of total life-time of the network
with respect to maximum hops. Accordingly, we conclude that as the maximum hops increases, the
total life-time of the network increases. From the slope of the curve, we deduct that this increase
saturated at a certain number of hops. This is the point where each node can reach any node in the
network (6-hops in this case).
5.7.3 Eect of Total Number of Nodes in a Cluster on Total Life-time of the Network
We wondered about the eect of total number of the nodes in the network on the total life-time
of the network. To investigate this, we considered the same network shown in Figure 5.28 along with
the simulation parameters same as Section 5.7.2. The only parameter that is dierent here is the
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Figure 5.29 Maximum hops vs. total life-time of the network.
maximum hops. We kept it constant and equal to 3. Then we started the simulation with 15 nodes
and then each time we removed one of the end nodes, repeated the simulation till we are left with
1 node in the network. As a result, Figure 5.30 shows the behavior of total life-time of the network
with respect to the total number of nodes in the network. Accordingly, we conclude that there is a
certain number of nodes (6 nodes in our case) in the network that provide the network to achieve
maximum total life-time (519.15 hours in our case).
5.7.4 Eect of Data Rate on Total Life-time of the Network
Here, we investigated the eect of frame rate of the nodes in the network on the total life-time
of the network. We considered the same network shown in Figure 5.28 along with the simulation
parameters same as Section 5.7.2. The only parameter that is dierent here is the maximum hops.
We kept it constant and equal to 3. Then we started the simulation with 15 nodes and then each
time we changed the frame rate, repeated the simulation for various frame rates. As a result, Figure
5.31 shows the behavior of total life-time of the network with respect to the frame rate of the nodes
in the network. Accordingly, we conclude that as the frame rate increases, total life-time decreases.
This is an expected result, because as the frame rate increases, more packets are sent between the
nodes thus more energy is consumed.
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Figure 5.30 Total number of nodes vs. total life-time of the network.
Figure 5.31 Frame rate vs. total life-time of the network.
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5.7.5 Conclusions from the Observations
There are 3 major trade-o situations that need to be balanced when implementing solutions
(i.e., security, etc.) to a clustered WSN:
1. There is a trade-o between 'maximum hop count' and 'total number of CHs'. As the
maximum hop count increases, total number of CHs decreases and vice versa.
2. There is a trade-o between 'total number of CHs' and 'total life-time of the network'.
There is an optimum number of CHs which leads network to survive the most life-time
possible (without having any partioning/segregation).
3. There is a trade-o between 'data rate (frames/minute)' and 'total life-time of the net-
work'. As the data rate increases, more data need to be processed and more packets need
to be transmitted causing more power to be spent, therefore the total life-time of the
network decreases.
5.8 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
In this chapter, the energy consumption simulation results of revised version of Kachirski et al.'s
clustering algorithm and our proposed power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm are pro-
vided. According to these results, our proposed power and connectivity aware clustering algorithm
out performed revised version of Kachirski et al.'s clustering algorithm in terms of energy eciency
and also total life-time of the network.
According to the simulation results, with our proposed power and connectivity aware clustering
algorithm, relative performance improvement (compared to the revised version of Kachirski et al.'s
clustering algorithm) in total life-time of the network varies between 85-93% for 1-hop neighborhood,
234-313% for 2-hop neighborhood, and nally 366-463% for 3-hop neighborhood, respectively.
Here, note that mobility can also be included as an another parameter in cluster head calculations
(in Equation 5.2) for MANETs. For example, highly mobile nodes (Wasp motes [35] provide 3-axis
accelerometer reading which would be used to measure mobility) maybe elected as cluster heads,
because they might be in contact with most of the nodes in a certain amount of time. Since WSNs
are mostly stationary, mobility is not considered in the calculations presented in this chapter and
left as a future work to be considered.
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CHAPTER 6 :
AN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON MULTI LEVEL
CLUSTERING FOR HIERARCHICAL WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) framework for hierarchical Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) that is based on multi-level clustering is proposed. The framework is based upon
the clustering algorithm that is proposed in this dissertation (the nodes use our proposed clustering
algorithm that is presented in Chapter 5, while forming their clusters). Our proposed IDS framework
provides two types of intrusion detection approaches, namely \Downwards-IDS (D-IDS) Scheme"
to detect the abnormal behavior (intrusion) of the subordinate (member) nodes and \Upwards-IDS
Scheme" to detect the abnormal behavior of the cluster heads.
In order to detect intrusions towards WSNs, detecting the abnormal behaviors of the member
nodes (in a cluster) is not sucient. As mentioned in Chapter 41, after the clusters are formed and
the CHs are elected, CHs may constitute a single point of failure. Therefore, in order to have a
complete IDS for hierarchical WSNs, intrusions through CHs need to be detected as well.
It is important to emphasize that our focus in this research is on the hierarchical WSNs, meaning
that sensor nodes are gathered into groups called \Clusters"2. Here, we would like to mention the
references that are directly related to our proposal. In the IDS approaches proposed by [9], [10]
and [11], the direction of the alert propagation is from sub-ordinates through CHs, leaving following
question unanswered for the detection part: \What happens if a malicious CH drops the packet that
is coming from a subordinate node and about to alert an upper level CH?". In the IDS approaches
proposed by Agah et al. [12, 13], only one of the clusters of the network is monitored at a time. This
leaves the rest of the network un-protected. In the IDS approach of Su et al. [14], both downwards
and upwards protection are provided, meaning that CH's monitor subordinate nodes and vice versa,
1Readers that are interested to read more on IDSs and related work, may refer to Chapter 4.
2Readers that are interested to read more on clustering algorithms and related work, may refer to Chapter 5.
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respectively. However, the proposed scheme uses SKC and therefore new nodes cannot be added to
the network after the deployment, which makes the proposed scheme impracticable to be used.
For our IDS framework, we adopt the idea of downwards and upwards protection proposed by Su
et al. [14]. For our D-IDS scheme, we adopted the \Isolation Table" concept that was suggested by
Chen et al. [10] and also \Watchdog" concept that was suggested by Krontiris et al. [129]. For our
U-IDS scheme, we adopted the \Monitoring Group" concept that was presented by Su et al. [14].
Finally, for both D-IDS and U-IDS schemes, as a detection algorithm, we adopt the \Sequential
Probability Ratio Test" algorithm that was proposed by Brown and Du [130].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 present the system model of the
proposed IDS framework. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 presents the details of the D-IDS and U-IDS schemes,
respectively. Details of the \Sequential Probability Ratio Test" that is used in our proposed D-IDS
and U-IDS schemes is presented in Section 6.5, whereas Section 6.6 summarized the decision making
process for each scheme. In Section 6.7, the eect of cluster size (maximum hops between cluster head
and cluster members) on the detection probability of our Intrusion Detection System is investigated,
when the IDS is located on the CH (D-IDS). In the reverse manner, in Section 6.8, the eect of total
number of monitoring nodes on the detection probability of a malicious cluster head is investigated,
when the IDS is located on the member nodes of a cluster (U-IDS). Finally, Section 6.9 concludes
the chapter.
6.2 System Model
As the name implies, the proposed IDS is based on multi-level clustering; meaning that level-1
cluster heads (CHs) are the CHs for sensor nodes and at the same time subordinates for level-2 CHs,
in the same manner, level-2 CHs are the CHs for level-1 CHs and at the same time subordinates for
level-3 CHs, and so on, as shown in Figure 6.1.
For the selection of the cluster heads, our proposed power and connectivity aware clustering
algorithm (for details, refer to Section 5) can be used as follows:
 Level-1 CH's would be selected by selecting the maximum hop size as \1".
 Level-2 CH's would be selected by selecting the maximum hop size as \2".
 Level-n CH's would be selected by selecting the maximum hop size as \n".
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Figure 6.1 Multi-level clustering for our proposed IDS framework.
Our proposed IDS framework provides two types of intrusion detection approaches for the pre-
sented multi-level clustered WSN:
1. Downwards Intrusion Detection System (D-IDS): CH's are responsible for watching all
the activities of their subordinates by using watchdogs and recording their activities in a
table called \Isolation Table".
2. Upwards Intrusion Detection System (U-IDS): A certain number of (monitoring group
size, m) subordinates coordinately monitor the activity of the CH and report any abnormal
activity to an upper level CH.
Intrusions through subordinates of the network are detected by the D-IDS and intrusions through
CHs of the network are detected by the U-IDS. By this way, our overall proposed IDS framework
(D-IDS and U-IDS) covers entire network in terms of detecting intrusions.
6.3 Downwards Intrusion Detection System (D-IDS)
CHs hold watchdog counters with abnormality counters for each subordinate. Since the intrusion
detection direction is from CH's towards subordinates, we call this scheme as \Downwards Intrusion
Detection System (D-IDS)" For example, consider the network show in Figure 6.2. Here, Node-A is
the level-1 CH of the remaining nodes. Therefore it has a watchdog (abnormality) counter for each
subordinate node, namely, Node-1, Node-2, ..., Node-6.
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Figure 6.2 Usage of watchdog counters for our D-IDS.
Whenever any watchdog counter reaches a certain threshold, the associated node is agged and
included in the isolation table. Then as a mitigation step, any communication with this node is
blocked (packets to be forwarded to this node as well as the packets coming from this node are
dropped). For example, consider again the same network shown in Figure 6.2. But this time,
assume that the watchdog counter of Node-4 is \10" and also assume that the threshold level for the
watchdog counters is \10" as well. Since the watchdog counter of Node-4 has reached the threshold,
Node-4 is marked as an abnormal node in the isolation table as shown in Figure 6.3. Then nally,
all communications with Node-4 is blocked by the level-1 CH (Node-A).
The mentioned D-IDS is applicable to all levels. For example, consider the network shown in
Figure 6.4. This time, Node-A is a subordinate of Node-X (an upper level node, level-2), just like
Node-B and Node-C. Node-X holds watchdog counters for the abnormal behaviors of Node-A, Node-
B and Node-C. As mentioned above, if any watchdog counter reaches a certain threshold, associated
entry in the isolation table will be marked and a mitigation technique is issued (revocation of the
node from the network).
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Figure 6.3 Usage of isolation table for our D-IDS.
Figure 6.4 Implementation of D-IDS for upper levels of the network.
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6.4 Upwards Intrusion Detection System (U-IDS)
A certain number of (monitoring group size, m) subordinates coordinately monitor the activity
of the CH and report any abnormal activity to an upper level CH. Abnormal activity is determined
when the watchdog counter reaches or exceeds a certain threshold. In accordance with the coordina-
tion concept, the total value of the abnormal cases is calculated by the logical \OR (+)" operation,
individual watchdog results of each monitoring node is OR'ed with the rest of the watchdog results.
As a result, the nal decision associated with the abnormal behavior of the CH is concluded by the
coordinated eort of all monitoring nodes.
The rationale for using OR operation is as follows: In some specic time interval, some of the
monitoring nodes might be in \sleep" mode and therefore might miss the abnormal behavior of the
CH. But in that specic time frame, the other monitoring nodes possibly would be in \awake" mode
and catch the incidence. So, after a certain period of time (update interval), each monitoring node
sends its' individual result to the rest of the monitoring nodes and nal decision is made.
In order to catch most of the incidences (high probability of detection), the sleep/awake cycles of
the monitoring nodes should be assigned accordingly. For instance, if there are 3 monitoring nodes
in a cluster and if one of them is in sleep mode at a specic time frame, then in order to catch the
incidences, the rest of the monitoring nodes should be in awake mode.
Consider the cluster of a network shown in Figure 6.5. Here, Node-A is again the level-1 CH
of the remaining nodes. Subordinate nodes are, namely, Node-1, Node-2, ... Node-5 and Node-6.
Among those, Node-1, Node-3 and Node-5 constitute the monitoring group. Their responsibility is
to monitor the abnormal activity of Node-A (consider that Node-A is showing abnormal behavior
for all time frames t1; t2; t3; t4). At a specic time frame, if the monitoring nodes are in awake mode
and detect any abnormality, they update their watchdog counters, accordingly. For example, at the
specic time frame of t1, Node-1 was in sleep mode and therefore it was not able to detect any
abnormality. But, Node-3 and Node-5 were in awake mode and detected an abnormality of Node-A
and updated their own watchdog counters, accordingly (associated to the time frame of t1). At the
end of the time frame t4, it is observed that out of 4 instances, Node-1 detected 2 instances, Node-3
detected 3 instances and Node-5 detected 2 instances.
The monitoring nodes share the entries of their watchdog counters among each other in certain
time intervals. In the specic case shown in Figure 6.5, assume that the monitoring nodes share the
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Figure 6.5 Usage of monitoring group for our U-IDS.
entries of their watchdog counters after the time frame t4. This is shown in Figure 6.6. Here, as a
result of the arrival of the watchdog counter entries from Node-3 and Node-5, Node-1 (m1 ) updates
the watchdog counter entries associated with them and nally the total number of encounters is
calculated by the OR operation as mentioned earlier. In accordance with the updates from Node-3
and Node-5, Node-1 has refreshed its watchdog counter and calculated the total number of incidences
as \4". In the same manner, Node-3 and Node-5 will update their watchdog counter entries and
calculate the total number of incidences as \4".
After each update interval, monitoring nodes check their updated counter values. Whenever
their watchdog counter reach a certain threshold (\15" in our example), they send an encrypted
alert message to an upper level CH. The reason of encryption is to hide the alert message from the
CH that is under investigation (Node-A in our example).
These alert messages are sent directly to the upper level cluster head. In order to do so, we
assume that the radios of the nodes have two dierent operation modes: \Normal" and \Alert".
In the normal mode, since CH's are generally in one hop away, the radios operate to transmit in
short range. This energy saving mode helps nodes to increase their life-time. In the alert mode, the
122
Figure 6.6 Watchdog update propagation in our U-IDS.
Figure 6.7 Alert propagation towards upper levels in our U-IDS.
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radios operate to transmit in long range. By this way, without the help of intermediate nodes, a
monitoring node can directly send the alert messages to an upper level CH.
Consider the case shown in Figure 6.7. Here, as mentioned above, in each update interval,
each monitoring node updates the other monitoring nodes and also check its' watchdog counter.
After a certain period of time, watchdog counters of all the monitoring nodes reached the threshold
value of \15". Therefore, they changed their radio's mode of operation to \Alert" mode and sent
an encrypted alert message directly to an upper level CH, namely a level-2 CH. In this specic
example, Node-1 has a higher probability to alert level-2 CH, since its location is closer than Node-3
and Node-5.
6.5 Detection of DoS Attacks in WSNs by using Sequential Probability Ratio Test
Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) for detection of Selective Forwarding Attacks
(a DoS attack in network layer of WSNs) was used in [130]. This method detects intentional packet
drops with a high probability of detection rate. Therefore, it can be applied to any packet drop
attack towards the security of WSNs, for example DoS attacks in network layer (blackhole attacks,
sinkhole attacks, etc.).
According to SPRT, a random variable p is used to dene the status of packet forwarding, where
0 denotes successful transmission of the packet (Good), and 1 denotes a packet drop (Bad). p is
calculated as the percentage of dropped packets over all packets to be transmitted. p' is dened as
the acceptable probability of dropped packets. A node is considered as legitimate if p  p0 holds,
and it is considered as compromised if p > p0 holds. p0 < p0 < p1 denes the \gray region" for the
decision making, where the decision is inconclusive regarding the legitimacy of the node. Figure 6.8
pictures the decision boundaries for the SPRT, namely; white, gray and black regions.
Note that 1; 2; : : : ;m represents the sample number. The ultimate goal is to minimize the miss
detection rate,  = P1(jDm = 0) and the false alarm rate,  = P0(jDm = 1), where Dm stands for
the decision at step m. At the same time, we need to achieve this in minimum number of samples
(mmin). SPRT calculates this number as shown in Equation 6.1:
mmin =
L(p) log() + (1  L(P )) log()
p log(p1p0 ) + (1  p) log(
1 p1
1 p0 )
(6.1)
Where L(p) is calculated as shown in Equation 6.2,
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Figure 6.8 Thresholds for the decision making.
L(p) =
( 1  )
h   1
( 1  )
h   ( 1  ) h
(6.2)
and h can be determined by solving the Equation 6.3:
p =
1  ( 1 p11 p0 )h
(p1p0 )
h   ( 1 p11 p0 )h
(6.3)
After setting all the parameters (p0; p1; ; ) and collecting m samples, the acceptance threshold
(am) and the rejection threshold (rm) can be found by using Equations 6.4 and 6.5, respectively:
am =
log( 1  )
log(p1p0 )  log(
1 p1
1 p0 )
+m
log( 1 p01 p1 )
log(p1p0 )  log(
1 p1
1 p0 )
(6.4)
rm =
log( 1  )
log(p1p0 )  log(
1 p1
1 p0 )
+m
log( 1 p01 p1 )
log(p1p0 )  log(
1 p1
1 p0 )
(6.5)
Let dame denotes upper bound for am and brmc denotes lower bound for rm. For each sample,
dame and brmc should be revised according to new values of am and rm respectively.
Let dm denotes the number of packets dropped in the m number of samples. Then, SPRT test
needs to be continuously performed as long as the Equation 6.6 holds:
dame < dm < brmc (6.6)
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At each round of the SPRT test, there are three possible outcomes based on the result of the
comparison shown in Equation 6.6:
1. If dm  dame, then the conclusion is that the node is legitimate.
2. If dame < dm < brmc, then the SPRT test needs to be continued.
3. brmc  dm, then the conclusion is that the node is compromised.
6.6 Decision Making in IDSs
According to Patcha et al. [74], decision engine (i.e., decision making algorithm) of an IDS
concludes either one of four decisions (with non-zero probabilities) as a result of the decision making
process over a triggered alarm (event):
 Intrusive but not anomalous (false-negative): There is an intrusion to the system, but
IDS fails to detect it and concludes the event as non-anomalous one.
 Not intrusive but anomalous (false-positive): There is no intrusion to the system, but IDS
mistakenly concludes a normal event as an anomalous one.
 Not intrusive and not anomalous (true-negative): There is no intrusion to the system,
and IDS concludes the event as non-anomalous one.
 Intrusive and anomalous (true-positive): There is an intrusion to the system, and IDS
concludes the event as an anomalous one.
Figure 6.9 summarized the mentioned possibilities regarding the legitimacy assessment of a node.
Eventually we expect the selected decision making algorithm to generate more percentage of true-
positives and true-negatives, and less percentage of false-positives and false-negatives.
6.7 Eect of Cluster Size on the Detection Probability of the D-IDS
In this section, we followed Shin et al.'s approach [9] to evaluate the eect of clustering on the
detection probability of D-IDS. Our main focus is to calculate the eect of the maximum distance
(hops) between cluster head (CH) and cluster members on the intrusion detection probability.
In Figure 6.10, a WSN is divided into clusters. Maximum distance of each cluster is 2 hops,
meaning that in a cluster, a CH (denoted as red nodes in the gure) is maximum of 2 hops away
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Figure 6.9 All possible detection results of an IDS.
from its member nodes. As an example; node A is a CH and nodes B and C are its member nodes.
2-hop cluster does not mean that node C is in direct communication range of A (as we can see in
the gure, C is outside of the communication range of A), but it means that A can connect and
monitor behavior of C through node B (since B is in communication range of both A and C, B
performs as a relaying node between nodes A and C).
CHs (such as node A) can use indirect monitoring (A monitors node C through node B) through
intermediate nodes (such as node B) to detect intrusions that would happen at the end nodes (such
as node C). However, this kind of monitoring denitely will increase the network overhead. Besides,
reliability of the intermediate nodes, such as the sleep rate and error rate, would certainly change
the overall performance of the intrusion detection system.
Let us dene the average Sleep Rate and the average Error Rate3 of all the nodes (except CH and
the malicious node) to be s and e, respectively. Here, we assume that the probability distributions
of these random variables (s and e) to be Gaussian with means 0  E(s)  1 and 0  E(e)  1;
variances 2s and 
2
e .
If a CH detects a malicious node located at j-hop away from the CH in an i-hop cluster, where i
is the cluster size in terms of number of hops, and if 0  j  i holds; then the Detection Probability
(pi;j) of each node is given by:
3Here, Error Rate is due to packet losses caused by the transmission problems, such as packet collisions.
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Figure 6.10 An example of clustered network with a maximum hop distance of 2.
pi;j = f(1  E(s))(1  E(e))gj 1 (6.7)
In Table 6.1, dierent values of pi;j are shown as i and j are varied
4.
Table 6.1 Detection probability (pi;j) for dierent values of i and j.
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4
i = 1 1 N=A N=A N=A
i = 2 1 (1  E(s))(1  E(e)) N=A N=A
i = 3 1 (1  E(s))(1  E(e)) f(1  E(s))(1  E(e))g2 N=A
i = 4 1 (1  E(s))(1  E(e)) f(1  E(s))(1  E(e))g2 f(1  E(s))(1  E(e))g3
Finally, the Average Detection Probability (Pi) of i-hop cluster is given by:
Pi =
1
i
iX
j=1
pi;j =
1
i
iX
j=1
f(1  E(s))(1  E(e))gj 1 (6.8)
4Here, note that the value of j cannot exceed the value of i.
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Figure 6.11 Eect of cluster size on the detection probability of the D-IDS for various packet loss
rates while the sleep rate is 60%.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show dierent values of Pi as the maximum number of hops (i) changes
according to Equation 6.8. There are 5 plots in each gure, for various values of E(e) in Figure 6.11
and E(s) in Figure 6.12, respectively.
In Figure 6.11, E(s) = 0:6 means that the average sleep rate of the nodes is 60%. Each plot
represents a dierent value of E(e) with a variance of 10%. From the plots, it can be observed that
as the packet loss rate of each node increases, the average intrusion detection probability of the
D-IDS decreases, which is expected. As the error rate increases, it becomes dicult for the D-IDS
to determine if the loss of a packet was caused by a channel error (natural causes) or an outside
(intruder) eect.
In Figure 6.12, E(e) = 0:3 means that the average packet drop rate of the nodes is 30%. Each
plot represents a dierent value of E(s) with a variance of 10%. From the plots, it can be observed
that as the sleep rate of each node increases, the average intrusion detection probability of the
D-IDS decreases, which is also expected. As the sleep rate increases, the chance of the D-IDS for
catching an intrusion decreases. Hence, the fewer number of nodes are awake in the network, the
lesser intrusions will be caught by the D-IDS. In other words, an intrusion that would be caught by
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Figure 6.12 Eect of cluster size on the detection probability of the D-IDS for various sleep rates
while the packet loss rate is 30%.
an intermediate node would be simply missed, because the node was sleeping at the exact time that
the intrusion happened.
From the plots of Figures 6.11 and 6.12, we can conclude that as the number of maximum range
of a cluster (maximum number of hops from a CH and a member node in a cluster) increases, the
average intrusion detection probability of the D-IDS decreases. In other words, indirect monitoring
of the intrusions has a bad eect on the overall intrusion detection probability of the IDS.
6.8 Eect of Monitoring Group Size on the Detection Probability of the U-IDS
In this section, we follow Yang et al.'s work [131], to investigate the eect monitoring group size
(m) on the detection probability of malicious cluster heads in our U-IDS. Here, we assume that m of
the member nodes of a cluster has an intrusion detection scheme that are running in a collaborative
manner. Thus, cluster members periodically give a decision regarding the trustworthiness of a cluster
head.
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Figure 6.13 A typical 15-node clustered WSN (1-hop distance).
Consider the clustered WSN (1-hop distance) shown in Figure 6.13. Node A (marked with red
color) is the cluster head and it has 15 member nodes, which are in the radio coverage of A. Among
these member nodes, 4 of them (m=4 ; marked with green color and denoted as m1,m2,m3 and m4)
are collaborating to monitor the activity of A.
In order to calculate the eect monitoring group size (m) on the detection probability of malicious
cluster head, assume that the size of a cluster is N (15 in our case) and the probability of each
member node to detect the malicious cluster head is Pd. Then, the total probability of the malicious
cluster head to be detected PD, as a result of the collaboration size (m) (m number of the nodes) is
calculated as shown in 6.9:
PD =
NX
k=m

N
k

P kd (1  Pd)N k (6.9)
Figure 6.14 shows the change of overall detection probability (PD) with respect to the collab-
oration size (m number of the nodes) for various values of Pd, for a cluster size of 15 (N = 15).
Accordingly, it can be observed that collaboration is useful in increasing the overall detection rate
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Figure 6.14 Detection probability (PD) vs. collaboration size(m) for various values of Pd.
(PD). As the collaboration size (monitoring group size, m) increases, overall detection probability
increases and approaches to 1 (100%).
Again, assume that the size of a cluster is N and the probability of each member node to
fail (false-alarm) in detecting the malicious cluster head is Pf . Then, the total probability of the
malicious cluster head goes un-detected (false-alarm) PF , as a result of the collaboration size (m
number of the nodes) is calculated as shown in 6.10:
PF =
NX
k=m

N
k

(1  Pf )k(Pf )N k (6.10)
Figure 6.15 shows the change of overall false-alarm probability (PF ) with respect to the collab-
oration size (m number of the nodes) for various values of Pf , for a cluster size of 15 (N = 15).
Accordingly, it can be observed that collaboration is useful in decreasing the overall false-alarm rate
(PF ). As the collaboration size (monitoring group size, m) increases, overall false-alarm probability
decreases and approaches to 0 (0%).
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Figure 6.15 Detection probability (PF ) vs. collaboration size(m) for various values of Pf .
6.9 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
This chapter presented our proposed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) framework based on
multi-level clustering for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. It is based upon the proposed clus-
tering algorithm (the nodes use our proposed clustering algorithm while forming their clusters, see
Chapter 5). Our proposed IDS framework provides two types of intrusion detection approaches,
namely \Downwards-IDS" to detect the abnormal behavior (intrusion) of the subordinate (member)
nodes and \Upwards-IDS" to detect the the abnormal behavior of the cluster heads.
The eect of cluster size (maximum hops between cluster head and cluster members) on the detec-
tion probability of a malicious node was evaluated, when the IDS is located on the CH (Downwards-
IDS). In the same manner, the eect of total number of monitoring nodes on the detection probability
of a malicious cluster head was evaluated, when the IDS is located on the member nodes of a cluster
(Upwards-IDS).
There is a trade-o between \maximum hop count" and \intrusion detection probability". As
the maximum hop count increases, intrusion detection probability (of an IDS) decreases and vice
versa. According to the results of the analytical calculations presented in Section 6.7, following
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recommendations are provided for the maximum hop count: Figures 6.11 and 6.12 suggest to keep
the maximum hop distance lower than \4". Maximum hop distance should be selected as \2" or
\3", depending on the \sleep rate" of the nodes and \average packet loss rate" of the network (1.0
represents 100% probability of a node to be sleeping or a packet to be lost): If the \sleep rate"
and/or \average packet loss rate" are higher than 0.7; then the maximum hop distance should be
selected as \2", otherwise it should be selected as \3".
As in most technologies, nothing comes for free. By using more number of monitoring members,
higher detection rates and lower false alarm rates can be achieved. The cost for this achievement is
the loss of scarce resources ( e.g., energy). Therefore, a proper trade-o point need to be determined
in nding the right number for the monitoring group size (m).
As Figure 6.14 in Section 6.8 suggests, out of 15 nodes in each cluster, by selecting m=7 ; very
satisfactory detection probability (> 95%) can be achieved if the individual detection probabilities
are higher than 70%. Again, out of 15 nodes in each cluster and for the same group size (m=7 ),
Figure 6.15 suggests that the false-alarm probability will be lower than 5% if the individual false-
alarm rates are lower than 30%.
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CHAPTER 7 :
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusions
In order to protect Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) from intrusions (attacks), this disserta-
tion presents a security provisioning plan (please refer to Chapter 2) that consists of three main
components: 1)Prevention, 2)Detection, and 3)Mitigation, of intrusions. Solutions to the rst two
components of the security provisioning plan are proposed in this dissertation: an Intrusion Preven-
tion System (IPS) and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
The proposed IPS scheme (please refer to Chapter 3) targets intrusion prevention in user level;
whereas the proposed IDS framework (please refer to Chapter 6) targets intrusion detection in both
sensor level and CH level.
The proposed IPS scheme employs both PKC and SKC approaches, so that it takes advantage
of both schemes. Analysis and simulation results have shown that, the proposed IPS scheme is
not only more secure and yet scalable than existing SKC based schemes, but also requires lesser
processing power and provides higher energy eciency than existing PKC based schemes. Proposed
IPS scheme brings advantages (scalability, exibility) of PKC, without requirement of extra cost
(in terms of energy) on the sensor nodes. Besides, time cost of the proposed IPS scheme is very
negligible compared to the existing PKC based schemes.
The proposed IDS framework provides two types of intrusion detection approaches, namely
\Downwards-IDS" to detect the abnormal behavior (intrusion) of the subordinate (member) nodes
and \Upwards-IDS" to detect the the abnormal behavior of the cluster heads. The eect of cluster
size (maximum hops between cluster head and cluster members) on the detection probability of a
malicious node was evaluated, when the IDS is located on the CH (Downwards-IDS). Similarly, the
eect of total number of monitoring nodes on the detection probability of a malicious cluster head
was evaluated, when the IDS is located on the member nodes of a cluster (Upwards-IDS). Following
the evaluations, optimum numbers for the mentioned parameters are suggested.
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For both components of the security plan (IPS and IDS), clustering is a requirement; meaning
that after deployment, sensor nodes form clusters and elect cluster heads. The proposed power
and connectivity aware clustering algorithm (please refer to Chapter 5) is the main workhorse in
achieving this.
According to the energy consumption simulation results, our proposed power and connectivity
aware clustering algorithm out performed existing clustering algorithm in the literature, in terms of
energy eciency and also total life-time of the network.
7.2 Future Work
The testing and performance evaluation of our proposed IDS framework for a specic attack,
such as blackhole attack, is left as a future work. Besides, in order to inspect the eciency of the
security provisioning plan for WSNs, the interaction and behavior of the proposed IPS scheme and
IDS framework have to be investigated while they are operating together.
In order to investigate real time performances of the proposed algorithms, it is worth considering
the hardware implementation with real sensor devices. Although we have done some simple imple-
mentation tests on 2-3 sensor nodes, it would be better to observe the behavior of our algorithms
while they are operating on a larger scale network consisting of 30-50 sensor nodes.
In general, nodes in the WSNs are considered to be stationary. So, throughout this dissertation,
our proposed algorithms are evaluated accordingly. But for some special applications of mobile
WSNs, the eects of mobility on the proposed algorithms have to be studied.
We anticipate that in providing energy ecient clustering and prevention/detection of intrusions,
the proposed algorithms and schemes presented in this dissertation can be applied (with some
modications) to the new emerging technologies such as pervasive computing, cloud computing,
ubiquitous computing and internet of things.
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A.1 Security Vocabulary
Access control : Ensures that all accesses to objects (information resources) are authorized by
regulating dierent privileged operations.
Attack : A specic formulation or execution of a plan to carry out a threat.
Audit : It is the process of gathering data about activity in the system and analyzes it to discover
security violations or diagnose their cause.
Authentication: It establishes a relation between a user and some identity (password, secret key,
token, etc.).
Authorization: Establishing a relation between a user and a set of privileges (access rights,
allowed operations (read-write, read-only, etc.)).
Availability : The network should always be able to answer any authorized request in its life time
before the request expires.
Condentiality : Only authorized parties should be able to access the data.
Integrity : If an authorized user receives data, this data should be correct and valid; it shouldn't
be changed by unauthorized parties.
Intrusion: A set of actions that are planned to compromise the security goals (integrity, con-
dentiality, and availability) of a computer system.
Non-repudiation: Neither the sender, nor the receiver can deny the transaction of the message.
Penetration: The ability to get unauthorized access to a computer system as a result of a
successful attack.
Risk : Accidental exposure of information, or violation of operation integrity due to the vulnera-
bilities in the system.
Vulnerability : A aw in the system that exposes its information to accidental disclosure.
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B.1 Attacks towards the Wireless Sensor Networks
In the literature, there is a variety of classications for attacks towards the Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) [80, 132{134]. Following, a brief summary of these classications is provided:
 According to Source of the Attack: Internal (insider)/external (outsider) attacks. Intrusion
prevention mechanisms can catch external attacks but not the internal attacks. The only
way of reacting against internal attacks is using the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
After an intrusion is detected then a prevention mechanism would be issued to minimize
the adverse eects.
 According to Participants: Host-based/network-based attacks.
 According to Activity of the Attacker: Passive/active attacks.
 According to the Targeted OSI Protocol Layer: Security attacks can also be categorized
based on the OSI protocol layers that are being targeted for node compromise:
{ Physical layer attacks: radio interference, jamming, DoS.
{ Data link (MAC) layer attacks: sleep deprivation torture (denial of sleep).
{ Network layer attacks: sinkhole, wormhole, blackhole, selective forwarding,
Sybil, HELLO ooding.
{ Transport layer attacks: memory exhaustion attack.
{ Application layer attacks: information gathering attack.
 According to the Techniques Used to Perform the Attack:
{ Cash poisoning: Information stored in routing tables are modied, deleted or
injected with bogus data.
{ Fabricated route messages: Route messages (e.g. request, reply, error, etc.)
that contain malicious data are injected into the network.
 False resource route: False route information is advertised through-
out the network (e.g. setting the route hope count to minimum
regardless of the destination).
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 Maximum sequence: Modifying the sequence eld in control mes-
sages to exceed the maximal allowed value, which would invalidate
all legitimate messages although they normally have sequence time
in the allowed ranges.
{ Flooding: Delivering unusual large amount of data or control packets to clog
the network.
{ Packet dropping: A node drops data packets (conditionally or randomly) that
it was supposed to forward.
{ Rushing: Uses a weakness that some of the routing protocols possess; whichever
routing message arrives rst to the recipient is accepted as the valid route
and the others are rejected (rst come, rst served). The attacker exploits
this vulnerability by broadcasting malicious control messages quickly to block
legitimate control messages that arrive later on [135].
{ Spoong: Injecting data or control packets with modied source addresses to
imitate as if they were sourced by legitimate users.
{ Sybil: A single node presents multiple identities to other nodes of the network.
This causes confusion in the network; nodes receive contradicting routing paths
that are passing through the attacker [136].
{ Wormhole: A tunnel is created (by out of the band, high transmission con-
nection) between two nodes that can be utilized to secretly transmit packets,
which would cause confusion and/or delusion in the network [137].
Among these, we will use both "According to source of the attack" and "According to the
targeted OSI protocol layer" classications as shown in Figure B.1. Following subsections include
descriptions of each item in the Figure B.1.
B.1.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks are performed in a way that it cannot be sensed by any means. This is because
of the fact that the adversaries do not make any radio emissions. Since wireless links are easier to
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Figure B.1 Security attacks towards the WSNs - OSI layered description
tap, wireless networks are more susceptible to passive attacks, such as eavesdropping, which can be
performed easily listening to the wireless communication amongst sensor nodes in the WSN without
capturing any of them. Passive attacks are mainly against data condentiality.
In passive attacks, attackers are typically camouaged, i.e. hidden, and tap the communication
lines to collect data. Passive attacks can be grouped into eavesdropping, node malfunctioning, node
tampering/destruction and trac analysis types (see Figure B.1).
Passive Information Gathering (Eavesdropping): Eavesdropping is also known as \Passive in-
formation gathering". Classied data can be eavesdropped by tapping communication lines, and
wireless links are easier to tap. Therefore, wireless networks are more susceptible to passive attacks.
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Since WSNs use short range communications, attacker must be in proximity in order to gather useful
information.
WSNs are a little more secure against tapping compared to other longer range wireless technolo-
gies, because signals are sent over shorter distances.
Node Malfunctioning: This may happen due to many dierent factors from faulty sensors or
energy depletion due to sensor overwhelming or other DoS attacks.
Node Tampering/Destruction: Physically destruction (with the usage of electrical surge, physical
force or ammunition) or tampering (changing the wiring of the electronic board, memory, etc.) of
the nodes by any means.
Trac Analysis: As well as the content of data packets, the trac pattern may also be very
valuable for adversaries. Important information about the networking topology can be derived by
analyzing trac patterns. In WSNs, the nodes closer to the base station, i.e. the sink, make more
transmissions than the other nodes because they relay more packets than the nodes farther from the
base station. Similarly, clustering is an important tool for scalability in WSNs and cluster heads
are busier than the other nodes in the network. Detection of the base station, the nodes close to it
or cluster heads may be very useful for adversaries because a denial-of-service attack against these
nodes or eavesdropping the packets destined for them may have a greater impact. By analyzing the
trac, this kind of valuable information can be derived.
Moreover, trac patterns can pertain to other condential information such as actions and
intentions. In tactical communications, silence may indicate preparation for an attack, a tactical
move or inltration. Similarly, a sudden increase in the trac rate may indicate the start of a
deliberate attack or raid.
B.1.2 Active Attacks
In active attacks, malicious acts are carried out not only against data condentiality but also
data integrity. Active attacks can also aim for unauthorized access and usage of the resources or the
disturbance of an opponent's communications. An active attacker makes a radio emission or action
that can be sensed by the WSN elements [138]. An example is DoS attack in the physical and/or
network layer that would cause network elements to drop data packets.
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In active attacks, an adversary actually aects the operations in the attacked network. This
eect may be the objective of the attack and can be detected. For example, the networking services
may be degraded or terminated as a result of these attacks. Sometimes the adversary tries to stay
undetected, aiming to gain unauthorized access to the system resources or threatening condentiality
and/or integrity of the content of the network. Active attacks that we are interested for WSNs
grouped into two main groups, attacks towards for all layers and attacks towards network layer.
Network layer attacks are divided into seven classes, as shown in Figure B.1.
B.1.2.1 Attacks Towards all Layers
Denial-of-Service (DoS): A denial-of-service (DoS) attack mainly targets the availability of net-
work services. A DoS is dened as any event that diminishes a network's capacity to perform its
expected function correctly or in a timely manner. A node is isolated from the rest of the network
by blocking the incoming and outgoing packets.
In DoS attack, an adversary attempts to prevent legitimate and authorized users of services
oered by the network from accessing those services. The classic way to achieve this is to ood
packets to any centralized resource (access point) used in the network so that the resource is no
longer available to the nodes in the network, resulting the network no longer operating what was
designed for. This may lead to a failure in the delivery of guaranteed services to the end users.
DoS attack in the physical layer is called jamming. A malicious device can jam a wireless carrier
by transmitting a signal at that frequency. The jamming signal contributes to the noise in the carrier
and its strength is enough to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio below the level that the nodes using
that channel need to receive data correctly. Jamming can be conducted continuously in a region,
which thwarts all the nodes in that region from communication. Alternatively, jamming can be done
temporarily with random time intervals, which can still very eectively hamper the transmissions.
The algorithms in the link layer, especially MAC schemes, present many exploitation opportuni-
ties for DoS attacks. For example, MAC layer DoS attacks may continuously jam a channel. More
complex DoS attacks can be designed based on MAC layer addressing schemes.
In the case of network layer DoS attack, an attacker injects signicant amount of packets into
the network which causes congestion in the network trac as well as deprivation of power resources
154
Appendix B (Continued)
Table B.1 DoS attacks towards WSNs [140].
DoS attacks Meaning
Radio interferences Jamming of the radio transmission in the MAC or physical layer
Physical tampering An attacker captures and compromises the sensor nodes
Denying channel An attacker uses collision to damage the wireless channel and causes packets
to be dropped
Black holes A malicious node in the route sinks and drops messages that are routed
through them
Misdirection An attacker uses loop or detour to misdirect trac
Flooding A malicious node oods lots of messages to cause congestion and energy
exhaustion
Anti-synchronization An attacker forges timing control messages to disrupt the synchronization
between two nodes
Critical attack An attacker learns the critical resources such as cluster heads and attacks
them.
throughout the network. Examples: \Routing table overow attack: Creation of the routes to
the non-existing nodes", \sleep deprivation attack: deprivation of the power supplies of a targeted
node" [139].
Application layer protocols can also be exploited in DoS attacks. Protocols like node localization,
time synchronization, data aggregation, association and fusion can be cheated or hindered. For
example, a malicious node that impersonates a beacon node and gives false location information or
cheats with regard to its transmission power, i.e. transmitting with less or more power than it is
supposed to do, may hamper the node localization scheme. Since these kinds of attack diminish the
related network service, they can also be categorized as DoS attacks.
All the possible DoS attacks against WSNs are summarized in Table B.1.
B.1.2.2 Attacks Towards Physical Layer
Jamming: It is a DoS attack at the physical layer. A malicious device can jam a signal by
transmitting in the same frequency. The jamming signal contributes to the noise in the carrier
and its strength is enough to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio below the level that the nodes using
that channel need to receive data correctly. Jamming can be conducted continuously in a region,
which thwarts all the nodes in that region from communication. Alternatively, jamming can be done
temporarily with random time intervals, which can still very eectively hamper the transmissions.
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Node Capture Attack: An adversary takes over the control of the sensor node by a physical attack,
e.g. attaching cables to its circuit board and reading stored data as well as ongoing transmission in
the WSN. Two problems arise in this case:
 Captured node can make arbitrary queries on behalf of the attacker (DoS attack against
availability).
 Captured node can provide false data to the legitimate users (attack against integrity).
B.1.2.3 Attacks Towards Data Link (MAC) Layer
Sleep Deprivation Torture (Denial of sleep): Preventing a node from going to sleep leading
to energy depletion from draining the battery. This can be from collision attacks or repeated
handshaking (RTS/CTS). In this attack, a node is forced to deplete whole energy stored in its
batteries [141].
B.1.2.4 Attacks Towards Network Layer
HELLO Flooding Attack: Attacker (has longer transmission range than normal nodes) broadcasts
advertisement messages to whole network and convinces other nodes that it is located in their
neighborhood.
Routing protocols broadcast \HELLO" message to inform of their presence to one-hop neighbors.
A node receiving such a packet assumes that it is within the radio range of the sender which may
not be true during this attack. A malicious node may ood \HELLO" packets with high enough
transmission power to convince every node in the network that it is their neighbor. When the other
nodes send their packets to the malicious node, those packets are not received by any node.
Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce themselves to their
neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet may assume that it is within (normal) radio range
of the sender. This assumption may be false: a laptop-class attacker broadcasting routing or other
information with large enough transmission power could convince every node in the network that
the adversary is its neighbor.
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\Flooding" is usually used to denote the epidemic-like propagation of a message to every node
in the network over a multi-hop topology. In contrast, despite its name, the HELLO ood attack
uses a single hop broadcast to transmit a message to a large number of receivers [133].
Hole Attacks
 Blackhole Attack: A malicious node may drop all the packets that it receives for forward-
ing. This attack is especially eective when the black hole node is also a sink hole. Such
an attack combination may stop all the data trac around the black hole. In some texts,
this attack is also referred as \Selshness".
 Sinkhole Attack: All the trac of the network is directed to a single node but in this
case it does not drop any packets. By this way, expects to remain un-detected by the
IDS. Since the all trac of the network passes through this particular node which literally
\sinks" all the data it receives, the name is given to this attack.
A malicious node can advertise by broadcasting to all the neighbor nodes that it is the
best next hop for sending the packets to its destination. When a node becomes a sink
hole, it becomes the hub for its vicinity and starts receiving all the packets which are
dropped.
A malicious node can be made very attractive to the surrounding nodes with respect
to the routing algorithm. For example, very attractive routing advertisements can be
broadcast and all the neighboring nodes can be convinced that the malicious node is the
best next hop for sending the packets to the base station. When a node becomes a sink
hole, it becomes the hub for its vicinity and starts receiving all the packets going to the
base station. This creates many opportunities for follow-on attacks.
 Wormhole Attack: A tunnel (out of the band fast transmission path) is created between
two nodes that can be utilized to transmit packets in a faster way. This way, two far parts
of the network advertised as neighbors to attract the surrounding trac.
A malicious node can eavesdrop or receive data packets at a point and transfer them
to another malicious node, which is at another part of the network, through an out-
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of-band channel. The second malicious node then replays the packets. This makes all
the nodes that can hear the transmissions by the second malicious node believe that the
node that sent the packets to the rst malicious node is their single-hop neighbor and
they are receiving the packets directly from it. The packets that follow the normal route
reach destination node, later than those conveyed through the wormhole and are therefore
dropped because they do more hops - wormholes are typically established through faster
channels. Wormholes are very dicult to detect and can impact on the performance of
many network services such as time synchronization, localization and data fusion.
Node Replication Attack: An attacker intentionally puts replicas of a compromised node in many
places in the network to incur inconsistency. Like the Sybil attack, the node replication attack also
can enable attackers to subvert data aggregation, misbehavior detection, and voting protocols by
injecting false data or suppressing legitimate data [142].
Routing Attacks
 Network Partitioning: A full connected network is portioned to sub-networks in which
the nodes in dierent sub-networks cannot communicate each other although they are
connected.
 Routing Loop: A routing loop is introduced in a route path. It is created by spoong
routing updates. Suppose an adversary can determine that node A and node B are within
radio range of each other. An adversary can send a forged routing update to node B with
a spoofed source address indicating it came from node A. Node B will then mark node
A as its parent and rebroadcast the routing update. Node A will then hear the routing
update from node B and mark B as its parent. Messages sent to either A or B will be
forever forwarded in a loop between the two of them. This leads to energy depletion and
eventual node/network failure [133].
 Spoofed, Altered or Replayed Routing Information: Routing information exchanged among
nodes can be altered by malicious nodes to have a detrimental eect on the routing scheme.
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Selective Forwarding Attack: It is a special kind of black hole attack, in which malicious node
acts more cleverly and does not drop every packet it receives but the ones it selects. By this way,
attacker expects to remain un-detected by the IDS.
Similar to sinkhole attacks, a malicious node subverts the routing protocol by making itself part
of many routes but instead of dropping of all packets selectively drop some packets while forwarding
others in order to avoid detection.
Forwarding packets is a major responsibility of a routing node. However, a malicious node
intentionally may drop any packet and forward other ones.
Multi-hop networks are often based on the assumption that participating nodes will faithfully
forward the messages they received. In a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes may refuse to
forward certain messages and simply drop them, ensuring that they are not propagated any further.
A simple form of this attack is when a malicious node behaves like a black hole and refuses to
forward every packet it receives. However, such an attacker has the following risk: Neighboring nodes
will conclude that it has failed and they may decide to seek another route. A more subtle form of
this attack is when an adversary selectively forwards packets. An adversary interested in suppressing
or modifying packets originating from a select few nodes can reliably forward the remaining trac
and limit suspicion of her wrongdoing.
Sybil Attack: A single node presents multiple identities to other nodes of the network. This
causes confusion in the network; nodes receive contradicting routing paths that are passing through
the attacker. This reduces the eectiveness of fault-tolerance schemes and poses a signicant threat
to geographic routing protocols. Apart from these services it may also aect the performance of
other schemes such as misbehavior detection, voting-based algorithms, data aggregation and fusion
and distributed storage.
B.1.2.5 Attacks Towards Transport Layer
Synchronization Flooding: An attacker sends multiple connection requests without ever complet-
ing the connection, thus overwhelming the buer.
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B.1.2.6 Attacks Towards Application Layer
Sensor Overwhelming: Attacking or altering sensitivity of the sensor measurements. Target
sensors with spurious interference or completely overwhelm and inundate with false stimuli.
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C.1 Solutions to Defend Against Various Attacks Towards the WSNs
Routing protocols can be designed such that an adversary cannot compromise nodes/messages
or make the routing scheme dysfunction. This is the most eective approach with respect to the cost
of the security scheme and eectiveness in defense of WSNs against the threats. Therefore, most of
the techniques fall into this category. Preventive approaches are designed to counter known threats
and may not be eective against new threats. Detection schemes for misbehaving or malfunctioning
nodes can be designed in a more generic fashion. On the other hand, they can be more costly than
preventive approaches. Finally, routing can be designed such that it still delivers the data packets
to the destination when there is an attack. Such resilient techniques are also costly.
Following subsections provide solutions (strategies and techniques) to defend against various
attacks towards the WSNs:
C.1.1 Solutions to Defend Against DoS Attacks
In [143], authors propose a cross-layer security mechanism, namely \Swarm Intelligence", to
detect DoS attacks. They also provide countermeasures to mitigate this kind of attack.
In Table C.1, some of the solutions to defend WSNs against DoS attacks are summarized.
C.1.2 Solutions to Defend Against HELLO Flooding Attacks
One possible solution to this problem is provided in [133]: Force every node to authenticate each
of its neighbors with an identity verication protocol using a trusted base station. If the protocol
sends messages in both directions over the link between the nodes, HELLO oods are prevented when
the adversary only has a powerful transmitter because the protocol veries the bi-directionality of
the link.
C.1.3 Solutions to Defend Against Node Replication Attack
Conventional methods to detect a node replication attack usually include centralized computing
based on node locations or the number of simultaneous connections, which is vulnerable to the
single-point failure. Distributed detection of the node replication attack was proposed in [142],
where each node is assumed to know its location, and it is required to send its location to a set of
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Table C.1 Solutions to defend WSNs against DoS attacks [13].
DoS attack Defense strategy
Radio interference Usage of spread-spectrum communication
Physical tampering Usage of tamper-resistant nodes
Denying channel Usage of error correction codes
Black holes Usage of multiple routing paths
Misdirection Usage of source authorization
Flooding Limiting the total number of connections
witness nodes. If a witness node nds a contradiction in the location claims of a suspected node
identity, this suspected node identity must be replicated many times. Asymmetric key technology is
used here to guarantee the authenticity of location claims. A similar approach is discussed in [144]:
Each node has a private key corresponding to its location, and the location based key can be used
to detect node replicas.
C.1.4 Solutions to Defend Against Passive Information Gathering (Eavesdropping)
Attacks
Link layer encryption would prevent outsider attacks such as eavesdropping, and some of the
solutions are provided in [133, 145{147].
C.1.5 Solutions to Defend Against Selective Forwarding attacks
There are two approaches to defending against selective forwarding:
 Detecting the nodes that selectively forwarding.
 Developing routing schemes that are more resilient and can deliver packets even when
there is a selective forwarding attack.
One approach to detecting the nodes that selectively forward is based on acknowledgements [148].
Every intermediate node that forwards a packet waits for an acknowledgement from the next hop. If
the next hop node does not return the same number of acknowledgements as the number of packets
sent, the node generates an alarm about the next hop node. However, compromised nodes can also
generate acknowledgements for the packets that they dropped, which make this scheme fail.
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Multipath routing can be an eective way to mitigate selective forwarding and black hole attacks
[133]. This requires at least link-disjoint paths, where two paths may share some nodes but no link.
Of course, node-disjoint paths, where two paths do not have any node in common, are better and
reduce the risk of selective forwarding attack compared to link-disjoint paths. However, disjoint
paths are not always available, and when paths are not disjoint, if the selectively forwarding node is
the node common to all the paths, then the attack can become as eective as in single-path routing.
Braided paths [149] may have nodes in common, but have no links in common (i.e., no two con-
secutive nodes in common). The use of multiple braided paths may provide probabilistic protection
against selective forwarding and use only localized information.
In [130], authors describe an ecient scheme for reporting packet drops. They also present
an eective scheme, namely \Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test", for detecting the selective
forwarding attack in a heterogeneous sensor network. According to presented simulation results,
proposed scheme achieves high detection ratio and low false alarm rate.
Wang et al. [150] proposed a failure detection framework to detect the selective forwarding attack.
The observation is that for a routing node, the number of packets it forwards must be equal to the
number of packets it receives. In their framework, each sensor node can work under a promiscuous
mode so that it can overhear the transmission of neighboring nodes. If a neighbor of a suspected
node nds that the number of packets that the suspected node fails to forward exceeds a certain
threshold, the neighbor can collaborate with other neighbors of the suspected node, and the opinions
from the neighbors of the suspected node are collected to form a decision about the suspected node.
C.1.6 Solutions to Defend Against Sinkhole Attacks
An algorithm which detects sinkhole attacks is presented in [118]. Proposed algorithm rst nds
a list of suspected nodes, and then eectively identies the intruder in the list through a network
ow graph.
C.1.7 Solutions to Defend Against Sybil Attack
To detect the Sybil attack, two methods were discussed in [151]. One method is radio resource
testing in which each node assigns a unique channel to each of its neighbors, including fake neighbors,
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and tests whether its neighbors can communicate with it through the assigned channels. Because
the radio of a sensor platform is usually incapable of simultaneously sending or receiving on more
than one channel, the failure of communication through one channel may be a sign of the Sybil
attack. The other method is to use the ID-based symmetric keys. For example, each sensor node
is preloaded with a set of keys that are selected from a global key pool by its node ID. The ID of
a suspected node is challenged by a set of validating nodes based on the keys shared between the
suspected node and the validating nodes. Several other methods were suggested in [151], including
registration, position verication, and code attestation.
To defend against Sybil attacks, the identities of every node should be veried. This can be
done either directly or indirectly. In direct validation a node directly veries whether the identity
of a neighboring node is valid. For example, a node may assign each of its neighbors a separate
channel to communicate and ask them to transmit during a period. Then it checks these channels
in a random order within that period. If a node is transmitting in its assigned channel, the node is
a physical node. If no transmission is detected on a channel, it indicates that the node assigned to
that channel may not be a physical node [151].
In indirect validation another trusted node provides the verication for the identity of the node.
For example, every node may share a unique key with the base station. When two nodes need to
establish a link between them, they verify each other's identity through the base station by using
these keys [133]. At the same time they can be assigned a session key. Nodes can also be allowed
to establish links with a limited number of neighboring nodes. Thus, compromised nodes can only
communicate with a limited number of veried neighboring nodes, which also limits the impact of
Sybil attacks.
Moreover, ID-based public keys [144] also can defeat the Sybil attack because both the ID and
location information were taken into the generation of key material during the initialization phase,
hence multiple identities need multiple keys, and this is impossible for a malicious node to achieve.
C.1.8 Solutions to Defend Against Wormhole Attacks
Wormholes are dicult to detect because an adversary passes the packets to a distant point from
the point at which they are received by using a single hop out-of-band channel. This channel cannot
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be listened to by the network. Moreover, the real copy of the packet reaches the point that receives
the replayed copy later than the replayed copy. Therefore, the replayed copy is fresher than the real
copy.
Detection mechanisms against wormhole attacks can be based on temporal and spatial analysis
of the packets. To detect the Wormhole attack, Hu et al. proposed to use packet leashes [137],
where location or timing information is embedded in packets, to limit the maximum range over
which packets can be tunneled. They require that each node either knows its location or has a
tightly synchronized clock so that this information can be used to calculate the maximum distance
that a relayed packet could travel.
Directional antennas [152] were also used to defend against the Wormhole attack, where some
direction information is used to detect the replayed packets. However, these defenses target ad
hoc networks and require expensive hardware devices, which may be infeasible for most resource
constrained sensor networks.
Wang and Bhargava [153] proposed to use centralized computing to detect theWormhole attack in
sensor networks, in which a controller collects the location information for all nodes to reconstruct the
network topology such that any topological distortion can be visualized. However, the visualization
approach incurs too much communication overhead, especially when malicious nodes move around in
the entire network because each location change of the Wormhole triggers a new round of execution
of the topology reconstruction algorithm. Location-based keys [144] also can eectively address the
Wormhole attack because each packet is authenticated by the location-based key.
C.1.9 Summary of the Solutions
Table C.2 summarizes the attacks and proposed solutions related to corresponding attacks.
Among those sinkhole attacks and wormholes pose signicant challenges to secure routing pro-
tocol design, and it is unlikely there exists eective countermeasures against these attacks that can
be applied after the design of a protocol has completed. It is crucial to design routing protocols
in which these attacks are meaningless or ineective. Geographic routing protocols are one class of
protocols that holds promise.
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Table C.2 Attacks and proposed solutions to defend (detect or prevent) against those attacks.
Attack type Proposed Solutions for Detection Proposed Solutions for Preven-
tion
Eavesdropping N/A Link-layer encoding [2, 133, 145{147]
DoS Swarm intelligence [143] Usage of spread-spectrum communi-
cation [13]
Selective for-
warding
Acknowledgement monitoring [148], Re-
porting packet drops [130], Failure detec-
tion framework [150]
Multi-path routing [149]
Sybil Radio resource testing and ID-based sym-
metric keys [151]
Identity verication [151], ID-based
public keys [144]
Node Replica-
tion
Distributed detection [142] ID-based public keys [144]
Wormhole Packet Leashes [137], directional antennas
[152]
Location-based keys [144], centralized
computing [153]
Sink hole [118] N/A
HELLO ood-
ing
N/A Identity verication protocol [133]
An ultimate limitation of building a multi-hop routing topology around a xed set of base
stations is that those nodes within one or two hops of the base stations are particularly attractive
for compromise. After a signicant number of these nodes have been compromised, all is lost. This
indicates that clustering protocols like LEACH [17] where cluster-heads communicate directly with
a base station may ultimately yield the most secure solutions against node compromise and insider
attacks.
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D.1 Author's Other Contributions
During his Ph.D. study, the author (_Ismail Butun) has contributed to the literature on variety
of topics which would not be included in this dissertation. Here is a short list of these contributions:
1. Telecommunications and Networking Author has many contributions in the eld of telecom-
munications and networking:
 Worked on \Cooperative MAC protocols for Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks". The
research was published in [154].
 Worked on \Queuing Theory" and evaluated the \Quick Start" algorithm for
low-latency networks. The research was published in [155].
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